Connolly v. Louisiana Highway Commission

• Decision Date: 27 March 1933
• Docket Number: 31514
• Citation: 177 La. 78,147 So. 505
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNOLLY et al. v. LOUISIANA HIGHWAY COMMISSION

147 So. 505

177 La. 78

CONNOLLY et al. v. LOUISIANA HIGHWAY COMMISSION

No. 31514

Supreme Court of Louisiana

March 27, 1933

Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier J. T. McInnis, Judge.

Suit by Joseph Connolly and others against the Louisiana Highway Commission. From a judgment of dismissal after sustaining defendant's exceptions of no right or cause of action plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment avoided, exception overruled, and case remanded.

Melvin F. Johnson and Murff & Perkins, all of Shreveport, for appellants.

Lewis L. Morgan and A. D. Cain, Jr., both of New Orleans, and D. M Ellison, of Baton Rouge, for appellee.

OPINION

BRUNOT, Justice.

This is a suit for the alleged value of certain growing crops of cotton and corn on 500 acres of land owned by the plaintiffs and situated north of United States Highway No. 80, in Bossier parish, La. The petition alleges that the regrading, building, and paving of the highway was done under the supervision and control of the defendant; that in constructing the paved highway the defendant removed the adequate bridges spanning the streams which were the natural drains that carried off the water from plaintiffs' lands, filled the drains with a dirt roadbed, and substituted for the adequate bridges small culverts that blocked the natural flow of the water from plaintiffs' lands to an extent which overflowed said lands and completely destroyed the growing crops thereon.

The defendant excepted to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae, on the ground that the domicile of the highway commission is in the parish of East Baton Rouge. This exception was overruled. Thereupon the defendant excepted to the petition as not disclosing a right or cause of action. This exception was heard, maintained, and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed at their cost. The appeal is from that judgment. The defendant has made no appearance in this court and has filed no brief herein. Therefore we need not consider the ruling of the court on the defendant's exception to its jurisdiction.

The appellants contend that they have been damaged by the direct acts of the highway commission and that agencies of the state are not immune from liability for damages resulting from its acts of commission, and in support of their contention they cite the following cases: DeMoss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700, 68 A. L. R. 336; Booth v. Louisiana Highway Commission et al., 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169, 170.

The trial judge held that the decisions in the cited cases were based upon exceptional facts. To some extent that is true, but the underlying principle on which these decisions rest is stated in the Booth Case, wherein this court said, after quoting with approval the following:

"'The levee boards of the state are state agencies in the same sense that police juries are, and when a police jury takes or damages private property for public purposes the parish represented by such police jury should be held liable therefor as has been the rule with respect to the levee boards, since such boards have been required to pay for property taken or damaged for public purposes.'

"The same rule must be applied also tothe Louisiana Highway Commission."

In the case of Nagle v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425, 427, December 22, 1932, this court held the defendant liable in damages for diverting excess water upon plaintiff's land, and for permitting a fire its employees had ignited to spread and injure plaintiff's trees and shrubbery. The court said:

"Defendant is unquestionably liable for the land actually appropriated by it for public use along the right of way, and also for the land, occupied by the ditch, constructed by defendant in plaintiff's field for like use. Booth v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169. Defendant, however, urges that it is not liable for the damage that may have been caused to the adjoining land by the overflowing of the ditch, nor for the damage caused by setting the debris afire to dispose of it. It urges that it is not liable, being an agency of the state, for the torts or acts of omission or negligence of its officers, agents, or employees,...