O'CONNOR v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
Decision Date | 03 February 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 1:93-CV-0476.,1:93-CV-0476. |
Citation | 846 F. Supp. 39 |
Parties | Robert O'CONNOR, Plaintiff, v. The AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD CONNECTICUT and Aetna Life and Casualty, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Kip Glasscock, Moore Landrey Garth Jones Burmeister & Hulett, Beaumont, TX, for plaintiff.
Stephen P. Pate, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, for defendants.
Plaintiff Robert O'Connor has filed his Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Motion to Remand. The Court having considered the briefs, arguments of parties and applicable law is of the opinion that the motions should be DENIED for the following reasons.
Robert O'Connor (O'Connor) sued the Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford Connecticut (AICHC) and Aetna Life & Casualty (Aetna) in Texas state court. O'Connor alleged that the defendants' failure to pay insurance proceeds gave rise to various causes of action including breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty. The petition further alleged that O'Connor purchased the policy through the defendants' agent, Mayer Insurance Agency, Inc. (Mayer). However, O'Connor failed to name Mayer as a defendant in the state court pleading.
On September 27, 1993, AICHC and Aetna removed to this court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. On November 17, 1993 O'Connor requested leave to amend his complaint to add Mayer as a defendant, urging that "negligent acts and/or omissions as well as the negligent representations and/or misrepresentations of the MAYER INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., were, in whole or in part, a producing cause of the property damages made the basis of Plaintiff's suit."1 O'Connor contemporaneously moved to remand because the amendment, if allowed, would destroy diversity. AICHC and Aetna challenge both motions and request the Court to exercise its discretion and deny leave to amend.
This situation is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) which provides:
If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).
By enacting this section, Congress has given the Court two options: Either deny the joinder, or grant it and remand the case. David D. Siegel, Comment on 1988 Revision to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (West Supp.1993). The ruling is discretionary, and it must take into account the original defendants' interest in their choice of forum. See Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987).2
Hensgens outlines several factors which guide the district court's decision. Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182. The court should consider first, whether the primary purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal jurisdiction. Next, whether the plaintiff has been diligent in requesting the amendment. Third, whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced if the amendment is denied. Finally, "any other factors bearing on the equities" are taken into account. Id. On balance, these factors determine whether the amendment should be allowed.
In the present case, the facts counsel against allowing joinder. In the first place, it appears to the Court that the amendment is requested primarily for the purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction. After all, as AICHC and Aetna forcefully argue, the state court petition refers to Mayer as the agency which sold the policy. The Court views this fact with much suspicion — since O'Connor knew about Mayer's role, yet failed to sue that party in state court. For the same reason, the Court finds that O'Connor has not been diligent in requesting the amendment. O'Connor easily could have named Mayer ab initio. Third, the Court finds O'Connor will not suffer any serious prejudice if the amendment is denied. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that AICHC and Aetna would be unable to satisfy a future judgment. Nor does O'Connor urge that Mayer is the sole cause of his injury. Importantly, O'Connor also faces legal obstacles to recovering against Mayer. See, e.g., Arzehgar v. Dixon, 150 F.R.D. 92 (S.D.Tex.1993) ( ), Haines v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 812 F.Supp. 93 (S.D.Tex.1993) ( ).3 Finally, the present record reveals no additional equities in favor of either party. Having considered the above facts and law, the Court concludes that the Hensgens factors militate against adding Mayer as defendant. Therefore, the motion for leave to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Estate of Tungpalan v. Crown Equip. Corp.
...the original defendant's interest in choosing a federal forum. Wells, 950 F. Supp. at 201 (citing O'Connor v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn., 846 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Tex. 1994)). "The general impetus for applying § 1447(e) is for the trial court to use its discretion and determine if al......
-
King v. Jim Jarrett, Greg Phillips, Tex. Gas Service/One Gas, Inc.
...was the entity responsible for his employment, discipline, and alleged constructive termination. See O'Connor v. Auto Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn, 846 F.Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (failure to plead viable claims against the non-diverse defendant weighs against allowing proposed amendment)......
-
Cinco Bayous, LLC v. Samson Expl., LLC
...after removal is viewed with "much suspicion" and suggests an effort to frustrate diversity jurisdiction. O'Connor v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 846 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Tex. 1994); see LJH, Ltd., 2016 WL 69912, at *2 (citing Tomlinson v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-0617, 2006 WL 1331541,......
-
Anzures v. Prologis Tex. I LLC, EP–11–CV–395–KC.
...Roofing is suspicious, and appears to be purely for the purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction. See O'Connor v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn., 846 F.Supp. 39, 41 (E.D.Tex.1994) (“The Court views this fact with much suspicion—since [the plaintiff] knew about [the potential defendant'......