O'Connor v. Cook County Officers Electoral Bd.
Decision Date | 21 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 1-96-0717,1-96-0717 |
Citation | 281 Ill.App.3d 1108,667 N.E.2d 672,217 Ill.Dec. 583 |
Parties | , 217 Ill.Dec. 583 Eileen O'CONNOR, Petitioner-Objector-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD, and its members, David Orr (by his designee, Daniel Madden), Jack M. O'Malley (by his designee, Donald Mizerk), and Aurelia Pucinski (by her designee, Ralph Schroeder); James Patrick Sheehan, Candidate; David D. Orr, in his official capacity as County Clerk of Cook County; The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, Illinois and its member commissioners, Michael Hamblett, Arnette Hubbard, and Richard A. Cowen, in their official capacities, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Attorney David L. Clark, Chicago, for Appellant.
Michael E. Lavelle, Lavelle, Juneau & McCollom, Ltd., Oak Park, for Appellee Sheehan.
In this appeal, we are asked to interpret various provisions of the Election Code as they pertain to the nominating petitions filed on behalf of a candidate seeking nomination in the primary election held on March 19, 1996. The specific challenge to the petitions concerns the propriety of the circulators' verification that they were registered voters during the time the petitions were circulated. The circuit court ruled that the candidate's petitions complied with the Election Code. We affirm.
Petitioner-objector, Eileen O'Connor, challenged the nominating petitions filed by respondent, James Patrick Sheehan, for the office of commissioner of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago. O'Connor claimed that the petitions failed to comply with the statutory requirements of section 7-10 of the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1994). The Cook County Officers Electoral Board denied O'Connor's claim, and O'Connor sought administrative review in the circuit court.
O'Connor argued in the circuit court that Sheehan's name must be stricken from the ballot because Sheehan's nominating petitions did not contain a "circulator's oath" required by section 7-10 of the Election Code. According to O'Connor, the Code mandated that the circulators affirm that they were registered voters of the political division at all times during the circulation of the petitions. Sheehan, on the other hand, pointed out that a verbatim transcription is not required under section 7-10 and that he has complied with all statutory requirements. Sheehan's petitions contained the following affidavit, sworn by each circulator:
"STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) ) §§ COUNTY OF COOK ) ___________________________________ (Signature of Circulator) ___________________________________ (Signature of Notary Public) (seal of stamp) My Commission Expires: ____________________" ----------
The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision, ruling that Sheehan's petitions fulfilled the statutory requirements.
O'Connor then sought an accelerated review of the circuit court's judgment in this court. Due to the expedited nature of this appeal, we entered an order, without opinion, on March 15, 1996, affirming the circuit court's decision. We now set forth our reasons in detail.
Analysis
Generally, a reviewing court must view an administrative agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact as prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1994); City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board 135 Ill.2d 499, 507, 143 Ill.Dec. 220, 554 N.E.2d 155 (1990). A court may reverse the agency's factual findings only if it is clearly evident that the agency should have reached the opposite conclusion. Freeport, 135 Ill.2d at 507, 143 Ill.Dec. 220, 554 N.E.2d 155. If the question involved is one of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, the agency's finding receives deference, but the court is not bound by it. Freeport, 135 Ill.2d at 507, 143 Ill.Dec. 220, 554 N.E.2d 155.
The statute then sets forth what information must be included in the contents of the petition. With regard to the circulator's statement, the statute provides that "[a]t the bottom of each sheet of such petition shall be added a statement signed by a registered voter of the political division, who has been a registered voter at all times he or she circulated the petition for which the candidate is seeking a nomination, * * *." 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1994). The circulator's statement must "state" certain facts about the circulator and must "certify" other facts relating to the circulation of the petition and the signatures upon it. 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1994).
The dispositive issue here is whether the form of the circulator's affidavit contained in section 7-10 is mandatory. We hold that it is not.
In interpreting statutes, this court must ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Pliakos v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission 11 Ill.2d 456, 143 N.E.2d 47 (1957). In so doing, we must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning; in other words, we may not declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports. Maloney v. Bower, 113 Ill.2d 473, 479, 101 Ill.Dec. 594, 498 N.E.2d 1102 (1986).
As noted, section 7-10 provides that no candidate's name shall be placed upon the primary ballot unless that candidate has filed a nominating petition "in substantially the following form * * *." 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1994) (Emphasis added). The word "substantially" is a relative term and must be interpreted in accordance with its context. Here, "substantially" means in the main, essentially, practically, nearly, almost or virtually. It does not mean identically or exactly alike, and thus does not connote a mandatory obligation as to the form of the affidavit.
If the legislature had intended to require that the nominating petition be in the exact form as set out in section 7-10, it would not have used the word "substantially." This court has the responsibility of interpreting a statute as written and cannot, by judicial fiat, usurp the role of the legislature. Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill.2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956). Accordingly, we simply may not ignore the import of the word "substantially."
Further support for this interpretation is found in the...
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