Connor v. State, 4444

Decision Date02 July 1975
Docket NumberNo. 4444,4444
PartiesRaymond Edgar CONNOR, Appellant (Defendant below), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

John W. Pattno of Pattno & Smith, Cheyenne, for appellant.

David B. Kennedy, Atty. Gen.; Jerome F. Statkus, Timothy J. Judson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Cheyenne; and Carl B. Lucas, Law Student, Wyoming Prosecution Assistance Program, Laramie, for appellee.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK and THOMAS, JJ.

GUTHRIE, Chief Justice.

Appellant herein was convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission of a burglary and of having been previously convicted of a felony, and was sentenced to a term of not less than fifteen nor more than thirty years for the crime of aiding and abetting, and was convicted of being an habitual criminal under § 6-10, W.S.1957, 1973 Cum.Supp., having been three times previously convicted of felonies before his conviction under the first count, and was sentenced to life imprisonment on this charge. It is from this judgment and sentence he has appealed.

No detailed factual summary is necessary to understand our disposal of this matter, but it does appear that the principal witness against defendant was Raymond Bernard Mora, Jr., a sixteen-year-old juvenile who accompanied defendant and Leroy Romo to Cheyenne from Longmont, Colorado, the evening of January 31, 1974, in defendant's automobile. After their arrival in Cheyenne defendant drove the others to a point near the business called 'The Supply Sergeant,' where he let them out, and defendant instructed Mora to go into the store with Romo and to follow his directions. After their entry had been made by breaking a window, and during the process of gathering up certain property and guns, Romo and Mora were arrested by police officers before leaving the building. Defendant was stopped by an officer while he was leaving the neighborhood and given a traffic citation but was not arrested because the officer was unaware of his involvement at that time. Later that evening defendant was arrested in a motel room in Cheyenne. Although there is much circumstantial corroboration, Mora was the witness upon whom the State relied for support of its case.

Defendant raises two claims of error, i. e., that he was denied the right to cross-examine the witness Mora in violation of Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution and of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and the admission by the court, in the trial upon the habitual criminal statute, of the exhibits discussed later in this opinion.

No separate discussion of the possible violation of the Wyoming Constitution will be made because defendant in his brief and argument relies solely on cases involving the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and confines his argument to that point.

In support of his first point appellant relies upon Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, for the general proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of the accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1079, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, Which correlates the right of confrontation with the right of effective cross-examination. These rulings are, of course, binding upon this court and we have no quarrel therewith. Defendant insists that by virtue of the holding in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, he was denied the right to effective cross-examination. This requires an examination of Davis. The principal thrust of that case is the holding that the confidentiality granted to a juvenile and to all proceedings involving him as a matter of State policy, as provided in the Juvenile Code, must yield to the right of effective cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment; and there was in that case a denial of effective cross-examination of constitutional magnitude under the evidentiary rule in Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624, which affords the defendant a right to develop all evidence on cross-examination which tends to show bias of the witness, particularly if immunity or promises have been made which might effect a bias. We do not glean from the opinion in Davis that it is intended to change or expand the usual rules of evidence except the requirement defendant be allowed to develop such evidence as might be necessary to show 'possible bias or prejudice,' which might be developed by reference to the juvenile court record, and we find comfort in the similar interpretation placed thereon by Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurrence in Davis v. Alaska, supra, 94 S.Ct. at 1112-1113.

We will, then, proceed to an examination of the record in this case. Defendant bases his contention upon the following which occurred during cross-examination of the witness Mora:

'Q. You were shaken up. Why were you shaken up? A. Well, because I had been arrested, and this was the first time something like this ever happened to me.

'Q. You have never been arrested before? A. Yes, I have.

'MR. CARROLL: Object to that as being irrelevant. The proper question, if this is for impeachment, would be has he been convicted of a felony.

'THE COURT: Well, I think the question has been answered to this extent and we will not pursue it any further, Mr. Pattno.'

This question and answer were proper as they would affect Mora's credibility directly insofar as his testimony might be construed as a statement that this was the first time he had ever been arrested. He demonstrably contradicted that statement or inference by his answer that he had been arrested before, and that closed the matter.

This was pursued no further by defendant. There was no suggestion that it was preliminary to an inquiry which might show bias, prejudice, or interest affecting his testimony. From this record we understand that the trial judge was ruling that he would not allow further impeachment by showing arrests and would confine such inquiries to felony convictions for that purpose, and the appellant raises no question of the propriety of this ruling. Upon this record we cannot reach the claimed error that the cross-examination was improperly restricted. In apparent anticipation of this appellant contends that Mora, not being a witness for defendant, could not or was not required to make an offer of proof. While there are many general statements that it is not necessary to make an offer of proof when evidence is excluded on cross-examination, a party cannot entirely avoid the application of one of the most important precepts of appellate procedure, which requires that no one can raise a question on appeal upon which the trial court has had no opportunity to rule or unless the question has been in some manner brought to the attention of the trial judge.

In State v. Ditzel, 77 Wyo. 242, 314 P.2d 832, this court held that a defendant could raise the issue of the exclusion of questions directed at the defendant without an offer of proof. This case is clearly distinguishable on its facts but notes the applicable rule. In Ditzel certain questions were propounded to defendant which this court considered admissible. No showing was made what answers defendant would...

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23 cases
  • Hannon v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • February 11, 2004
    ...Supreme Court, this Court has considered claims of denial of the right to confront witnesses on a number of occasions. In Connor v. State, 537 P.2d 715, 717 (Wyo.1975), we said "[t]he principal thrust of [Davis] is the holding that the confidentiality granted to a juvenile and to all procee......
  • Thompson v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • January 17, 2018
    ...under the habitual offender statute even though they are resolved at the same time. Keene, 812 P.2d at 151-52 (citing Connor v. State, 537 P.2d 715, 719 (Wyo. 1975) ). The requirement that the convictions be "separately brought" was satisfied because the offenses were "spatially and tempora......
  • Lindsey v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • September 16, 1986
    ...that the Davis v. Alaska holding is limited to the showing of bias or prejudice, Salaz v. State, Wyo., 561 P.2d 238 (1977); Connor v. State, Wyo., 537 P.2d 715 (1975), but bias and prejudice are the precise concerns involved in Koenig's The State's motion in limine should have been denied, ......
  • Hoskins v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • July 21, 1976
    ...of his instruction, brought to his attention before appeal to this court, so the question is properly raised on appeal. Connor v. State, Wyo.1975, 537 P.2d 715. Since that is the case, we cannot see how defendant was prejudiced by the absence of counsel, even if true that defendant was unre......
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