Connors v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 26 November 1910
• Docket Number: 2176
• Citation: Connors v. Pratt, 38 Utah 258, 112 P. 399 (Utah 1910)
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNORS v. PRATT, Warden of State Prison

112 P. 399

38 Utah 258

CONNORS v. PRATT, Warden of State Prison

No. 2176

Supreme Court of Utah

November 26, 1910

Original petition of habeas corpus by Frank Connors against Arthur Pratt, Warden of the State Prison, for the discharge of petitioner.

PETITIONER REMANDED TO CUSTODY.

Dale H Parke for plaintiff.

A. R BarnesAttorney-General, for defendant.

FRICK, J. McCARTY, J., concurs.STRAUP, C. J., concurring in the result.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

Frank Connors filed his petition in this court praying for a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground that he is illegally restrained of his liberty by Hon. Arthur Pratt, warden of the state prison of Utah.The writ was duly issued and the warden made return thereto, from which it is made to appear that said Connors is held by said warden under two commitments one issued out of the district court of Utah County, dated the 9th day of October, 1899, and the other issued out of the district court of Carbon County, dated the 14th day of October, 1902.The first commitment was issued upon a judgment whereby said Connors was convicted of murder in the first degree for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the state prison of Utah.The second commitment was based upon a conviction for burglary upon which he received a sentence of ten years in said prison.

At the hearing the plaintiff, through his counsel, conceded that he was legally held under the judgment convicting him of burglary, but contended that he was illegally held under the judgment convicting him of murder for the reason that the information upon which that judgment is based was signed and filed by the district attorney of the Fourth Judicial District pursuant to chapter 56, p. 77, Laws Utah 1899, which chapter, he contends, is of no force or effect for the reason that it was adopted contrary to certain provisions of the Constitution of this state.In view that the plaintiff concedes that he is not illegally restrained of his liberty by the warden upon one of the commitments aforesaid, the Attorney General suggested at the hearing that all that this court can do at this time is to remand the prisoner back into the custody of the warden.Upon the other hand, plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding the fact that he is rightfully held upon one commitment, he nevertheless has the right to have the legality of his first sentence determined by this court.

We are of the opinion that inasmuch, as the plaintiff concedes that the warden is not illegally restraining him of his liberty upon one of the commitments, we might well refuse at this time to examine into the legality of the other.Under our statute(section 1088,Comp. Laws 1907), we are, however, to "dispose of the prisoner as justice mad require."In this connection we remark that in section 1686x13 it is, in substance, provided that the board of pardons is authorized to extend to all convicts who are "sentenced for a period less than life, and who shall not have been guilty of a breach of the rules of discipline of the prison, a reduction of the period of sentence."By the section following the one just quoted from the maximum amount of reduction that the board of pardons may make is specified.Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the warden of the state prison is required to furnish to the board of pardons a certificate in which the reduction of time to which any convict may be entitled shall be stated, and, if there are no objections to the reduction being granted, the board of pardons orders the convict released from further imprisonment under the sentence.It seems that, while the statute fixes the maximum amount of time that a sentence may be reduced for good conduct, the board nevertheless must determine whether in a particular case such or some other deduction of time less than the maximum shall be allowed or not.As the plaintiff's sentences now stand, both of which are prima facie valid, he is under a life sentence as well as under one for a shorter period.If the sentence for life is valid, then plaintiff cannot insist upon a reduction of time, because upon a sentence of that character no reduction is legally permissible.If, however, the life sentence is invalid, as hereinafter pointed out, he may be entitled to a reduction upon the ten-year sentence.So long, however, as the life sentence, which is prima facie valid, is not declared to be invalid by some court of competent jurisdiction, that sentence always stands in plaintiff's way, in attempting to have the board of pardons allow him the statutory reduction on the ten-year sentence.This is so because it may be assumed that the board of pardons will not pass upon the legality of the life sentence since it has no power to do so, and, so long as that sentence is in effect, an application for a reduction of time by plaintiff upon the ten-year sentence would be useless.

In view of this anomalous situation, in so far as plaintiff is concerned, and in view of the fact that, although the life sentence may be void, the state may nevertheless prosecute the plaintiff for the crime of murder in case it be determined that he was tried for that crime in a court having no jurisdiction, it seems to us that justice requires that we at this time pass upon the legality of the first commitment so that in the event that it should be declared...