Connors v. Wilkinson
| Decision Date | 01 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. CV19-7704-00465,No. 19,CV19-7704-00465,19 |
| Citation | 34 Conn.Supp. 270,387 A.2d 568 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Common Pleas |
| Parties | Daniel CONNORS v. Anthony WILKINSON et al |
Leary & Fahey, Windsor Locks, for plaintiff.
King, Dubeau & Ryan, Rockville, for defendants.
The issue raised in the case at bar is whether the owner of a motor vehicle seized by the police incident to a lawful arrest is liable to a private wrecker service operator for towing and storage charges. The question is one of first impression in the state of Connecticut.
After a trial had on December 1, 1977, the facts of the case could be summarized as follows: On March 5, 1976, the plaintiff, a wrecker service operator, received a call from the state police asking him to go to the defendants' residence, to remove the named defendant's vehicle and to garage that vehicle until further notice. The named defendant, hereinafter the defendant, had been involved earlier in an automobile accident on a public highway located approximately one mile from his home. The defendant's vehicle was towed by the plaintiff to his garage where it was inspected and examined by the police. Evidence adduced from the examination led to the defendant's arrest on a criminal charge. Although no search or seizure warrant had been procured, the parties to this hearing have stipulated that the search and seizure were legal. It was further agreed that the defendant had never authorized or consented to the removal of his vehicle. In a separate proceeding the defendant's vehicle was released to him after a bond was posted.
The plaintiff, on March 25, 1976, instituted a small claims action against the defendant and his wife seeking $340 in damages for towing and service charges. The defendant and his wife concede that this sum is reasonable. The action was transferred on April 14, 1977, to the regular docket of the Court of Common Pleas and was subsequently heard on December 1, 1977.
The question of whether the owner of a motor vehicle seized from his garage by a private wrecker operator at the request of the police is obliged to pay for towing and storage charges is answered neither in the General Statutes nor in Connecticut case law. The plaintiff contends that his claim is authorized by General Statutes § 14-150(b). This court cannot agree with that contention.
Section 14-150(b), states, in pertinent part, that "any state police officer, upon discovery of any motor vehicle, whether situated within or without any highway of this state, which is a menace to traffic, shall take such motor vehicle into his custody and may cause the same to be taken to and stored in a suitable place." (Emphasis added.)
The defendant's vehicle was neither abandoned nor unregistered. Furthermore, the gravamen of § 14-150(b) is found in the clause "which is a menace to traffic." That clause limits the police power to remove only those vehicles which present "a menace to traffic." The uncontradicted evidence established that the defendant's vehicle was properly and safely garaged on his private property at the time the plaintiff seized it. It constituted no menace to traffic.
The plaintiff understandably argues that "the purpose of this statute seems to be to reimburse expenses to those who tow and store vehicles at the direction of the police." That is a conclusion with which this court cannot agree.
"We must construe and apply the statute as we find it, without reference to whether we think it would have been or could be improved by the inclusion of other provisions." Granniss v. Weber, 107 Conn. 622, 630, 141 A. 877, 879. Further, Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36, 38.
A reading of the statutes reveals that the legislature intended to discourage the imposition of towing and storage fees. The General Assembly, under General Statutes § 14-150(c), provided that an abandoned or unregistered vehicle not constituting a menace to traffic was to have affixed to it a notification sticker warning the owner that, unless the vehicle was removed within twenty-four hours, he could be liable for towing and storage. Neither § 14-150(b) nor § 14-150(c) is supportive of the plaintiff's claim.
In further support of his claim, the plaintiff cites the decision of Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.Civ.App.). The facts of that case are easily distinguishable from those of the present case. In Bray, the police, after hot pursuit, arrested the defendant for drunk driving. At the conclusion of the chase the defendant's vehicle was mired in the surf of a public beach. A wrecker service was dispatched to remove the vehicle and to garage it.
In a trial contesting the legality of the towing and storage charges, the Texas court found, not surprisingly, in favor of the wrecker service. The court made reference (p. 818) to article 6701d, § 94, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., wherein an arresting officer is empowered "to remove a vehicle from the scene of the arrest when the driver must be taken before a magistrate." The Texas court found (pp. 818-19) that ...
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Halloran v. Spillane's Servicenter, Inc.
...not warrant a finding that an implied or quasi contract existed that would support a lien to secure payment. In Connors v. Wilkinson, 34 Conn.Sup. 270, 274, 387 A.2d 568 (1978), a case involving some of the same principles as the present one in a different factual context, the court, citing......