Conrad v. State

• Decision Date: 17 September 1892
• Citation: 132 Ind. 254,31 N.E. 805
• Parties: Conrad v. State.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

132 Ind. 254

31 N.E. 805

Conrad

v.State.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 17, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Jasper county; E. P. Hammond, Judge.

Joseph Conrad was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

S. P. Thompson, for appellant. John T. Brown, for appellee.

OLDS, J.

The appellant, Joseph Conrad, was jointly indicted with one Sherman Cooper for larceny, and was tried and convicted. The questions presented arise upon the ruling of the court in overruling the motion for new trial, and relate to the sufficiency of the evidence and the giving and refusal to give instructions. No good can be accomplished by a discussion of the evidence. The evidence of the witnesses was conflicting, and there was impeaching evidence as to the character of several witnesses, but there was sufficient evidence tending to establish the guilt of the appellant to support the verdict of guilty. The defendant sought to establish an alibi, and upon this subject the defendant requested the court to give the following instruction: “(4) If the jury, taking into consideration all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was at the house of James Comer on the night of May 11, 1891, the night said Comer claims the meat was taken, the jury should find him not guilty.” The court refused to give the instruction, and counsel for the appellant claims that it is applicable to the evidence, and should have been given, and that the court gave no instruction covering the same point.

In instruction No. 5, given by the court, the jury is instructed that “an alibi is a legitimate and proper defense in a criminal action, and is to be judged by the jury, as any other defense, by the evidence, and, if the evidence thereof raises reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt in the mind of any juror, such juror should not vote to convict the defendant.” The instruction given by the court, we think, covers the proposition contained in the instruction refused, and more properly expresses the law. Indeed, we do not wish to be understood as holding that the instruction refused should have been given, even if the court had not given instruction No. 5; for the instruction requested states that the defendant should not be found guilty if he was not at the house of Comer on the night of a certain date, the time when Comer claims the meat was taken. To make proof of his absence a good defense, it must have raised a reasonable doubt as to his presence at the premises on the night the larceny was in fact committed, and not relate to a time when some witness, although it be the prosecuting witness, claimed the property was taken. A juror may have a reasonable doubt as to whether a larceny was committed on a particular date testified to by the witnesses, and yet have no doubt as to the fact that the defendant did actually commit the larceny. The data is only material as showing it to have been committed within the time for which there may be a conviction. It is a matter about which there is much more liability to be mistaken than there is in regard to the fact that goods were taken; but it is not necessary to determine whether the instruction requested correctly stated the law or not, for, as we construe it, the instruction given correctly stated the law relating to the alibi sought to be proven. It is contended that the word “ alibi” is technical, and its meaning was probably not grasped by the jury. We think this is no valid reason for the giving of the instruction refused. The word is clearly defined in the dictionaries, and has been in common use in connection with the criminal law for ages, and certainly a juror sitting in a criminal case, in which an alibi was sought to be proven as one of the principal defenses, would fully grasp and comprehend the meaning of the word when used by the court in an instruction. The court gave instruction No. 6, requested by counsel for the appellant, relating to circumstantial evidence, and then, on its own motion, gave instruction No. 3, relating to the same subject, and objection is made to some parts of instruction No. 3. We have examined this instruction, and do not regard it as...