Conroy v. Idlibi

• Decision Date: 04 May 2021
• Docket Number: AC 42416
• Citation: 254 A.3d 300,204 Conn.App. 265
• Parties: Katie N. CONROY v. Ammar A. IDLIBI
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

204 Conn.App. 265

254 A.3d 300

Katie N. CONROY

v.Ammar A. IDLIBI

AC 42416

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 21, 2020

Officially released May 4, 2021

Ammar A. Idlibi, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Lavine, Alexander and Flynn, Js.^*

LAVINE, J.

The self-represented defendant, Ammar A. Idlibi, returns to this court in his continuing effort to reverse the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Katie N. Conroy. In the present appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court, Connors, J. , abused its discretion (1) by denying his motion to open based on fraud (motion to open) and (2) by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A brief review of the procedural history of the present case provides context for the defendant's claims. The plaintiff commenced an action for dissolution of marriage on May 26, 2015,² and a trial was conducted in May, 2016. The dissolution court, Carbonneau, J. , issued a memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and issuing certain orders on August 15, 2016.³

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of dissolution, claiming that the dissolution court had "erred (1) by finding that neither party bore greater responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage and (2) in making financial awards that were favorable to the plaintiff." Conroy v. Idlibi , 183 Conn. App. 460, 461, 193 A.3d 663, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 921, 194 A.3d 289 (2018). This court affirmed the judgment;⁴ id. ; and our Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certification to appeal. Conroy v. Idlibi , 330 Conn. 921, 194 A.3d 289 (2018). The parties have filed multiple postdissolution motions in the trial court, including motions to modify alimony filed by the defendant.⁵ See Wasson v. Wasson , 91 Conn. App. 149, 151 n.1, 881 A.2d 356 (appellate courts like trial court may take judicial notice of Superior Court files in same or other cases), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 932, 890 A.2d 574 (2005). On October 29, 2018, the defendant, representing himself, filed the motion to open at issue in the present appeal. The substance of the motion to open is the defendant's claim that the plaintiff had committed a fraud upon the dissolution court because she was not truthful about the nature of her extramarital relationship and her allegations of physical abuse by the defendant. Following a hearing held on December 10, 2018, Judge Connors denied the motion to open. The defendant appealed.

The following facts as found by the dissolution court are relevant to the defendant's claims in the present appeal. The plaintiff grew up in California. Her father died when she was two years old and left her a substantial education fund. In 2005, when she was eighteen years old, the plaintiff "began to communicate with the defendant over the Internet. The plaintiff was estranged from her mother at the time and living with her grandmother. At first, the plaintiff and the defendant discussed the plaintiff's interest in the defendant's faith, Islam. The topic of conversation quickly shifted from the defendant's faith to marriage." Conroy v. Idlibi , supra, 183 Conn. App. at 462, 193 A.3d 663. At trial, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff wanted him to rescue her from the control of her mother and family. The defendant informed the plaintiff that their talk of a life together could only happen if they were married given his devout religious beliefs. "About three weeks after meeting online, [the] defendant flew to California, picked up [the] plaintiff, brought her to Connecticut and they married." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The dissolution court also found that the early years of the parties’ marriage were happy. The defendant's dental practice thrived, and the couple lived a lavish lifestyle. The plaintiff adhered to a specific dress code and diet, and eschewed contact with males who were not her husband. The court also found that at about the time the parties’ first child was born, however, the plaintiff began to resent and resist the religious dictates of the marriage. She complained that the defendant came to control every aspect of her life. At trial, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant permitted only certain clothes and food for her and their children and that her only friends were women from their religious circle. She also claimed that she was not permitted to listen to certain music, leave her home, or communicate with her family. The plaintiff, however, had returned to California several times to see her family. At trial, she also alleged that the defendant's physical abuse of her began "about five years ago."

The dissolution court found that, at the time of trial, the defendant was forty-nine years old. He had been married twice before and had three children from those marriages. He grew up in Syria and received his dental education and training in the United States. At first, he worked as a pediatric dentist for others but, in 2007, the defendant opened his own dental practice. He earned as much as $600,000 to $900,000 per year. In 2008 and early 2009, the defendant felt a great deal of financial pressure. The plaintiff withdrew her college education fund of $132,000 and gave it to the defendant as an investment in his dental practice that he was to repay in the future. Following publicity about an incident of domestic violence between the parties, which resulted in criminal charges being filed against the defendant, the defendant's dental practice again suffered difficulties.

The dissolution court found that at trial both of the parties damaged their credibility. Detective Damien Bilotto of the Plymouth Police Department investigated an incident at the marital home in July, 2015. The court highly credited Bilotto's testimony. During the investigation, the "[p]laintiff declined to answer [Bilotto's] questions not once but twice about the sequence of events that occurred on July 29, 2015, between her and [the defendant]. Despite his thorough investigation, the detective could not rule out that [the] plaintiff's injuries were self-inflicted when she accused [the defendant] of a brutal assault." The court also found that, "[w]hile the wording of the defendant's interrogatories dated September 30, 2015, concerning [the] plaintiff's extramarital relationships may have been imprecise, [the] plaintiff's responses–under oath–were less than forthcoming. The plaintiff's recollection of her relationship with [another man] was vague. Her testimony about having lost her ‘last opportunity’ to attend college—at age twenty-nine—was not credible nor was her description of the extent and permanence of her medical conditions."

The dissolution court found that the defendant damaged his credibility due to mistakes, omissions, oversights and nondisclosures on his eleven sworn financial affidavits. The defendant explained that "he was not diligent in reviewing" his affidavits, that he "trusted his accountant," and that he is "not good" with numbers. Nevertheless, the court found that the defendant had sworn to the accuracy of the statements. See Reville v. Reville , 312 Conn. 428, 442, 93 A.3d 1076 (2014) (court entitled to rely on truth and accuracy of sworn statements).

Regarding the division of the parties’ material and financial resources, the dissolution court stated: " ‘There are three stages of analysis regarding the equitable distribution of each resource: first, whether the resource is property within [General Statutes] § 46b-81 to be equitably distributed (classification); second, what is the appropriate method for determining the value of the property (valuation); and third, what is the most equitable distribution of the property between the parties (distribution). Krafick v. Krafick , 234 Conn. 783, 792–93, 663 A.2d 365 (1995)." The court then made the following findings with regard to the equitable distribution of the parties’ resources.

"This is a ten year marriage. The plaintiff is twenty years younger than the defendant. ... The plaintiff suffers from temporary or treatable conditions, and the defendant is relatively healthy for his age. They lived a high lifestyle thanks to the defendant's many years of training and his earnings as a dental specialist. The lurid drama of this dissolution and other court proceedings will eventually fade from public view. The defendant's dental practice will recover, giving him a greater capacity than the plaintiff for future acquisition of capital assets and income. However, the plaintiff is—using the defendant's words—‘intelligent and capable.’ [Although] her vocational skills and employability may be limited now, she has many years to seek an education or training in order to provide for herself and the support of her children.

"The seeds of this dissolution were sown at the very time the relationship began. The plaintiff was an eighteen year old high school student rebelling against her mother's ‘control.’ The defendant, twenty years the plaintiff's senior, cannot now be surprised that the plaintiff is once again rebelling to escape perceived control. The court has considered her relationship with another man during the marriage. The court finds no direct evidence of her and this other man ever having [had] sex. The court does not condone either party's behaviors or actions. As parents, they should each be ashamed that neither of them has cared for or supported their children for nearly a year. However, the court ascribes no greater fault for the breakdown of the marriage to either party." (Emphasis added.)

Citing General Statutes § 46b-82, the statute that governs alimony awards, the dissolution court noted that that the statute requires it to "consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,...