Conset Corp. v. Community Services Admin., Civ. A. No. 79-1174.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-1174.
• Citation: 624 F. Supp. 601
• Parties: CONSET CORPORATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

624 F. Supp. 601

CONSET CORPORATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 79-1174.

United States District Court, D. Columbia.

March 16, 1985.

William G. Kapit, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN GARRETT PENN, District Judge.

The plaintiffs, Conset Corporation and its principal shareholder, Stanley Zimmerman, filed this action on April 27, 1979.¹ Plaintiffs allege that the manner in which the defendant agency officials terminated a business arrangement between Conset and the National Demonstration Water Project, a nonprofit federal grantee, infringed their Fifth Amendment due process rights. The matter is presently before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment.

I

The defendants Mr. Olivarez, Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones, and Mr.Ramsey were Director, Assistant Director, Chief Legal Officer and Chief of the Demonstration Division, respectively. The defendant, Community Services Administration (CSA),² was a federal antipoverty agency established by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. Section 2825 established pilot and demonstration projects, conducted by public or private agencies, designed to test or assist in the development of new approaches or methods that would aid in overcoming special conditions in furtherance of the public interest. The National Demonstration Water Project (NDWP), designed for the purposes of developing local water and sewer facilities for low income families, was such a demonstration project. Plaintiff, Conset Corporation, was a service corporation that sold management services to NDWP. Plaintiff, Stanley Zimmerman, the President of Conset, also served as the Executive Director of the NDWP until September 30, 1978.

In August 1977, the new administration of CSA began a re-evaluation of NDWP as a CSA demonstration project. In the course of reviewing that project, the propriety of Conset's contractual relationship with NDWP was also evaluated. NDWP, a CSA grantee, had contracted its entire grant to Conset, a for-profit corporation, to carry out the NDWP program. An August 17, 1977, preliminary opinion indicated, that in light of Mr. Zimmerman's position as both the President and major stockholder of Conset, and as the Executive Director of NDWP; this business relationship constituted a "conflict of interest" in violation of OEO³ Instruction Number 6909-01.

In 1977, CSA officials discussed the "dual status issue" with representatives from both the NDWP and Conset. A subsequent memorandum, dated November 7, 1977, also explored the potential conflict of interest issue. Discussions continued between the three parties and the plaintiffs were advised of the existence of the potential conflict issue, although the prior OEO/CSA administrations had always approved of the NWDP/Conset arrangements. Plaintiffs were instructed that even though the past arrangements had been consistently approved, the NDWP had not heretofore violated Instruction Number 6909-01, because the regulations permitted such conflicts to exist, provided that they were specifically approved by the CSA. See Mack affidavit ¶ 4. Despite the lingering existence of the potential conflict of interest, a "short term" contract was approved through January 1, 1978. CSA thereafter decided to provide further funding to NDWP and established a final grant for that organization which terminated on September 30, 1978. This grant was made on August 24, 1978, retroactively effective through February 1, 1978. CSA contends that the termination had nothing to do with the conflict of interest issue; rather, the officials felt that NDWP had fully demonstrated its effectiveness as a "demonstration" project and was suitable for funding by other agencies.

In late February 1978, it came to the attention of CSA officers that the plaintiffs were representing to government and congressional officials that CSA had determined that there was no potential conflict of interest in the NDWP/Conset arrangement. It was at this juncture that the Assistant Director of the Office of Legal Affairs and General Counsel were compelled to issue the "General Counsel's Final Opinion Memorandum" dated March 9, 1978. It is this memorandum which is the subject of this action.

Defendants contend that the March 9, 1978 memorandum was issued by high agency officials and counsel, as a final legal opinion re-evaluating the relationship between Conset and NDWP. Plaintiffs contend that they suffered substantial harm as a result of the memorandum and its alleged circulation outside the agency. Plaintiffs maintain that the memorandum ultimately forced the resignation of Zimmerman as Executive Director of the NDWP, foreclosed Conset's business opportunities, and eventually drove Conset out of business. Plaintiffs seek damages for violation of their constitutional rights, alleging that the defendants failed to afford them adequate notice and sufficient opportunity to respond, subsequent to the preparation of the allegedly "stigmatizing" March 9th memorandum, and before the allegedly "adverse action" of its dissemination outside of the agency.

This court dismissed the action and denied plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief.⁴ The court of appeals, 655 F.2d 1291, affirmed the decision that plaintiffs had no property rights; but reversed and remanded on the issue of whether plaintiffs had a "liberty interest" which would implicate due process protection.⁵ However, this Court resolves the action on the basis of two jurisdictional issues which have not heretofore been considered.

II

The defendants moved to dismiss the action, or for summary judgment, asserting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), to stand for the proposition that "there can be no individual liability for damages because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law." In Procunier, an inmate, alleging infringement of his First Amendment rights, sought damages for the prison officials' interference with the outgoing prisoner mail. Noting that during the period of the alleged constitutional violations, there was no "clearly established" right protecting an inmate's mail privileges, the Supreme Court held that summary judgment was appropriate because "the defendant officials were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law." Id. 434 U.S. at 565, 98 S.Ct. at 861.

The plaintiffs, in opposition, maintain that the qualified immunity defense is not available to the individual defendants because they "should have known" that their challenged actions would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Court finds that the government officials are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

a) The Appropriate Qualified Immunity Standard

The former Procunier test encompassed both objective and subjective components:

qualified immunity was denied an official who knew or should have known that the action he took within the sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the complainant, or if the official took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.

Id. at 434 U.S. at 562, 98 S.Ct. at 860; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Thus under the Procunier standard, immunity was available only if the federal official had neither violated clearly established law, nor acted out of malice. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562, 98 S.Ct. at 860.

The subjective element required a showing that the official took the action in "good faith" without an intention to cause injury, however, the Court soon recognized that the good faith requirement often defeated summary judgment. As questions of subjective intent "are rarely amenable to resolution on motions for summary judgment; the broad-ranging discovery which resulted could often be disruptive of effective government." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Harlow Court observed that the denial of immunity subjected government officials to harassing civil litigation.

It is not difficult for an ingenious plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where subtle questions of constitutional law and the decisionmaker's thought processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient to force a trial. The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 and n. 29, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 and n. 29.

Prompted by the "desire that judges could quickly weed out frivolous claims through firm application of the Federal Rules Civil Procedure", the Harlow Court made an adjustment of the former qualified immunity standard by severing the subjective element of the defense. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39; Zwiebon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 168 (D.C.Cir. 1983).

Under the current Harlow standard, it is well-established law that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id.:

The previously recognized subjective aspect of qualified or good faith immunity ... frequently has proved incompatible with the principle that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Now, however, once the trial judge determines that the law was not clearly established at the time that the contested conduct occurred; the inquiry ceases. At that point the

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