Consiglio v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

• Citation: 81 A.2d 351,137 Conn. 693
• Parties: CONSIGLIO v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 22 May 1951
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 351

81 A.2d 351

137 Conn. 693

CONSIGLIO v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 22, 1951.

James F. Rosen, New Haven, James R. Greenfield, New Haven, for appellant.

Harry Silverstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and TROLAND ^*, JJ.

INGLIS, Judge.

There are two questions to be decided in this case. They are, first whether an employee is subject to the disqualification for unemployment benefits prescribed in General Statutes, § 7508(2), if he leaves work at which he is being employed only part time to accept a better paying position, and, second, whether, if he leaves during a vacation period, his leaving dates from the beginning of that period or from the date of his actual leaving.

For a long time prior to July, 1949, the plaintiff had been in the employ of the Echlin Manufacturing Company. Commencing in January, 1949, the company, because of business conditions beyond its control, had great difficulty in providing work for its employees. In April it was compelled to go on a three-day week, and from then on its employees worked only on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. On this schedule the plaintiff's weekly pay was $20.88. Her weekly benefit rate under the Unemployment Compensation Act was $20. In May the plaintiff applied for and received benefits in the amount of $3 a week for partial unemployment, pursuant to General Statutes, § 7502. This condition continued to and including Wednesday, June 29. During the following two weeks, that is, the weeks ending July 9 and 16, the company closed for vacation. The plaintiff was entitled to and received a full week's pay of $38.80 for the first week of the vacation but was not entitled to any pay for the second week.

During the second week of the vacation period the plaintiff obtained work at the Sperry and Barnes Company at a rate of pay which would normally yield her $42 per week. She thereupon left her job with the Echlin company and started work for Sperry and Barnes. Her employment, however, lasted for only two weeks. On July 30 she was laid off for lack of work. The plaintiff at the time was married and had no children. Her husband was employed at a wage which would have adequately supported the family. She would not have left her employment at the Echlin company had she not obtained the job at Sperry and Barnes.

The plaintiff claims that her employment with the Echlin company terminated on June 29, the last day on which she worked, and that she is entitled to unemployment benefits for the week ending July 16, the second week of her vacation and for the period following her discharge from the Sperry and Barnes Company on July 30, all on the basis of the benefit rate accrued by reason of her employment by the Echlin company. The unemployment commissioner, concurring with the field supervisor, concluded that she left her employment at the Echlin company without sufficient cause as of July 9 and that she was disqualified under the statute for benefits during the four-week period from July 9 to August 6, 1949. The Superior Court sustained him in these conclusions.

General Statutes, § 7508, so far as pertinent to the present inquiry, reads as follows: 'An individual shall be ineligible for benefits * * * (2) during the week in which, in the opinion of the administrator, he has (a) left work without sufficient cause connected with his employment except when such leaving is beyond his control solely by reason of governmental regulation or statute * * * and for the next four following weeks, none of which shall count towards the waiting period provided for in subsection (4) of section 7507 * * *.' This disqualification is in accord with the general theory of unemployment compensation laws, which is that compensation is to be provided for unemployment which is involuntary on the part of the employee. Almada v. Administrator, 137 Conn. 380, 386, 77 A.2d 765; Baldassaris v. Egan, 135 Conn. 695, 698, 68 A.2d 120. An employee forfeits his benefits for a four-week period if he leaves his work without sufficient cause connected with his employment, because such leaving is voluntary on his part and it is to be presumed that his unemployment for the four-week period thereafter is the result of his leaving. Kempfer, 'Disqualification for Voluntary Leaving & Misconduct,' 55 Yale L.J. 147, 149. On the other hand, if an employee leaves his work for what, in the opinion of the administrator, is a sufficient cause connected with his employment, his resultant unemployment is not voluntary and, accordingly, the statute relieves the employee from the disqualification. The sole test of whether an employee escapes the temporary disqualification resulting from his quitting his job, therefore, is whether, in the opinion of the administrator, the employee left for a sufficient cause connected with his employment.

It is to be noted that, in the present case, the unemployment commissioner made no finding that the cause of the plaintiff's leaving work was a sufficient cause connected with her employment. On the contrary, he found that she would not have left had she not obtained the better job with Sperry and Barnes. Still less does it appear that the cause was such a one 'in the opinion of the administrator,' as the statute provides. The plaintiff, therefore, must and does rest upon the claim that the cause of her leaving work was a sufficient cause connected with her employment as a matter of law and that the field supervisor and the commissioner abused their discretion in concluding otherwise.

Her contention is, first, that a cause for leaving is sufficient and connected with her employment if that employment is not suitable, and, second, that under the definition of suitable as contained in the act her employment with the Echlin company was not suitable. The first part of her claim is valid. The act does not contemplate that an employee must remain upon a job which is unsuitable to the extent, for instance, that it endangers his health. If he leaves a job which is really unsuitable, his leaving is not voluntary. If the cause of his leaving is the unsuitability of the job, that cause is one which the administrator might reasonably find is sufficient and one which is connected with the employment.

The second phase of the plaintiff's contention, however, is not so well founded. It is true that, if unsuitability of the work is a sufficient cause for...