CONSOL. FREIGHTWAYS CORP. OF DELAWARE v. Larson, Civ. No. 84-0222.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 84-0222.
• Citation: 647 F. Supp. 1479
• Parties: CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Thomas D. LARSON, individually, and in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation, Department of Transportation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Jay Cochran, Jr., individually, and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police; Leroy S. Zimmerman, individually, and in his capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard Thornburgh, individually, and in his capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

647 F. Supp. 1479

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Thomas D. LARSON, individually, and in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation, Department of Transportation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Jay Cochran, Jr., individually, and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police; Leroy S. Zimmerman, individually, and in his capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard Thornburgh, individually, and in his capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.

Civ. No. 84-0222.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

November 19, 1986.

Jack M. Stover, Shearer, Mette & Woodside, Harrisburg, Pa., and John Duncan Varda, DeWitt, Sundby, Huggett & Schumacher, S.C., Madison, Wis., for plaintiff.

John J. Knorr, Deputy Atty. Gen., Chief Litigation Section, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

HERMAN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is a preemption case. The plaintiff is Consolidated Freightways Corporation (Consolidated or Consolidated Freight). Consolidated operates truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer combinations (twins or doubles) and truck tractor-semitrailer combinations (single twins) in which the semitrailer has a length less than twenty-eight and one-half feet, a width of 102 inches, and which usually operates as part of a twin on highways in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff also operates some truck tractor-semitrailer combinations (semis) in which the semitrailer has a length of forty-four feet. Plaintiff contends that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) preempts certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4908, 4921, and 4923 governing access by twins, single twins, and large semis to and from a national network of highways established by the federal act. Plaintiff seeks as its remedy declaratory judgment and an injunction against enforcing the allegedly preempted portions of state law.¹

The record in this case consists of the transcript of a non-jury trial held January 8, 1986 through January 14, 1986, the exhibits introduced at that hearing, deposition transcripts submitted by agreement of the parties, and designated portions of the record of a prior proceeding in which the instant plaintiff challenged Pennsylvania's proscription of twin trailer combination vehicles on all of its roadways. See Document No. 9, dated September 5, 1984 in this action, and Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Thomas D. Larson, C.A. No. 81-1230.

The parties have submitted their post-trial briefs and requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the matter is now ripe for decision.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, Consolidated Freight, advances two main arguments in support of its claim that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act preempts Pennsylvania's statutory and administrative scheme providing access to the national network. First, Consolidated asserts that Pennsylvania's access laws are facially violative of the federal law in that the federal law does not allow review of access routes prior to their use by STAA vehicles, whereas Pennsylvania denies use of any non-network route by STAA vehicles unless and until that route is approved by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and any local municipalities that may have jurisdiction over the route. Further, Consolidated argues, the Pennsylvania laws are facially violative of the STAA because they essentially deny all access to facilities off the national network for food, fuel, rest and repair, and because they effectively prohibit access by single twin trailers and household goods movers to points of loading and unloading.

Second, Consolidated argues that Pennsylvania's access scheme as applied violates the STAA because of the delays in access route approvals, the arbitrary denials, and the applications of erroneous standards that have proved to be the norm during the several years since institution of the approval procedures.

The Commonwealth, however, urges that the STAA does allow for state review and approval of access routes prior to their use by STAA vehicles, and that this approval process, while slow and cumbersome in the past, has become streamlined and acceptable under the STAA with the promulgation of several new regulatory procedures and policies.

A. The Supremacy Clause Analysis

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and the preemption doctrine that arises therefrom, prohibit any state from enacting and enforcing any laws contrary to the laws of the United States. A federal law can preempt a state law either expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, it is clear that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act expressly preempts any conflicting state laws: "No State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access ..." 49 U.S.C. § 2312(a). Because Congress has expressed a "clear and manifest" intention to preempt conflicting state law, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977), our only inquiry in this case is whether the Pennsylvania laws governing access to the national network of highways established by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act conflict with that Act. In conducting this inquiry, we must consider not only the state and federal laws as written, but also these laws as they are interpreted and applied. Id. at 526, 97 S.Ct. at 1310.

B. The Federal Statute

The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 was passed to alleviate the burden on interstate commerce created by individual states such as Pennsylvania prohibiting twin trailers and other large vehicles on interstate highways within their borders. The Act created national vehicle size limitations of 102 inches in width, forty-eight feet in length for a semi-trailer, and twenty-eight feet in length for twin trailers (vehicles of these dimensions will be termed STAA vehicles). The Act also created a national network of Interstate Highways and federal-aid primary roads designated by the United States Secretary of Transportation on which these wider and longer STAA vehicles could run. In order to insure access for these vehicles to terminals and facilities for food, fuel, rest, and repair, and, for household goods carriers, to points of loading or unloading, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act also prohibited states from interfering with "reasonable access" between the network and these facilities.

In subsequent amendments, Congress provided a mechanism for exempting certain segments of the interstate highway system from the national network if the Secretary of the Department of Transportation determines that they are not capable of safely accomodating the larger STAA vehicles. Congress also approved inclusion of segments of highways in the national network that have lanes less than twelve feet in width, and made explicit that tractors pulling a single 102 inch wide twin trailer should also be afforded reasonable access to and from points of loading and unloading. See 49 U.S.C. § 2312; Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, P.L. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2829.²

At issue in this litigation is the intent of Congress in providing that "no State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access" to the national network. Plaintiff, Consolidated, asserts, as outlined above, that this provision prohibits state review and approval of access routes before allowing STAA vehicles to travel on these routes, and that states are precluded from denying access based on safety concerns. This interpretation of the statute is based on a narrow and restrictive reading of the provision "no state may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access." Consolidated's argument goes as follows: Pennsylvania denies the use of routes not a part of the national network to STAA vehicles until application for a particular route has been made and the route has been approved by the Commonwealth and various local entities (see section II-C, infra). Eventually, most applications for access routes are approved. These access routes that are approved must, because of the approval, be reasonable. Therefore, argues Consolidated, during the application process while the routes were closed to STAA vehicles, the Commonwealth was denying reasonable access to STAA vehicles in violation of federal law.

While this interpretation, although awkward, might be plausible had Congress enacted the reasonable access provision without comment, Congress has indicated a contrary intent in the legislative histories of both the original Surface Transportation Assistance Act and the later Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984. In the House Committee Report on the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, H.R.Rep. No. 555, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3639, the Committee noted that the provision requiring the states to permit STAA vehicles reasonable access to and from the national network "is not intended to preempt a State's reasonable exercise of its police powers with respect to safeguarding public safety on roads within the area of its jurisdiction." Id., 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 3662. This comment indicates that although states may not deny reasonable access, Congress intended that an ingredient in determining reasonableness may be a determination of whether or not use of a particular route by STAA vehicles would endanger the public safety. In other words, Congress clearly intended that a state or local government might deny access to and from the national network over a route that cannot safely be used by STAA vehicles.

Further, the Congressional intent that states be allowed to reasonably exercise their police powers in the interest of safety, that they be allowed to deny certain access routes for safety reasons, also indicates that in appropriate circumstances a state may reasonably exercise its police power in...