Consol. Traction Co. v. Graham

• Citation: 40 A. 773,62 N.J.L. 90
• Parties: CONSOLIDATED TRACTION CO. v. GRAHAM.
• Decision Date: 19 July 1898
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

40 A. 773

62 N.J.L. 90

CONSOLIDATED TRACTION CO.

v. GRAHAM.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 19, 1898.

Damages—Excessive Verdict.

In suits to recover for personal injuries, or for death by wrongful acts, a verdict which is grossly excessive will be set aside without regard to the number of times the case has previously been tried.

(Syllabus by the Court)

Action by Abraham L. Graham, administrator of the estate of Melville T. Graham, deceased, against the Consolidated Traction Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Heard on rule to show cause why verdict should not be set aside, and new trial granted. Rule made absolute.

Argued February term, 1898, before LIPPINCOTT, GUMMERE, and LUDLOW. JJ A. Q. Garretson, for the rule.

McEwan & McEwan and Frank M. Hardenbrook, opposed.

GUMMERE, J. Melville T. Graham, a child between four and five years of age, was run over by one of the cars of the defendant company, and killed, on the 10th day of April, 1890; and this suit was brought by his administrators to recover the pecuniary loss sustained by the next of kin of said decedent by reason of his death. The case came on at the Hudson circuit, at the September term, 1896, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $5,000. A rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a new trial granted was allowed by the trial judge; and, on the hearing of the rule, this court directed that the verdict be set aside as "absurdly excessive," and a venire de novo issued, unless the plaintiff would consent to have his verdict reduced to $1,000. The plaintiff having refused to consent to the reduction, the rule to show cause was made absolute. The case came on to be tried a second time, at the October term, 1897, and at that trial a second verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000. A second rule to show cause having been allowed by the trial judge, we are now asked by the defendant to direct a third trial, for the same reason that a second one was ordered.

This application should prevail. As has already been said, in effect, by this court, it is patent that when damages, in a case of this kind, are assessed by the jury at such a sum as $5,000, they are not estimated upon any correct legal principle. Our statute confines the amount of the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary injury sustained by the next of kin by reason of the death of the decedent; and that injury, as was said by Beasley, C. J., in Paulmier v. Railroad Co., 34...