Constant v. Continental Telephone Co. of Illinois

• Decision Date: 29 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-4058.,89-4058.
• Citation: 745 F. Supp. 1374
• Parties: Robert A. CONSTANT, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, and Ed Bennett, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

745 F. Supp. 1374

Robert A. CONSTANT, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, and Ed Bennett, Defendants.

No. 89-4058.

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division.

August 29, 1990.

Gregory McHugh, Aledo, Ill., for plaintiff.

Robert E. Arroyo, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

ORDER

MIHM, District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion by the Defendants for summary judgment (# 32) which is brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (# 32).

BACKGROUND

Constant grew up in Aledo, Illinois, and attended Western Illinois University in Macomb, Illinois. Constant was employed by Contel as an engineer from 1972 until his employment ended in June, 1987. Constant was born on December 16, 1945, and, at the time of his termination, he was 41 years of age.

Constant received many awards during his service at Contel and the Defendants admit this. Also, Constant was a kidney transplant recipient who was on special medicine. The parties dispute whether the Plaintiff's medical condition had anything to do with Plaintiff's separation from Contel.

Constant commenced working for Contel in its Aledo, Illinois office. Constant and his wife have resided in the Aledo area for most of their lives. In 1985, Contel transferred Constant to its Carthage, Illinois office, which is approximately 70 miles from Aledo. Rather than relocate his residence to Carthage, Constant rented an apartment in Carthage and commuted on weekends to his home in Aledo. Constant held the position of outside plant engineer.

Bennett, a supervising engineer, was Constant's immediate supervisor. Bennett works at Contel's Mascoutah, Illinois office. Mascoutah is approximately 280 miles from Aledo.

On Friday, June 26, 1987, Constant and Bennett met at the Carthage office where Bennett presented Constant with a 15 year anniversary tie tack. The two traveled to Macomb, Illinois for lunch and discussed upcoming work assignments. During lunch, Bennett informed Constant that Constant was being transferred to Mascoutah, Illinois. The Defendants assert that Constant felt it was unfair to be transferred twice within two years. Bennett claims that while returning to Carthage after lunch, Constant became increasingly angry about the transfer to Mascoutah and punched Bennett in the face. Constant denies that he hit Bennett. (Constant deposition at 88-89, 96-97; Constant deposition Exhibit 1 at 3; Bennett deposition at 84-91, 98).

The Plaintiff asserts that upon return to work, Ed Bennett went to the washroom while Plaintiff talked with his immediate supervisor, Paul Ellis. The Plaintiff maintains that Bennett entered the room and accused Plaintiff of punching Bennett in the face. (Constant deposition at 106-113). In an interoffice memo dated June 30, 1987, Paul Ellis confirmed Constant's story regarding what Constant claimed happened at the office. (Defendants' production document # 227).

There is no indication in Ellis' memo that Constant called Bennett a liar or that Constant threatened Bennett. Bennett claims that Constant called Bennett a liar and threatened Bennett in front of Paul Ellis. (Defendants' production document # 223). Paul Ellis stated in his memo that Bennett left the office after he told Constant that he hit him. There is no indication in Ellis' memo that Constant called Bennett a liar or that Constant threatened Bennett.

Constant maintains that he finished working that day but that he could not sleep. He testified that the next Saturday he talked to an old supervisor to voice the fear of losing his job. (Constant deposition at 122-123). The Plaintiff then decided to go for a check up at the Mayo Clinic. The Plaintiff left the clinic on Wednesday, July 1. On July 2, he claims that he was at his home recuperating. While at the Mayo Clinic, a supervisor told the Plaintiff to be in Springfield on Friday, July 3. (Constant deposition at 129-130).

Representatives of Contel met with Constant and Bennett in Springfield, Illinois, on Friday, July 3, 1987 to discuss Bennett's contention that Constant hit Bennett and to determine whether Constant was agreeable to transferring to Mascoutah. When Constant arrived in Springfield, Constant was required to talk with a Mr. Mahoney (Contel's security administrator) for about one hour about the alleged hitting of Bennett. (Bailey deposition at 14). Constant testified that it appeared that Mahoney believed Bennett's story. (Constant deposition at 136). Constant testified that Mahoney dragged him to the window for a physical exam of the Plaintiff's hands. Id. Mahoney advised the Plaintiff to apologize or to lose 15 years of his life at his job. (Id. at 137). Constant stated that he was not going to apologize for something he did not do. (Id.).

The Plaintiff then met with Robert Fox, Elaine Bailey, and Mahoney. Bennett was also present. At this meeting, Constant stated that he probably would not agree to transfer. (Constant deposition at 130-134, 150-151). Plaintiff indicated that it was his impression at the time of the meeting that because he would not apologize to Bennett, he was out of a job. Constant felt that it would be difficult for him to transfer and continue to work under Bennett's supervision. (Id. at 50).

As a result of this conversation, the Contel representatives presented Constant with a resignation agreement entitled "Termination Agreement" and requested that Constant consider signing it and delivering it to Contel's Sycamore, Illinois, office on or before Tuesday, July 7, 1987. At the meeting, Constant claimed that the word "termination" in the agreement was too strong, so the Contel representatives changed the word to "separation." The word "separation" sounded better to Constant. (Id. at 143-147 and attached Exhibit 4).

Constant was told that if he did not sign the separation agreement, Contel would proceed with the investigation of whether he struck Bennett. Constant asserts that, although he was not directly told he would be fired, he believed that the Contel representatives were pre-disposed to believe that he struck Bennett and that if he did not sign the agreement he would be fired and not receive the severance payment provided for in the agreement. (Id. at 144-146).

Bailey testified that she could recall that only the release form was brought to the meeting by the Contel group. (Bailey deposition at 21). Constant now argues that because no other form was brought to the meeting, Contel had not considered less drastic measures which would allow the Plaintiff to keep his job.

Regarding the severance pay standard, Contel asserts that there are no rules or regulations at Contel requiring that any sum be given to employees who resign. However, Contel admits that the amount of severance pay granted to Constant was based upon separation pay guidelines established by itself. Contel asserts that using the guidelines and providing separation pay are wholly discretionary and are determined by Contel on a case-by-case basis. (Bailey deposition at 22, 24-27, 35-37, 73). Contel contends that the severance pay given to Constant was paid in consideration of his resignation and release. (Defendants' answer to interrogatory # 1).

Contel maintains that the discretionary nature of the separation pay guidelines is exemplified by two separation agreements Contel entered into with other employees. In October 1989, Contel negotiated separation payments with employees John Boswell and William Fuller. Contel chose to offer Boswell separation pay after he announced his plan to terminate his employment with the company. However, it asserts that the amount offered was not based upon the discretionary guidelines applied in Constant's case. (Bailey deposition at 34-37 and attached Exhibit 9). Also, Contel contends that the amount of separation pay offered Fuller was determined by the Human Resources Department without recourse to the separation pay guidelines. (Bailey deposition at 37-38 and attached Exhibit 8).

Contel's separation guidelines state in the section entitled "Principal":

Contel of Illinois believes that it is in the company's and employee's best interest to provide assistance if an employee is separated due to work force restructuring, reorganization, job elimination, or failure to meet performance standards, through the use of separation pay. (Emphasis added).

The "policy" section of the separation guidelines provides:

Employees will not be eligible for separation pay if separated due to: retirement; disability; resignation; termination for cause. (Emphasis added).

Applying the policy guidelines, Boswell was probably not given the amount of severance pay provided for in the policy because he resigned to take another job. (See Bailey deposition Exhibit 9).

In Bailey's deposition, she admitted that Fuller was terminated because of his job performance. Under the part of the separation guidelines entitled "principal," Contel must pay employees who failed to meet the performance standards separation pay (assuming the separation guidelines are obligatory). Under the "policy" section of the separation guidelines, Contel is not obligated to pay employees benefits when they are "terminated for cause." Thus, because the separation guidelines apparently conflict on whether Fuller would be entitled to separation pay under the guidelines, the implications of Contel's failure to pay Fuller separation pay is unclear and does not resolve the question whether the separation pay guidelines are obligatory or are merely discretionary.

In this case, if the allegations of Bennett were true, then Constant could have been terminated for cause and not given any benefits. In any event, apart from the possibility that Constant could have been terminated for cause, Constant resigned; therefore, according to its policy, Contel was not obligated to provide severance pay under its separation...