Contee v. Univ. of Pa., CIVIL ACTION No. 21-1398
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 21-1398 |
| Parties | CLAY CONTEE, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Clay Contee has alleged Defendant University of Pennsylvania (Penn) discriminated and retaliated against him because of his disability, which resulted in his wrongful termination from a graduate program. Before the Court is the University of Pennsylvania's1 motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim. Penn argues it had no employer/employee relationship with Contee, and therefore, he cannot sustain a claim of discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The Court finds Contee has plausibly stated a claim for violation of either Title I or Title III of the ADA.
Contee was accepted as a student in Penn's graduate program in the Department of Physics and Astronomy in January 2018. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Contee began working for Penn and receiving payments in June 2018. (Id. ¶ 17.) He began taking courses in September 2018. (Id. ¶ 23.) Contee suffers from several mental health disabilities, including major depressive disorder and anxiety. (Id. ¶ 18.) Contee consulted with Penn's Counseling and Psychological Services ("CAPS")beginning in the summer of 2018, and he had monthly check-ins with a case manager and social worker from CAPS throughout his first year in the program. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)
Contee finished his first semester of classes in December 2018 with a grade point average (GPA) of 1.67. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Due to his low GPA, he was placed on academic probation and had to meet minimum GPA requirements for the next year. (Id. ¶¶ 26-29.) In March 2019, Contee was concerned that his disabilities would impede his capacity to meet the required academic thresholds for the spring semester. (Id. ¶ 30.) He contacted Penn's Office of University Life about his concern, and a representative suggested he could apply for medical leave. Contee contacted Professor Joshua Klein about applying for medical leave and proposed a leave of approximately three weeks, so that he could still participate as a summer teaching assistant. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Contee asserts that Klein questioned his need to take medical leave, accused Contee of acting in bad faith, and threatened to refuse to extend his departmental funding if he took medical leave and missed his spring 2019 final exams. (Id.) Fearing retaliation, Contee did not take medical leave and sat for his spring 2019 final exams as scheduled. (Id. ¶ 34.) He performed below the required academic thresholds. (Id. ¶ 36.) However, Penn permitted Contee to continue in the graduate student program for the summer and fall of 2019 because if he achieved a 4.0 GPA in the fall semester, he could still meet his academic thresholds for the year. In the fall 2019 semester, Contee fell short of the probationary academic requirements. (Compl. ¶ 38.) Penn dismissed Plaintiff from the graduate program in January 2020 because his cumulative GPA was below the required threshold, and he received a low grade in a core class in the fall 2019 semester.
Contee filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on October 28, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 12.) The EEOC issued a Dismissal andNotice of Rights letter on December 30, 2020, which stated that there was "[n]o jurisdiction" and "[n]o employee/employer relationship." Contee also filed a complaint with the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights, which denied his appeal on February 23, 2021.
On a motion to dismiss, the court must first separate the factual and legal elements of a claim and "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The court "must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint must contain "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]" of a cause of action. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, the court must "construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.
Plaintiff asserts two counts of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The Complaint does not specify whetherit seeks relief for discrimination under Title I or Title III of the ADA. Title I prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by an "employer" in regard to, inter alia, "discharge of employees...and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a). Title III prohibits disability discrimination in public accommodations, which includes a "postgraduate private school, or other place of education[.]" 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(J), 12182. A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before the EEOC in order to bring a Title I claim, but a Title III claim does not require administrative exhaustion. McInerney v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2007).
Title IV of the ADA prohibits retaliation against anyone for asserting rights under the ADA and makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with anyone exercising his or her rights under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b). The remedies available for a retaliation claim depend on the context. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(c). "[A] plaintiff bringing an ADA retaliation claim involving employment will have the remedies of Title I of the ADA, which incorporates the remedies of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act], but a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim involving public accommodations will have the remedies of Title III of the ADA, incorporating the remedies of Title II of the Civil Rights Act." Datto v. Harrison, 664 F. Supp. 2d 472, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Although the Complaint does not specify whether it seeks relief for discrimination under Title I or Title III of the ADA, it contains indicia of a Title I claim. Plaintiff states that he filed a charge with the EEOC and has "exhausted his administrative remedies, as required under federal and state law." (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff also seeks damages, which are not an available remedy for private enforcement of a Title III violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir. 2006). In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues he has plausibly pleaded that he was an employee of Penn within the meaning ofTitle I. Meanwhile, Penn argues the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because Contee has not alleged any employee relationship with Penn.
As a threshold matter, Penn argues that the Court should defer to the EEOC's determination, set forth in the Notice of Dismissal, that it had no jurisdiction because there was no employee/employer relationship. Penn relies on Air Courier Conference of America/International Committee v. U.S. Postal Service, in which the Third Circuit acknowledged that an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction may be entitled to deference. 959 F.2d 1213, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986)). Unlike in Schor, the Court is not being asked to adjudicate whether an agency's assessment of its own jurisdiction was reasonable. Contee has not challenged the EEOC's determination that it did not have jurisdiction to pursue a claim on his behalf. Instead, he has brought a claim for disability discrimination, which this Court must review de novo. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973). This review includes an independent assessment of whether Contee's relationship with Penn is plausibly that of employee/employer because Title I applies only to employment discrimination.
The issue before the Court is whether Contee has alleged an employee/employer relationship given Contee's role as a graduate student. Penn has presented no EEOC regulation or section of the EEOC Compliance Manual interpreting the meaning of the term "employee" that it argues should be afforded deference. As a result, the Court has no means of assessing what level of deference might be appropriate. Compare Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9 (2003) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (EEOC Compliance Manual is not controlling but is a "body of experience and informed judgment" to which the Court may resort for guidance), and Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103,114-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (), with Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (...
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