Contempt of Dougherty, In re
| Decision Date | 06 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | M,Docket Nos. 77337,77338,SCHOONOVER-HIGGIN,A |
| Citation | 413 N.W.2d 392,429 Mich. 81 |
| Parties | , 81 A.L.R.4th 971 In re CONTEMPT OF Peter DOUGHERTY, James Smith, Carfon Foltz, Daniel La Grou and Sol Metz. WILLIAMS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James SMITH, Carfon Foltz, Daniel La Grou and Sol Metz, Appellants, and Peter Dougherty, Defendant-Appellant, and Jim Smith, Matt Goodheart, Margaret Dewey, Ken Berger, Elizabeth Walters, Janet Kurtz, Pat Robertson, Robert Glassman, Covenant for Peace, Michigan Alliance for Peace, John Doe and Mary Roe, Defendants. In re CONTEMPT OF Jeffreyargaret Dewey, Anthony Raffenaud and Ken Grunow. WILLIAMS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffreynthony Raffenaud and Ken Grunow, Appellants, and Margaret Dewey, Defendant-Appellant, and Jim Smith, Matt Goodheart, Peter Dougherty, Ken Berger, Elizabeth Walters, Janet Kurtz, Pat Robertson, Robert Glassman, Covenant for Peace, Michigan Alliance for Peace, John Doe and Mary Roe, Defendants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Keywell and Rosenfeld, Dawn L. Phillips, Jeffrey C. Kauffman, Troy, for appellee.
Michael L. Pitt, Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson, William H. Goodman and Ernest Goodman, Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian, Kenneth M. Mogill, Mogill, Posner, Cohen & Weiss, F. Randall Karfonta, Detroit, Barbara A. Patek, Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, Southfield, Deborah A. Choly, Susan DeWinter, CLA, Brief Coordinator, Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson, Detroit, for defendant-appellant and respondents-appellants.
Stark and Gordon by Clark D. Cunningham, Bell and Associates, P.C. by Glen R. Warn, Detroit, for amici curiae.
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. by Justin C. Ravitz, Southfield, amicus curiae brief of Nat. Lawyers Guild, Detroit Chapter Nat. Conference of Black Lawyers, Michigan Trial Lawyers Assn.
Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen, P.C. by John P. Jacobs, Detroit, for amici curiae, the Peace and Justice Com'n of Diocese of Lansing and the Peace and Justice Committee of St. Joan of Arc Parish.
Appellants in these consolidated cases challenge the validity of two civil contempt orders. The circuit judge found appellants in civil contempt of court for violating a June 29, 1983, permanent injunction enjoining them from trespassing on, and obstructing ingress or egress to, Williams International Corporation's plant at Walled Lake, Michigan. 1 The appellants were ordered incarcerated until they purged their contempt by promising to obey the injunction in the future.
Appellants argue before this Court that their contempt was criminal and that the trial court's sentencing discretion was therefore limited under M.C.L. Sec. 600.1715(1); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1715(1) to imprisonment for a definite period, not in excess of thirty days, a $250 fine or both. Alternately, they contend that if their contempt was civil in nature the trial court exceeded its authority by requiring a promise of future obedience to the court's injunction as a means of purging their contempt. The requirement of this promise was further challenged as unauthorized by existing statutory law, contrary to the free speech and expression guarantees of the Michigan and federal constitutions, and as not being the least-restrictive alternative available to the trial court to protect Williams International's legitimate property interests.
We hold that the trial court erred in imposing a coercive sanction upon appellants for their trespass upon Williams' land, a past violation of the trial court's injunction. Since appellants were, at the time of the contempt hearing, in compliance with the injunction, it was beyond the power of the trial court to impose an indefinite, coercive sentence upon them. The trial court was limited to imposing a criminal sanction, after a properly conducted criminal contempt proceeding, or to issuing a civil contempt order compensating plaintiff for its actual losses.
The Court of Appeals set forth the facts leading to the issuance of the June 29, 1983, injunction as follows:
2
These two cases concern violations of the permanent injunction which occurred on April 20, 1984, 3 and June 11, 1984. 4 Hearings were held before the trial court on the dates of the incidents, and appellants admitted that they did, with knowledge of the injunction, violate its provisions. 5 The trial court found all appellants in civil contempt of court and committed them to the Oakland County jail 6 until they purged themselves of the contempt by promising to obey the court's June 29, 1983, injunction in the future. The orders provided that upon purging their contempt they would be released from jail. 7
The trial court additionally found the April 20, appellants in contempt of court for their conduct in court for "refusing to agree to refrain from violating" the injunctive order.
The April 20, 1984, contemnors filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals on April 30, 1984. On May 10, 1984, the Court of Appeals stayed the April contempt order and appellants were released from jail. Three of the four June contemnors executed stay bonds and were freed. The fourth, Margaret Dewey, was released from jail after conducting a fast and after the trial court determined that she was no longer capable of violating the injunction. The June contemnors filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals, which the Court consolidated with the April contemnors' appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt orders, 144 Mich.App. 257, 375 N.W.2d 408, finding that the proceedings were civil in nature because of the trial court's expressed purpose to secure the contemnors' future compliance with the injunction. 8 Additionally, the Court of Appeals upheld the propriety of conditioning the release of the appellants upon their willingness to promise to abide by the injunction in the future. 9
We granted appellants' applications for leave to appeal.
The sui generis nature of contempt proceedings has often obfuscated the distinction between criminal and civil contempt. 10 The confusion between criminal and civil contempt has resulted partly from the fact that all contempts may be said to be criminal in nature because they permit imprisoning a contemnor for wilfully failing to comply with an order of the court. Hence, legal authors and courts have stated that all contempts are "quasi-criminal" or "criminal in nature." 11 As one court aptly stated, "[a] contempt proceeding occupies what may be termed the twilight zone between civil and criminal cases...." 12
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that contempts are "neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal," Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911), and has stated that " 'it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes.' " Id., quoting Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329, 24 S.Ct. 665, 667, 48 L.Ed. 997 (1904).
Although it may be difficult to distinguish between criminal and civil contempts, this distinction is often critical since a criminal contempt proceeding requires some, but not all, of the due process safeguards of an ordinary criminal trial 13 and because the purpose sought to be achieved by imprisoning a civil contemnor (coercion) varies significantly from the purpose of imprisoning a criminal contemnor (punishment). Furthermore, Michigan statutory law limits a court's sentencing discretion in all contempts, "except in those cases where the commitment is for the omission to perform an act or duty which is still within the power of the person to perform," to thirty days imprisonment, or a fine of $250, or both. M.C.L. Sec. 600.1715(1); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1715(1). 14 As will be shown below, a commitment for the omission to perform an act or duty that is within the power of the party to perform is the classical case of civil contempt that permits the use of a coercive sanction.
The oft-cited case of Gompers, supra, is the leading case distinguishing between criminal and civil contempts. In Gompers, Samuel Gompers and several other labor union leaders were enjoined from boycotting Bucks Stove and Range Company and from publishing that Bucks Stove was on any "unfair" or "we don't patronize" list. Gompers and two others engaged in acts that violated this injunction and Bucks Stove petitioned the trial court to hold them in contempt. After a hearing on the petition, the court found all three individuals in contempt of court and sentenced them to definite jail terms of six, nine, and twelve months.
The United States Supreme Court reversed defendants' contempt adjudications on the ground that the contempt proceeding was conducted as if it were civil, but the sentence meted out was fixed and wholly...
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