Contempt of Warriner, In re

• Decision Date: 06 April 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 52550
• Parties: PEOPLE of the City of Detroit, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John WARRINER, Defendant-Appellant. 113 Mich.App. 549, 317 N.W.2d 681
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 681

317 N.W.2d 681

PEOPLE of the City of Detroit, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John WARRINER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 52550.

113 Mich.App. 549, 317 N.W.2d 681

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 8, 1981.

Decided Feb. 19, 1982.

Released for Publication April 6, 1982.

[113 MICHAPP 550] Sylvester Delaney, Acting Corp. Counsel, Alfred Sawaya, Supervising Atty., and Mary Jane Liddy, Law Dept., Detroit, for City of Detroit.

Robert J. Katz, Flint, for defendant-appellant.

Before MacKENZIE, P. J., and CAVANAGH and WALSH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was found in contempt of court and was summarily sentenced to 30 days in jail. Defendant appeals as of right.

On July 7, 1980, defendant was an observer in a courtroom of the Detroit Recorder's Court during a hearing to set bond for defendant's friend, Edmond Desmond, Jr. After the amount of the bond was determined, Desmond and several other individuals (charged with similar offenses) were led out of the courtroom by police officers. During this procession,[113 MICHAPP 551] and in full view of the judge, defendant raised his fist in the air and began shouting. The court then ordered defendant to stand before him on the charge of contempt. The following colloquy occurred:

"What is your name?

"MR. WARRINER: John Warriner.

"THE COURT: You know Court is here. You're not out on the streets. When you're in this courtroom you keep the dignity of this courtroom. That means no talking, no noise.

"MR. WARRINER: I didn't make any noise.

"THE COURT: You didn't, huh?

"MR. WARRINER: No.

"THE COURT: I heard you and I saw you raise your clenched fist also in support of those leaving, yelling. Is that correct, yes or no?

"MR. WARRINER: No, it's not.

"THE COURT: It isn't? I hold you in contempt of Court. Thirty days in Wayne County Jail. That's committed in my presence."

The order entered by the judge reads as follows:

"THAT one John Warriner of 32960 Parkdale, Wayne, Michigan, appeared in the courtroom of the Honorable Judge M. John Shamo on the seventh day of July 1980, and did create a disturbance by saluting and shouting in the courtroom and raising his fist in the air as prisoners were being lead [sic] out of the courtroom by police officers; that the actions and conduct of the aforesaid John Warriner disrupted the decorum and orderly procedures of the Court whereupon the defendant was found guilty of Contempt of Court committed in the presence of the Court and sentenced to serve thirty (30) days at the Detroit House of Correction."

On appeal, defendant initially contends that a summary contempt charge was improperly [113 MICHAPP 552] brought because his behavior did not occur during the "sitting" of the court and it did not interrupt any judicial proceedings. We find these arguments unpersuasive.

M.C.L. Sec. 600.1701; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1701, provides, in part:

"Supreme court, circuit courts, and all other courts of record, have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, persons guilty of any neglect or violation of duty or misconduct in the following cases:

"(1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed during its sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or impair the respect due to its authority * * *."

Summary punishment for contempt is available under M.C.L. Sec. 600.1711(1); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1711(1):

"When any contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, the court may punish it summarily by fine, or imprisonment, or both."

Defendant argues that because the court had adjourned the bond proceeding it was no longer "sitting". We decline to construe this term so narrowly. The word "sitting" is defined in very broad terms as follows:

"SITTING. In English law. The part of the year in which judicial business is transacted. A session or term of court; usually plural. People v. Higgins, 173 Misc. 96, 16 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310." (Emphasis supplied.) Black's Law Dictionary, (Rev. 4th ed.), 1557.

"Session" is defined as:

"The sitting of a court, Legislature, council, commission, etc., for the transaction of its proper business. Hence, the period of time, within any one day, during [113 MICHAPP 553] which such body is assembled in form, and engaged in the transaction of business, or, in a more extended sense, the whole space of time from its first assembling to its prorogation or adjournment sine die. Ralls v. Wyand, 40 Okl. 323, 138 P. 158, 162." Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed.), 1536.

"Term of court" is given the following definition:

"When used with reference to a court, signifies the space of time during which the court holds a session. A session signifies the time during the term when the court sits for the transaction of business, and the session commences when the court convenes for the term, and continues until final adjournment, either before or at the expiration of the term. The term of the court is the time prescribed by law during which it may be in session. The session of the court is the time of its actual sitting." (Emphasis supplied.) Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed.), 1640.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the phrase "the sitting of the court" is normally accorded a very general meaning, synonymous with the part of the year or the time prescribed by law for judicial business. Contrary to defendant's contention, the phrase need not be strictly limited to the period of a court's gavel-to-gavel functioning. Under the wording of the statute itself, the factor which limits behavior defined as contempt is provided by the language which requires that the contemptuous acts be committed "in * * * [the court's] immediate view and presence". In a discussion concerning an identically worded statute, the Supreme Court stated:

"While the court, under this statute, may be considered as sitting from the beginning of its session until the end thereof, yet the words 'immediate view and presence' are words of limitation, and exclude the idea [113 MICHAPP 554] of constructive presence. The immediate view and presence does not extend beyond the range of vision of the judge, and the term applies only to such contempts as are committed in the face of the court. Of such contempts, he may take cognizance of his own knowledge, and may proceed to punish summarily such contempts, basing his action entirely upon...