Conti v. Fisher

• Decision Date: 04 November 1926
• Docket Number: No. 725.,725.
• Citation: 134 A. 849
• Parties: CONTI v. FISHER et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

134 A. 849

CONTI

v. FISHER et al.

No. 725.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 4, 1926.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Hugh B. Baker, Judge.

Suit by Elena Conti against Julia R. Fisher and respondents Boscaglia. Decree for complainant, and respondents Boscaglia appeal. Appeal dismissed, and cause remanded.

Charles R. Easton, of Providence, for appellants.

Patrick P. Curran, Hoyt W. Lark, and Green, Curran & Hart, all of Providence, for appellee.

BARROWS, J. Heard on appeal from a final decree of the superior court ordering reformation of two deeds, and incidentally enjoining respondents Boscaglia from prosecuting an action of trespass quare clausum against complainant.

The facts as found by the lower court show that respondent Fisher sold certain real estate with a dwelling and barn thereon on Metcalf street, in Providence, to complainant, and about three months later sold an adjoining parcel, likewise with dwelling, to respondents Boscaglia. The lots were conveyed by deed describing them only by number on a plat. There was a fence upon the platted lot named in the Boscaglia deed. It had stood for a long time. To both purchasers, prior to the sale, their respective properties were pointed out, and the trial justice finds "both clearly purchased according to the existing boundary lines then on the property as shown by the fences." The lot delineated on the plat referred to in the Conti deed showed the northerly line to be six feet south of the fence, and the lot delineated on the plat referred to in the Boscaglia deed showed its southerly line to be identical with the aforementioned northerly line of the Conti deed. The result, according to the deeds, was that the Boscaglias seemed to have title to a strip six feet wide, extending the full depth of the lot between the fence and the division line as shown on the plat. This strip neither the Boscaglias had intended to purchase, nor Fisher to sell, to them. Written receipts for deposits at the time of the making of the contracts of sale were given by Fisher to both Conti and Boscaglias, and the deeds supposedly pursuant thereto followed. These receipts referred to the land sold as Nos. 105 and 109 Metcalf street, respectively. They had been lost prior to the trial, and the introduction of oral evidence of their contents, together with other oral evidence of the intentions of the parties, over respondents Boscaglias' objections, based upon the statute of frauds, furnishes the basis for respondents' present contentions.

Both purchasers entered into occupation of their respective curtilages, complainant occupying the house and barn—the latter of which rested upon a portion of the six-foot strip now in dispute—and the respondents Boscaglia occupying the house within the fence lines on their lot, but at no time exercising dominion either real or apparent over the six-foot strip. After four years of such occupation, the mistake in the deeds was discovered, and the present litigation followed.

The court found on the evidence that a mutual mistake had been made in the descriptions in the deeds whereby Conti received less than had been purchased and the Boscaglias more. The decree recites these mutual mistakes, and gives directions concerning their rectification. Respondent Fisher, who admitted the mistake, and joined in the prayer of the bill, is ordered by the decree to clear the record title of complainant by releasing all of her right, title, and interest in the strip in question after the Boscaglias have quitclaimed to complainant their interest in said six-foot strip, and the Boscaglias are directed to discontinue prosecution of the lawsuit against Conti for trespass.

Respondents Boscaglias say a single point is presented, viz. "whether such a conveyance of real estate as prayed for by the bill and ordered by the decree to be made by respondents is within the statute of frauds." Gen. Laws 1923, c. 333, § 6 (4854).

The general jurisdiction of equity to correct mistakes is not questioned, nor the right therein to introduce parol evidence to show mutual mistakes and seek reformation of written instruments in general. Walden v. Skinner, 101 U. S. 577, 25 L. Ed. 963. It is urged, however, that, where a contract, such as for the sale of land, is by statute required to be in writing, and an omission from the deed causes a conveyance of less land than was orally agreed upon, parol evidence, while admissible to secure a rescission, is not admissible to secure a reformation and enforcement of the contract as reformed. Such use of the evidence is said to charge a respondent upon a contract not in writing in violation of the statute of frauds. Macomber v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 485, 17 A. 910, and a leading case, Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 3 Am. Rep. 418, take this view.

Complainant and the lower court regard the instant case as ruled, not by the Macomber Case, but by Carroll v. Ryder, 34 I R. I. 383, 83 A. 845. From the rescript of the trial justice it appears that some uncertainty may exist as to whether the Ryder Case overrules or limits the Macomber Case. The doubt has been created, perhaps, by failure of the later case to refer to the earlier case. The contradictory results of the two cases give an appearance of inconsistency. The records, however, as they came before the Supreme Court, show that in the Macomber Case admission or rejection of oral evidence of the agreement made before the execution of the deed was the sole question for determination. The effect of the statute of frauds was the vital issue. Of it the court said, at page 486 (17 A. 910):

"The naked...