Continental Bldg. Corp. v. Union Oil Co. of California

Decision Date27 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-0434,86-0434
Citation105 Ill.Dec. 502,504 N.E.2d 787,152 Ill.App.3d 513
Parties, 105 Ill.Dec. 502 CONTINENTAL BUILDING CORPORATION, an Illinois Corporation, Continental Envelope Corporation, an Illinois Corporation; and Continental Envelope Corporation of Genoa, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Conklin & Adler, Ltd., Chicago (Howard L. Lieber and Peter A. Quilici, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., Chicago (James J. O'Hagan, Carmel M. Cosgrave and Eric L. Samore, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Justice STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Continental Building Corporation, Continental Envelope Corporation and Continental Envelope Corporation of Genoa, ("Continental"), appeal from the circuit court's order dismissing Count X of their amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs' amended complaint sought to recover damages for extensive damage to their real and personal property caused by a major fire which originated in a warehouse containing defendant's, Union Oil Company of California ("Union Oil"), containers of solid and liquid chemicals which were "highly flammable, combustible and explosive."

Plaintiffs were owners of a complex of buildings located at 1301 West 35th Street, Chicago, Illinois. Stored within that complex were various fixtures and personal property, including large quantities of paper goods owned by Continental. Prior to August 26, 1980, Union Oil arranged to have some of its chemical products stored at an independently owned warehouse located at 3615 South Iron Street, Chicago, Illinois.

On or about August 26, 1980, a fire broke out at the 3615 South Iron Street warehouse facility. The fire quickly spread to an adjacent building located at 3601 South Iron Street and then to Continental's property on 1301 West 35th Street.

Count X alleged that Union Oil was engaged in an ultrahazardous activity by storing highly flammable, combustible and explosive solid and liquid chemical products in an unsuitable environment. Moreover, the complaint alleged that Union Oil had a duty to assure that such products were placed in safe and suitable storage containers and that Union Oil failed to fulfill this duty. Finally, Continental alleged that as a result of Union Oil's ultra-hazardous activity, Continental's property became involved in a fire resulting in damages of $551,932.

Union Oil moved to dismiss Count X with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. After reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument Judge O'Brien granted Union Oil's motion. Continental requested that the court's order be made final and appealable. Judge O'Brien granted Continental's request.

On September 12, 1986, Union Oil filed a motion with this court requesting that the prayer in Continental's reply brief, seeking leave to amend Count X to remedy any deficiencies in its allegations, be stricken and denied.

Initially, we address Union Oil's motion to strike Continental's prayer for relief in its reply brief. Supreme Court Rule 303 c(2) requires that the notice of appeal specify "the relief sought from the reviewing court." Moreover, a party desiring to file an amended pleading should make it part of the record on appeal. If this is not done, a court of review is not in a position to say that justice would be done by granting leave to amend. (Hassiepen v. Marcin (1974), 22 Ill.App.3d 433, 436, 318 N.E.2d 162.) In its notice of appeal, Continental failed to request that this court grant it leave to amend its complaint. Moreover, Continental failed to request such leave in the trial court. In fact, Continental specifically asked the trial judge to make his order final and appealable. In their reply brief, Continental requested this court allow plaintiffs to amend Count X in the event this court should decide to affirm the trial court's decision. We grant Union Oil's motion to strike Continental's prayer to amend Count X of its complaint because Continental failed to request such relief at the trial level.

The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Count X of Continental's complaint alleging that Union Oil's activity of storing flammable substances was an ultra-hazardous activity creating liability without fault.

As this court has previously noted, most jurisdictions in this country have adopted the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 and impose strict liability on owners and users of land for harm resulting from abnormally dangerous activities and conditions. (Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 525, 528-29, 20 Ill.Dec. 467, 380 N.E.2d 445 citing Prosser, Torts § 78, at 505 (4th ed. 1971) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1976).) The "rule" of Rylands is that "the defendant will be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in light of the character of that place and its surroundings." Prosser, Torts § 78 at 508 (4th ed. 1971).

One of the activities to which the rule of Rylands has often been applied is the storing and use of explosives and flammable materials. 63 Ill.App.3d 525, 528-29, 20 Ill.Dec. 467, 380 N.E.2d 445; see Indiana Belt Harbor R.R. Co. v. American Cynamid Co. (N.D.Ill.1981), 517 F.Supp. 314; Fitzsimmons & Connell Co. v. Braun (1902), 199 Ill. 390, 65 N.E. 252; see e.g. City of Joliet v. Harwood (1877), 86 Ill. 110; Opal v. Material Service Corporation (1956), 9 Ill.App.2d 433, 133 N.E.2d 733 (Courts found that the use of explosive material, such as dynamite, in a residential area was intrinsically dangerous and gave rise to strict liability for the blaster.)

In Indiana Belt Harbor R.R. Co., a Federal court, applying Illinois law, held that shipping acrylonitrile, a hazardous and toxic substance, was an ultra-hazardous activity that subjected the shipper to strict liability. The court reviewed Illinois cases dealing with ultra-hazardous activities and noted that while Illinois cases had focused largely on blasting operations, they had not expressly limited the concept to this activity. (517 F.Supp. 314, 317.) The court determined that the Illinois blasting cases stood for the proposition that, "[i]f an activity is inherently dangerous and harm naturally and probably results from it despite the exercise of utmost care, liability will result." (517 F.Supp. 314, 317.) Consequently, the court found that Illinois law was in accord with Rylands and applied the Second Restatement's approach in determining that defendant was strictly liable. 517 F.Supp. 314, 317.

Section 519 of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the general principle that "[o]ne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." Section 520 sets forth the following factors to be considered in defining an abnormally dangerous activity: "(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattles of...

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