Continental Oil Co. v. Barnes

Decision Date18 September 1936
Docket NumberNo. 13397.,13397.
Citation97 S.W.2d 494
PartiesCONTINENTAL OIL CO. et al. v. BARNES.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from District Court, Wichita County; Allan D. Montgomery, Judge.

Suit by A. L. Barnes against the Continental Oil Company and another. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Cantey, Hanger & McMahon, J. A. Gooch, and James C. Wilson, Jr., all of Fort Worth, for appellants.

W. W. Shuler and Smoot & Smoot, all of Wichita Falls, for appellee.

SPEER, Justice.

This suit was instituted by A. L. Barnes against the Continental Oil Company and Virgil Davidson for damages growing out of the alleged negligence of defendants. The material allegations of plaintiff were as follows:

On February 24, 1934, Davidson was in the employ of the Continental Oil Company, driving one of its trucks in the course of his employment. While operating the truck along a certain highway which was so constructed as to have a deep ditch on either side, and a branch or gully extending across the highway, spanned by a flat wooden bridge, Davidson negligently stopped the truck near the center of the traveled part of the highway in close proximity to the wooden bridge; that the truck was stopped at a point on the traveled part of said highway where insufficient space was left on either side to enable other vehicles to pass in safety; that the truck was not equipped with a rear-view mirror; that the driver made no effort to ascertain if another car was following him along the highway, and made no visible or audible sign or signal of his intention to bring his truck to a stop at said time and place. These and other acts of Davidson were alleged to be negligence and the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

The plaintiff further alleged that he, on the date mentioned, was operating a truck on said highway hauling gravel from a nearby pit to a WPA job then under construction; that plaintiff's truck was in a good state of repair, equipped with good and efficient brakes, and that he was keeping a lookout ahead for other vehicles and objects on and along the highway, traveling at a moderate and safe rate of speed; that he saw the other truck come off of the Continental Oil Company's premises and on to the highway immediately in front of him and that he followed it about one mile, keeping approximately 50 or 60 feet behind it; that at a point near the narrow wooden bridge the driver of the Continental Oil Company's truck, without warning or signal of any kind, brought his car to a sudden stop immediately in front of plaintiff near the center of the road, and plaintiff applied his brakes and attempted to stop but, because of the suddenness with which the other truck had stopped, the plaintiff had approached close enough that he could not stop his own truck in time to avoid a collision, and to prevent this he swerved his car to the left and went out of the roadway into the ditch, and, seeing the ravine that crossed the highway immediately in front of him and realizing he must be precipitated into it, he again swerved his car to the right, bringing it out of the ditch on to the roadside, went on to the narrow bridge, blew out a tire and damaged his truck in such a way that when he arrived at the point where he dumped his gravel the water had leaked out of his radiator and his motor was ruined.

Plaintiff further alleged that, because of the negligent acts of said Virgil Davidson at the time mentioned, he (the plaintiff) was confronted with what appeared to him to be certain death or serious bodily injury, and that sudden necessary movements of his body and limbs in his effort to extricate himself from his perilous position so wrenched his body, jarred and shocked his nerves, that his mind went through such a severe shock and strain that members of his body, including his mind and heart, were so seriously affected as to cause great physical pain and mental anguish, and all have had the effect to permanently weaken and disarrange his heart action and his circulatory system until he will never recover therefrom and be able to do manual labor or otherwise earn a livelihood.

Defendants answered by what is commonly known as a general denial, thus putting in issue all of plaintiff's allegations.

The case was submitted to the jury on special issues, involving all of the alleged acts of negligence by the defendants upon which testimony was offered. We think there were sufficient pleadings and evidence to warrant the submission of these issues. The answers of the jury to issues propounded were favorable to plaintiff, naming damages in the sum of $1,363, upon which answers the court entered judgment.

Defendants perfected an appeal to this court and have assigned fifty-five errors upon which they have presented fourteen points or propositions for our consideration. Several of these propositions, for the purpose of this opinion, may be grouped as presenting similar questions from which we may dispose of the case. They are: (1) That, by the form of certain issues, explanations, and conditions mentioned by the court, the jury was informed what effect its answers would have on the judgment to be rendered; (2) that the court should have submitted to the jury special issues relating to contributory negligence by the plaintiff; (3) that the matter of an insurance company being interested in the result of the suit was improperly injected into the case and that a mistrial should have been declared; (4) that the question of burden of proof was improperly submitted.

We shall dispose of the case by discussing it in the order we have classified defendants' several propositions, and refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court.

Much has been written by the courts with reference to the inhibition of imparting to the jury by courts and counsel information as to the effect its findings would have on the judgment to be rendered. It is right and proper, under the provisions of our laws creating what is known as the special issue statute, that the jury answer inquiries as to facts only without a concern as to the kind of judgment that shall be entered by the court, and to this end it is improper for counsel or the trial court to apprise it of the legal effects of its answers.

In this case the court gave in his charge definitions of negligence and proximate cause in terms such as to evoke no criticism from the defendants. The special issues submitted embraced each of the alleged grounds of negligence, such as: Did the driver of the Continental Oil Company's truck stop his truck without giving a signal of his intention to do so? Did the driver of defendant's truck stop in such a position on the highway as to leave insufficient room for other cars to pass on his left hand side? Was the truck of defendant company equipped with a rearview mirror so that the driver could see vehicles approaching from the rear? Did the driver of the defendant company's truck use the mirror on his truck, if any he had, to discover the approach of plaintiff's truck? Did the driver of defendant company's truck stop at a place on the highway so as to leave a clear unobstructed space opposite his truck of at least 15 feet on the improved portion of the highway for the free passage of other vehicles?

After an explanation following each of those issues that, if answered in the affirmative, they would answer the succeeding issue, there followed an issue as to whether the act inquired about was a proximate cause of the damage alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff. Those issues submitting whether or not the alleged acts of negligence were proximate causes were Nos. 3, 7, 10, 14, and 17. Then we quote from the charge:

"If you have answered either of special issues Nos. 3, 7, 10, 14 and 17 in the affirmative, then you will answer the following special issue, and if you have answered all said special issues in the negative, you will not answer the following special issue:

"Special Issue No. 19: What amount of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for his injury, if any, proximately caused by the negligence, if any, of the defendant at the time and place in question? Answer as you find the facts to be. Answer: $1,125.00."

Defendants complain that the paragraph quoted, preceding special issue No. 19, informed the jury the effect their former answers would have on the judgment to be rendered by the court.

It is well settled in this state that, when a case is submitted to the jury upon special issues as provided in article 2189, R.C.S., no general charge shall be given nor shall the court in any way so instruct the jury or frame the issues in a way that the jury may know therefrom what the effect of its answers shall be upon the judgment to be rendered.

It is difficult to comprehend the full meaning of the distinctions drawn by many of the courts on this point. It seems that there can be no harm done, and it is not reversible error if the information imparted does not disclose something the jury did not already know. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines v. Grasso (Tex.Civ.App.) 59 S.W. (2d) 337. Jurors of ordinary intelligence, but untrained in law, may know more about the effect of their several answers to issues than those of us who have made a study of the law are willing to give them credit for, yet the line must be drawn somewhere, and it becomes largely a question of opinion of the person speaking as to the extent of their knowledge.

In some cases the courts have held it was not error for the trial court to insert between some issues submitted instructions to the jury, in substance, that if they answered the preceding issue in the negative they should not answer the next issue, but if they answered in the affirmative they should proceed to answer the next issue. Western Indemnity Co. v. Corder (Tex.Civ.App.) 249 S.W. 316...

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    ...answers than lawyers realize, but upheld the rule because "the line must be drawn somewhere." Continental Oil Co. v. Barnes, 97 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1936, writ ref'd). Our Court recognized that a strict rule against telling the jury the effect of its answers ignores rea......
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