Contracts Funding and Mortgage Exchange v. Maynes, 13608

• Decision Date: 04 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 13608,13608
• Citation: 527 P.2d 1073
• Parties: CONTRACTS FUNDING AND MORTGAGE EXCHANGE, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Darrell D. MAYNES, Director, Salt Lake County Building and Zoning Enforcement Department, Defendant and Appellant. CONTRACTS FUNDING AND MORTGAGE EXCHANGE, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1073

527 P.2d 1073

CONTRACTS FUNDING AND MORTGAGE EXCHANGE, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Darrell D. MAYNES, Director, Salt Lake County Building and Zoning Enforcement Department, Defendant and Appellant.

CONTRACTS FUNDING AND MORTGAGE EXCHANGE, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 13608.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Nov. 4, 1974.

Carl J. Nemelka, Salt Lake County Atty., John G. Avery, Ralph D. Crockett, Richard S. Shepherd, Deputy Salt Lake County Attys., Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.

J. Richard Bell, Bell & Bell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal by the County from a judgment saying plaintiff should be allowed to develop a mobile home project on vacant, unzoned property. Affirmed.

Taking substantially the defendants' statement of the facts, in brief they were as follows: Plaintiff had agreed, on October 17, 1972, to purchase a piece of unzoned property in the County through the Probate Court. On December 4, 1972, the County Commissioners had a defectively noticed public hearing to determine why all of the unzoned County property categorically should not be zoned.

Plaintiff appeared and requested no zoning at that time. The request was granted. Then plaintiff asked for a conditional use permit, directed to the County's Planning Commission, for construction of the mobile homes. On March 3, 1973, the latter considered the request, and conditionally approved the application upon its staff checking the matter and reporting back, which it did on March 27, 1973, about three weeks later, so that residents of the area could appear and express their opinions.

At the March 27th meeting of the Planning Board, plaintiff's application for a building permit verbally was denied. Written notice of such denial was given a week or so later, whence plaintiff appealed directly to the Commission, thus anchoring the matter.

On May 27, 1973, the Probate Court confirmed plaintiff's offer and the inchoate purchase was concluded. On August 7, 1973, plaintiff again asked for a building permit, and on August 9, 1973, two days later, the Commission not only denied the appeal, but passed a zoning ordinance excluding plaintiff's proposal to construct the homes, indirectly interdicting any go-ahead permission.

Therefore, as we see it, the plaintiff had a right to build what it said it wanted to build, if it had filed an application for a permit to do so.

There is nothing in this record to indicate that the County or anyone else denied the application for a permit because of failure to file something, pay something, do something or violate something. The presumption in this case is in favor of the applicant's right, with...