Contreras ex rel. Her Minor Child A.L. v. Dona Ana Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners

• Decision Date: 20 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-2176,18-2176
• Citation: 965 F.3d 1114 (Mem)
• Parties: Kathy CONTRERAS, ON BEHALF OF her minor child A.L., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DONA ANA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, doing business as Doña Ana County Detention Center; Paco Luna; Jaime Casado ; and Shaylene Platero, Defendants - Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

965 F.3d 1114 (Mem)

Kathy CONTRERAS, ON BEHALF OF her minor child A.L., Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.DONA ANA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, doing business as Doña Ana County Detention Center; Paco Luna; Jaime Casado ; and Shaylene Platero, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 18-2176

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED July 20, 2020

Katherine Wray (Margaret Strickland, McGraw & Strickland, Las Cruces, New Mexico, with her on the briefs) Wray & Girard, PC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.

Damian L. Martinez (Haley R. Grant with him on the brief), Holt Mynatt Martinez P.C., Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Appellees.

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

This appeal arises from allegations of deliberate indifference to violence among pretrial detainees at a juvenile detention facility in Doña Ana County, New Mexico.

After A.L. was booked into the Doña Ana County Detention Center, three other detainees threatened him with physical harm. Corrections officers responded by imposing a highly-restrictive lockdown regime on all three aggressors. Despite these countermeasures, one of the aggressors—while temporarily permitted outside of his cell—accessed the touchscreen control panel that regulated access to cells within the juvenile pod. While corrections officers were distracted, he opened several cells simultaneously. The other two aggressors took this opportunity to physically assault A.L.

Kathy Contreras, A.L.’s mother, subsequently brought this lawsuit against the three corrections officers present during the attack, as well as the Doña Ana County Detention Center. She alleges the defendants violated A.L.’s Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process through deliberate indifference to the violence threatened by other detainees. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. On appeal, a majority of the court concludes the district court did not err. No legal authorities clearly establish a constitutional violation under these circumstances.

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.¹ Chief Judge Tymkovich concurs, concluding that no constitutional violation occurred. Judge Carson concurs, concluding that he would dispose of this case without determining whether a constitutional violation occurred. Judge Baldock concurs in part and dissents in part. He concurs in the affirmance of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Jaime Casado and Shaylene Platero, but he dissents as to Defendants Paco Luna and Doña Ana County, concluding (1) Sergeant Luna violated A.L.’s clearly established constitutional right to protection from violence, and (2) Doña Ana County should also be liable for that violation.

TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, concurring.

In my view, Ms. Contreras has failed not only to demonstrate the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, but also the violation of a constitutional right at all.

I. Background

On the evening of May 3, 2016, A.L. was booked into the Doña Ana County Detention Center (DACDC) for violating terms associated with his probation. As A.L. was led to his cell, three other detainees—A.H., J.S., and J.V.—spontaneously began banging on their cell doors and yelling to A.L. that they "were gonna f**k him up."

In response, corrections officers placed all three aggressors on pre-disciplinary lockdown ("pre-disc"), which imposed a number of restrictions. While subject to pre-disc, A.H., J.S., and J.V. could only leave their cells for one of several enumerated purposes, and never at the same time. This regime also proscribed any contact with A.L. And it likewise sought to restrict communication among the three aggressors.

The next morning, Officer Casado, Cadet Platero, and Sergeant Luna were in the common area on the first floor of the juvenile pod. While A.L., J.S., and J.V. remained locked in separate cells on the second floor, A.H. obtained permission to leave his cell for the permissible purpose of a shower. The shower room sat on the first floor, just adjacent to the common area.

Video indicates all three corrections officers watched television in the common area as A.H. finished his shower. Consistent with the restrictions imposed by A.H.’s pre-disc, no other detainee appeared outside of the locked cells. Upon exiting the shower room, A.H. entered the common area, which houses both the commissary kiosk and the touchscreen control panel. The record discloses that Officer Casado had left the control panel unlocked.

A.H. obtained permission from Sergeant Luna to use the commissary kiosk. But as he stands at the kiosk, the video suggests A.H. glances over his shoulder to check whether the corrections officers were paying attention. He then walks offscreen. Moments later, one of the corrections officers—evidently recognizing something amiss—stands suddenly as A.H. reappears onscreen. Around this same time, J.S. and J.V. flee their newly-unlocked cells.

They enter A.L.’s cell, closing the door behind them. J.S. and J.V. then begin assaulting A.L. As they do so, A.H. runs upstairs and locks himself inside his own cell, before Officer Casado can catch him. From downstairs, Cadet Platero re-opens A.L.’s cell. Sergeant Luna eventually subdues A.L.’s attackers with pepper spray. All of this transpires within twenty seconds.

II. Analysis

Ms. Contreras contends the district court erred in concluding the corrections officers’ behavior did not violate a clearly-established constitutional right to protection from violence.¹

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. E.g. , Lindsey v. Hyler , 918 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Trask v. Franco , 446 F.3d 1036, 1043 (10th Cir. 2006) ("On appeal, we review the award of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo .")). Summary judgment becomes appropriate when there exists no genuine dispute of material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ).

In conducting this exercise, we consider evidence and draw inferences in the manner most favorable to the non-moving party. Id . (citing Schutz v. Thorne , 415 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) ). But where, as here, a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time the violation transpired. Id . (citing Medina v. Cram , 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) ). Unless the plaintiff can satisfy both requirements, the defendant will prevail.

We examine each requirement in turn.

A. Constitutional Violation

The Supreme Court has explained that "the treatment a prisoner receives ... and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment."² Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). The Court has accordingly construed the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" to encompass certain "restraints on prison officials." Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). For example, officials may not apply "excessive" physical force against inmates. Id . (citing Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ).

The Supreme Court has likewise held that the Eighth Amendment imposes certain affirmative obligations upon prison officials. Among these obligations are provisions for "adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care." Id . (citing Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 526–27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) ). Most importantly for present purposes, the Court has held that prison officials "must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of [ ] inmates [ ]." Id . (citing same).

To the extent prison officials manifest deliberate indifference to any of these affirmative obligations, injured parties may seek redress under § 1983. E.g. , Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104–06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). But this cause of action does not imply that "every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another will translate into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (cleaned up).

To prevail on a constitutional claim for "deliberate indifference," a plaintiff must demonstrate both an objective and a subjective failure on the part of prison officials. Id ; see also Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he plaintiff must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, the objective component, and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to his safety, the subjective component.").

1. Objective Inquiry

Where a § 1983 action is premised "on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." See id . (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Howard v. Waide , 534 F.3d 1227, 1236 (10th Cir. 2008) ("First, the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious under an objective standard. In cases involving a failure to prevent harm, this means that the prisoner must show that the conditions of his incarceration present an objective substantial risk of serious harm ." (emphasis added) (citing Smith, 445 F.3d at 1258 )).

And where the plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to the threats inmates may pose to one another, he must demonstrate a connection between the conditions of incarceration and the substantial (and particularized) risk of serious harm. See, e.g. , Verdecia v. Adams , 327 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2003) ("To establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect [an inmate from harm by other inmates], the plaintiff must show that he [was] incarcerated under conditions posing ...