Contreras v. Rubley

• Decision Date: 23 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 31123.,31123.
• Citation: 130 P.3d 1111,142 Idaho 573
• Parties: Ramiro G. CONTRERAS and Omar Baeza Martinez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Clare B. RUBLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

130 P.3d 1111

142 Idaho 573

Ramiro G. CONTRERAS and Omar Baeza Martinez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Clare B. RUBLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 31123.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 2005 Term.

February 23, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sasser & Inglis, P.C., Boise, for appellant. Clay M. Shockley argued.

Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Boise, for respondents. John W. Kluksdal argued.

TROUT, Justice.

This case involves a personal injury action brought by respondents Ramiro G. Contreras and Omar Baeza Martinez against appellant Clare B. Rubley as a result of a three-car accident. A jury found Contreras and Baeza Martinez were entitled to a portion of their damages caused by the accident. Contreras claimed less than $25,000 in damages and was awarded attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(4). Baeza Martinez's claim for damages was significantly more than $25,000 and the trial court awarded him attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 37(c). Rubley now appeals those attorney fee awards.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 24, 2000, Rubley was driving down a state highway in dense fog on icy roads when the brake lights of the car in front of her came on abruptly, causing Rubley to step on her brakes. Rubley's truck slid on a patch of ice and then stuck on the guardrail so she was unable to move it, causing her to partially block traffic. Contreras and his passenger, Baeza Martinez, stopped their car on the highway to offer assistance. Before they could exit their car, a third driver, Hamsa Siebanthaler, struck Contreras' car and propelled it into Rubley's truck, injuring both Contreras and Baeza Martinez.

There was correspondence back and forth between the parties' attorneys, including a letter dated June 18, 2002, which was directed to Rubley's insurance company (Statement of Claim). In that letter, respondents' attorney referenced Idaho Code § 12-120(4) and indicated respondents would be filing suit and would demand attorney fees if Rubley did not make an offer of at least 90% of the amount Contreras was ultimately able to obtain from a jury. The Statement of Claim listed some medical expenses for both Contreras and Baeza Martinez, and included a picture of Contreras' damaged car, as well as a copy of the police report. Respondents' attorney requested $20,000 on behalf of Contreras because he believed his damages were less serious than those of Baeza Martinez. With respect to Baeza Martinez, the attorney indicated $100,000 would be sufficient to take care of Baeza Martinez's claims. The insurance company refused to tender any money at all and ultimately suit was filed. During the course of the litigation, other demands were made by respondents to Rubley, including another request to settle the case that specifically mentioned the $2,500 damage done to Contreras' car.

Respondents settled with Siebanthaler, so the case proceeded only against Rubley. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Siebanthaler 70% at fault, Rubley 28% at fault, and Contreras 2% at fault. The jury awarded damages for medical expenses and for loss of the car, and awarded a small amount of damages for both Contreras and Baeza Martinez. The district court then entered judgment for 28% of those respective amounts.

Subsequently, Baeza Martinez sought attorney fees pursuant to Rule 37(c), arguing Rubley unreasonably refused to admit negligence in response to certain requests for admission. Likewise, Contreras sought attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(4) based upon his claim for an amount of damages less than $25,000 in a personal injury action. Rubley opposed any award of attorney fees to respondents and sought attorney fees for herself under I.C. § 12-120(4) as the prevailing party and under Rule 37(c), claiming Contreras unreasonably failed to admit negligence.

The district court granted Baeza Martinez's motion for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 37(c) because the court concluded Rubley unreasonably failed to admit negligence. The district court also awarded Contreras attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(4), concluding evidence of the damage to Contreras' car did not constitute evidence of a significant new item of damage. The district court then denied Rubley's motion for attorney fees, finding respondents were prevailing parties and Contreras' denial of negligence was reasonable. Rubley appeals these awards and the denial of her request for attorney fees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 (2004). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Nampa Charter School, Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 29, 89 P.3d 863, 869 (2004).

When the award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute giving rise to that award, however, a different standard of review applies. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute will govern and there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Rubley contends Contreras waived his right to fees under I.C. § 12-120(4) because he sought a "significant new item of damage" ($2,500 for his car) at trial which was not included in his Statement of Claim.¹ Rubley also argues the district court erred in awarding Baeza Martinez attorney fees under Rule 37(c) because Rubley had a reasonable belief she would prevail at trial on the issue of negligence, and therefore reasonably denied respondents' requests for admission. Finally, Rubley claims the district court erroneously denied her requests for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 37(c), as Contreras' denial of several requests for admission was unreasonable. Thus, the key issues raised by this appeal are (1) whether evidence of damage to Contreras' car constitutes a "significant new item of damage" such that Contreras forfeited his right to recover attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(4); and (2) whether Rubley's blanket denial of a request for admission was unreasonable and therefore justified an award of attorney fees to Baeza Martinez under Rule 37(c). This Court will also address whether Rubley was entitled to attorney fees below and whether attorney fees will be awarded to any party on appeal.

A. Significant New Item of Damage

Under I.C. § 12-120(4), a plaintiff waives the ability to claim attorney fees if she "includes in ... evidence offered at trial, a different alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of claim...." A statement of claim is defined, in part, as follows:

(a) An itemized statement of each and every item of damage claimed by the plaintiff including the amount claimed for general damages and the following items of special damages: (i) medical bills incurred up to the date of the plaintiff's demand; (ii) a good faith estimate of future medical bills; (iii) lost income incurred up to the date of the plaintiff's demand; (iv) a good faith estimate of future loss of income; and (v) property damage for which the plaintiff has not been paid.

I.C. § 12-120(4) (emphasis added). Rubley argues Contreras waived his right to claim attorney fees because he did not make any claim for property damage in his Statement of Claim, yet sought reimbursement of $2,500 for his car—a "significant new item of damage"—at trial. Ultimately, the jury awarded Contreras $2,500 for property damage, in addition to other damages.

Here, the property damage claimed by Contreras was new because it was not expressly included in his Statement of Claim to Rubley's insurer, as required by I.C. § 12-120(4)(a)(v). Contreras did include photos of the totaled car with his Statement of Claim, but this was done simply to show the severity of the collision, as Contreras' attorney noted, "I have also enclosed pictures of my client's vehicle, which indicates this was a violent collision." Also, the police accident report accompanying the Statement of Claim estimated $5,000 of damage to the car, but this does not qualify as sufficient statement of a claim for this property damage.

Even though evidence of the property damage was new, it is not significant enough to constitute a waiver of Contreras' right to attorney fees. Contreras' original Statement of Claim to Rubley's insurer on June 18, 2002, sought $20,000 in damages. The insurer disclaimed liability for the accident and made no tender to respondents in an attempt to settle the case. We agree with the district court that the $2,500 car was not necessarily a significant item of damage when compared to the $20,000 demand made in the Statement of Claim. As Rubley's insurer disclaimed any liability by concluding Siebanthaler was 100% responsible for the accident, it is difficult to see how a lack of awareness of damage to the car played any part in Rubley's insurer's refusal to settle prior to the commencement of the suit. We affirm the district court's award of attorney fees to Contreras made pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(4).

B. Requests for Admission

Rubley denied a request to admit "negligence"² (duty and breach of duty) as well as various requests relating to whether her negligence caused the accident. The district court awarded attorney fees to Baeza Martinez pursuant to Rule 37(c) because it concluded Rubley unreasonably denied she was negligent, although the court emphasized it was reasonable for Rubley to...