Converse v. City of Kemah
| Decision Date | 12 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-105 |
| Parties | RONALD LEE CONVERSE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF KEMAH, TEXAS, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Plaintiff, Ronald Lee Converse, has sued the City of Kemah Police Department as well as Kemah Police Officers James Melton, Ruben Kimball, Marcus Way, and Daniel Kirby, Police Dispatcher Anna Marie Whelan, and Police Chief Greg Rikard, in their individual capacities. Converse alleges that his son, Chad Silvis, committed suicide in April 2014 by hanging himself in a jail cell, using a blanket provided to him by one of the officers. Converse bring claims on his own behalf as well as on behalf of his son's estate. The mother of Silvis's minor child has also filed a lawsuit in this Court, asserting nearly identical claims on behalf of Silvis's child, and the Court has consolidated these suits.
Converse filed his lawsuit in state probate court in March 2015, and the City removed it this Court. After an initial motion to dismiss, Converse filed another "Complaint." Defendants again filed a motion to dismiss. Converse then filed a "First Amended Complaint," which is his current live pleading. Converse acknowledges that some documentation and a videotape has been handed over by the City, but he alleges that no other discovery has taken place.
Converse's live pleading alleges that, twenty minutes after midnight on April 11, 2014, a passerby informed Officer Way of a "possible jumper" on a Kemah bridge. Officers Melton, Way, and Kimball all responded to the scene and Converse alleges that these officers then "gained actual knowledge that Mr. Silvis was suicidal." Silvis was arrested for an unstated reason and transported to the Kemah Police Department. During the booking process, Converse alleges that "Silvis [was] clearly depressed" and "told officers that he [was] unhappy, that he [was] ready to go to the doctor and see what is wrong with him," and "complain[ed] that he does not have anyone." Converse describes Silvis's behavior during the booking process as "erratic, with mood swings and irrational behavior and talk of suicide."
At some point after Silvis's arrest, but before he was placed in a cell, Officer Kimball gave Silvis a blanket. Silvis took this blanket into his cell, and Converse alleges that Officers Kimball, Way, and Kirby, as well as Dispatcher Whelan, all saw Silvis take the blanket into his cell with him. Converse alleges that "the individual Defendants knew Mr. Silvis was clearly in distress and wanting to complete his suicide attempt." Nonetheless, Converse alleges that Silvis was left "in a solitary cell, with a defective blanket with no monitoring, either in person or through the video cameras in the cell or checks instituted."
Converse alleges that, while in the cell, Silvis yelled and banged on the cell door, injuring his hands. Converse alleges that Silvis asked for a nurse for his hands, as well as for a cigarette, then "says that he should have jumped" and "that he is going to hurt himself." At 1:44 a.m.—less than an hour and a half after he was reported on thebridge—Silvis hanged himself in his cell with the blanket. Converse alleges that, while Silvis was hanging himself, Dispatcher Whelan was "in the dispatch room with the monitors showing Mr. Silvis's jail cell, watching TV on the internet." Silvis's death was discovered 45 minutes later, at approximately 2:30 am.
Converse now contends that the City of Kemah and the individual Defendants failed to provide proper medical care to Silvis; failed to give him a "non-defective blanket;" and violated the City of Kemah's policies requiring prisoner medical requests be conveyed to a shift supervisor and that suicidal prisoners be given a "non-defective blanket" or "suicide smock." Converse alleges that the individual officers were ignorant of, or wholly ignored, these policies. Converse also alleges that Chief Rikard "falsely reported in the custodial death report" that Mr. Silvis "did not have mental issues."
Converse pleads that the conduct of the City and the Officers "caused the death of Mr. Silvis." Converse first specifically alleges that the City and the individual officers are liable for "negligence and gross negligence" under Texas law. Next, he alleges that the individual defendants "were deliberately indifferent to the serious risks associated with the mental state of Mr. Silvis and the risks/mental health issues posed to prevent this unfortunate death." Converse alleges that the individual defendants knew that Mr. Silvis was "physically and mentally impaired and suicidal," but failed to issue proper medical care and instead gave him the very blanket he used to commit suicide. Further, Converse contends that the officers failed to take away the blanket once it was given to Silvis, failed to check on Silvis or obtain medical help for him, failed to watch Silvis over monitors while he was in the cell, and then failed to discover his death for 45 minutes.Converse alleges these failures were deprivations of Silvis's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Converse alleges that the City violated Silvis's constitutional rights by failing to treat Silvis's mental health problems, and by failing to create policies to attend to Silvis's mental health issues. Converse alleges that the City acted with "deliberate indifference to its actual knowledge of Mr. Silvis's suicidal state." Alternatively, Converse alleges that the City "adopted a custom or informal policy disregarding the constitutional rights of detainees." Converse highlights that, even though the City had a policy in place "to prevent detainees who displayed suicidal behavior from being given blankets," officers were allegedly told during their training to disregard this policy. Converse alleges that formal policies about securing medical attention for prisoners were also customarily ignored. In fact, Converse appears to allege that the City of Kemah routinely ignores all of its policies, stating, "For example, in a recent Houston Chronicle Article, Kemah residents accused the Mayor of Kemah of ignoring municipal and building codes."
Converse also brings a cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act, "since Mr. Silvis's death was caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property." Converse alleges that the blanket, the bunk, and the cell were all defective because they lacked the safety components to be used by a suicidal detainee.
The City has filed a motion to dismiss most, but not all, of Converse's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The City has not yet moved to dismiss the claims brought by the mother of Silvis's minor child.
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the formal sufficiency of the pleadings and is "appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1966).Moreover, the court does not accept as true legal conclusions: "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 1950.
Converse first alleges that the Defendants are all liable for negligence and gross negligence under Texas law. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction to decide the remaining state law claims that are a part of the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action for the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. A complaint under § 1983 must allege that the acts complained of occurred under color of state law and that the complaining parties were deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1995). A complaint under § 1983 must also allege that the constitutional or statutory deprivation was intentional or due to deliberate indifference and not the result of mere negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Plaintiffs suing public officials under § 1983 must file short and plain complaints that must be factual and not conclusive. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d...
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