Conway County Bridge District v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 November 1934
• Docket Number: 4-3557
• Citation: Conway County Bridge District v. Williams, 189 Ark. 929, 75 S.W.2d 814 (Ark. 1934)
• Parties: CONWAY COUNTY BRIDGE DISTRICT v. WILLIAMS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

75 S.W.2d 814

189 Ark. 929

CONWAY COUNTY BRIDGE DISTRICT v. WILLIAMS

4-3557

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 12, 1934

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Frank H. Dodge, Chancellor affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Owens & Ehrman, E. L. McHaney, Jr., and E. A. Williams, for Conway County District, appellants, and Hays & Smallwood, Schott & Goodier, Reece Caudle and J. B. Ward, for Yell and Pope District, appellants.

F. D Majors, J. G. Rye, Audrey Strait and W. P. Strait, for appellees.

JOHNSON C. J. SMITH and MCHANEY, JJ., dissent.

OPINION

JOHNSON, C. J.

Appellees, the county judge and certain citizens and taxpayers of Conway County, instituted this proceeding in the Pulaski Chancery Court against Roy V. Leonard, State Treasurer, and the county treasurer of Conway County, to prohibit the respective treasurers paying over to Conway County Bridge District certain funds accumulated in the State Treasurer's hands under authority of act 11 passed at the special extraordinary session of the General Assembly of 1934. The complaint alleged the source of the accumulated fund and that the disposition thereof as provided for in § 23 of [189 Ark. 931] said act, in so far as it undertook to donate same to the Conway County Bridge District, was in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of 1874, which prohibits local legislation. Subsequently an intervention of certain interested parties was filed by Pope and Yell county citizens against Yell & Pope County Bridge District which sought similar relief. Thereafter, the Conway County Bridge District and Yell & Pope Bridge Districts intervened in said cause and asserted their respective interests in said fund, and in addition thereto denied the invalidity and unconstitutionality of § 23 of said act.

The case was submitted for trial and decree upon an agreed statement of facts and certain oral testimony then and there produced and heard, but we deem it unnecessary to here set out in detail the facts adduced. The chancellor determined that that portion of act 11 of 1934 contained in § 23 thereof, which undertook to allot a certain part of the county highway improvement funds to bridge districts was in violation of Amendment No. 14, and therefore unconstitutional and void, and thereupon permanently restrained and enjoined the disbursements of said fund or any part thereof to the two bridge districts, and this appeal comes therefrom.

Section 23 of act 11 of 1934, a part of which was declared unconstitutional and void by the trial court, reads as follows:

"Section 23. Paragraph (e) of § 1 of act No. 63 of the General Assembly, approved February 25, 1931, is amended to read as follows:

"(e) All net tax derived from motor vehicle fuel under the provisions of paragraph (c) of this act shall be divided: Ninety-two point three per cent. (92.3%) shall be deemed State highway revenue, and seven point seven per cent. (7.7%) shall be deemed county highway improvement revenue, and shall be credited by the Treasurer of State to the 'county highway fund.' Said county highway fund shall be segregated, set apart and placed in trust for the sole, separate and exclusive use of the several counties of this State to be apportioned under the existing laws, and the State expressly covenants that it will not permit the percentage herein allotted to the county highway fund to be reduced. Providing that the refund going to any county in the State having a bridge district where the bridge is across a navigable stream, as defined by the Department of Commerce of the United States Government and is located not less than seven miles from the county seat of said county, and constitutes a continuation of a State highway, the funds going to the county under the terms of this act shall be allotted to the bridge commission to be applied to the retirement of the bridge district bonds, and the county treasurer shall pay such funds to the proper trustee for such application. Provided further that this amendment does not apply to toll bridges. Provided that one-half of the refund going to any other county in this State other than the counties herein classified or in which the refund is controlled by any existing legislation shall be allotted to the bridge commission of any bridge district where the bridge constructed by the district is across a navigable stream as defined by the Department of Commerce of the United States Government and constitutes a link in a State highway, and where said bridge is situated not less than one mile from the county seat."

It appears from the section of the act just quoted that the Legislature divided the net tax derived from motor vehicle fuel into two funds, namely: State highway revenue and county highway improvement revenue. It also appears that the county highway improvement revenue as therein created is dedicated to the several counties of the State to be apportioned under existing laws, provided, however, the fund going to any county having a bridge district, where the bridge is across a navigable stream * * * and is located not less than seven miles from the county seat of said county and constitutes a continuation of a State highway, the funds going to the county under the terms of this act shall be allotted to the bridge commissioners to be applied to the retirement of the bridge bonds, and the county treasurer shall pay such funds to the proper trustee for such application. Provided further that this amendment does not apply to toll bridges, and provided further that one-half of the refund going to any other county in this State other than the counties herein classified or in which the refund is controlled by any existing legislation shall be allotted to the bridge commission of any bridge district where the bridge constructed by the district is across a navigable stream as defined by the Department of Commerce of the United States Government and constitutes a link in a State highway, and where said bridge is situated not less than one mile from the county seat.

From the language quoted, it definitely and certainly appears that the benefits granted by the State to bridge districts is restricted as follows: First, only to districts where the bridge spans a navigable stream; secondly, the bridge must not be within one mile of a county seat; third, such bridge must not be a toll bridge.

The restriction that the bridge of a benefited district must span a navigable stream localizes the benefits to such districts as border navigable streams, and we judicially know that many bridge districts in this State do not border such streams and will not do so within any reasonable future time. The restriction that the bridge in the district to be benefited must not be a toll bridge further restricts the applicability of said section by excluding from its benevolent purposes all bridge districts in the State which collect tolls. The further elimination of all districts where the bridge is situated within one mile of the county seat further restricts the applicability of the benefits of said section.

Appellants' first contention is that the two bridge districts here under consideration, and which are...