Conway v. Town of Wilton

• Decision Date: 06 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15335,15335
• Parties: , 111 Ed. Law Rep. 1219 Amy Jeanne CONWAY v. TOWN OF WILTON et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 242

680 A.2d 242

238 Conn. 653, 111 Ed. Law Rep. 1219

Amy Jeanne CONWAY v. TOWN OF WILTON et al.

No. 15335.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 6, 1996.

Decided Aug. 6, 1996.

David T. Grudberg, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Ira B. Grudberg, for appellant (plaintiff).

Raymond J. Plouffe, Jr., Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin S. Coyne, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Hugh W. Cuthbertson, New Haven, with whom was Dana Shaw MacKinnon, for appellee (defendant Connecticut Association of Secondary Schools).

Mary-Michelle U. Hirschoff, Bethany, filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities et al. as amici curiae.

William F. Gallagher and Kurt D. Koehler, New Haven, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Justice.

In Manning v. Barenz, 221 Conn. 256, 603 A.2d 399 (1992), this court held that municipalities and their employees are "owners" under General Statutes § 52-557f(3) and are, therefore, entitled to immunity from liability for injuries sustained on land available to the public for recreational purposes. Today, we reconsider Manning, conclude that it was not properly decided and, accordingly, overrule it.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, Amy Jeanne Conway, brought this action against the town of Wilton (town), David Dixon, the parks and recreation director for the town, and the Connecticut Association of Secondary Schools (association), ¹ for personal injuries sustained while participating in a state high school tennis tournament sponsored by the association on premises owned by the town. The plaintiff alleged that on June 9, 1986, the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (conference) ² held a championship tennis tournament for high school girls at the Wilton High School tennis courts. No fee had been charged for the use of the tennis courts. The plaintiff further alleged that, while competing in the tournament, she fell as a result of a defect in the courts and sustained serious injuries to her knee and ankle. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the proximate cause of her injuries was the negligence of Dixon and his staff in maintaining the tennis courts, and the negligence of the association in failing to inspect the courts in order to ensure that the town repair any unsafe conditions and in failing to supervise the administration of the tournament.

The defendants moved for summary judgment claiming immunity under General Statutes § 52-557g, the immunity provision of the Connecticut Recreational Land Use Act (act), General Statutes § 52-557f et seq. ³ In her opposition to the association's motion, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the association "owed [her] an affirmative duty of care to choose a safe place for the tournament to be held and otherwise to properly run a safe event ... and ... it breached [that duty] when it brought her to the defective courts." The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that they were immune from liability pursuant to the act.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that "the trial court improperly granted the motions for summary judgment because (1) the act as applied to the plaintiff violates article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution, (2) the association owed a duty to the plaintiff that is independent of the act, and (3) Dixon and the town failed to make the premises 'available to the public,' and, therefore, are not entitled to statutory immunity." Conway v. Wilton, 39 Conn.App. 280, 282-83, 664 A.2d 327 (1995). The Appellate Court rejected all three claims. Id., at 285-89, 664 A.2d 327. The plaintiff also claimed that Manning v. Barenz, supra, 221 Conn. 256, 603 A.2d 399, should be overruled. Because the Appellate Court cannot overrule a Supreme Court decision, it declined to review that claim. Conway v. Wilton, supra, 39 Conn.App. at 283 n. 5, 664 A.2d 327.

Thereafter, the plaintiff petitioned this court for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following questions: (1) "Should this court reconsider its holding in Manning v. Barenz, [supra, 221 Conn. 256, 603 A.2d 399], that the recreational land use statute, General Statutes § 52-557f et seq., applies to municipalities?" and (2) "If the answer to the first question is no, did the Appellate Court improperly conclude that the trial court was correct in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant Connecticut Association of Secondary Schools [association], where the plaintiff claimed that [the association] owed a duty to the plaintiff independent of any duty it may have owed as an 'owner of land' within the meaning of the recreational land use statute?" Conway v. Wilton, 235 Conn. 934, 934-35, 667 A.2d 1271 (1995).

We begin with the rule of stare decisis. ⁴ This court has repeatedly acknowledged the significance of stare decisis to our system of jurisprudence because it gives stability and continuity to our case law. ⁵ Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 196, 676 A.2d 831 (1996). Stare decisis is "a formidable obstacle to any court seeking to change its own law." C. Peters, "Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis," 105 Yale L.J. 2031, 2036 (1996). It "is the most important application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture" and it is an obvious manifestation of the notion that decisionmaking consistency itself has normative value. Id., 2037. Stare decisis does more than merely push courts in hard cases, "where they are not convinced about what justice requires, toward decisions that conform with decisions made by previous courts." Id., 2090. The doctrine is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception that the law is relatively unchanging, it saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency. A. Kronman, "Precedent and Tradition," 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1038-39 (1990) ("respect for past decisions is desirable to the extent that it increases the sum of social welfare ... by enhancing the law's predictability, economizing judicial resources, strengthening the prestige of legal institutions, etc.").

As this court has stated many times, "[t]he true doctrine of stare decisis is compatible with the function of the courts.... [T]here is no question but that [a] decision of this court is a controlling precedent until overruled or qualified.... [S]tare decisis ... serve[s] the cause of stability and certainty in the law--a condition indispensable to any well-ordered system of jurisprudence...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).

Whether stare decisis serves the interests of judicial efficiency, protection of expectations, maintenance of the rule of law, or preservation of judicial legitimacy, however, is not dispositive. The value of adhering to precedent is not an end in and of itself, however, if the precedent reflects substantive injustice. Consistency must also serve a justice related end. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) p. 150 (favoring rejection of precedent when it "has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare"). When a prior decision is "seen so clearly as error that its enforcement [is] for that very reason doomed"; (emphasis added) Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992); the court should seriously consider whether the goals of stare decisis are outweighed, rather than dictated, by the prudential and pragmatic considerations that inform the doctrine to enforce a clearly erroneous decision. Stare decisis is not an " 'inexorable command.' " Id. The court "must weigh [the] benefits [of stare decisis] against its burdens in deciding whether to overturn a precedent it thinks is unjust. The rule of stare decisis may entail the sacrifice of justice to the parties in individual cases, but, far from being immune from considerations of justice, it must always be tested against the ends of justice more generally." C. Peters, supra, 105 Yale L.J. 2047.

Indeed, this court has long believed that although " '[s]tare decisis is a doctrine developed by courts to accomplish the requisite element of stability in court-made law, [it] is not an absolute impediment to change.... [S]tability should not be confused with perpetuity. If law is to have a current relevance, courts must have and exert the capacity to change a rule of law when reason so requires....' In re Stranger Creek & Tributaries in Stevens County, 77 Wash.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)." White v. Burns, supra, 213 Conn. at 335, 567 A.2d 1195. " '[I]t is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience.' Barden v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 154 U.S. 288, 322, 14 S.Ct. 1030, 1036, 38 L.Ed. 992 (1894). The United States Supreme Court has said that when it has become 'convinced of former error,' it has 'never felt constrained to follow precedent.' Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665, 64 S.Ct. 757, 765, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944), reh. denied, 322 U.S. 769, 64 S.Ct. 1052, 88 L.Ed. 1594 (1944)." White v. Burns, supra, at 336, 567 A.2d 1195.

"[One] well recognized exception to stare decisis under which a court will examine and overrule a prior decision ... [is when that prior decision] is clearly wrong.... The doctrine [of stare decisis] requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v....