Coody v. Coody
| Decision Date | 12 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 20-071 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | Jamie Killian COODY v. John Allen COODY |
Elvin C. Fontenot, Jr., Attorney at Law, 110 East Texas St., Leesville, Louisiana 71446, (337) 239-2684, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Jamie Killian Coody
David L. Wallace, Attorney at Law, 518 N. Pine Street, DeRidder, Louisiana 70634, (337) 462-0473, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: John Allen Coody
Bobby Holmes, Attorney at Law, 1800 Ryan St., Ste. 107, Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601, (337) 221-3028, Counsel for the Minor Children: Remington Coody and Brycen Coody
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Candyce G. Perret, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.
In this child custody dispute, the mother appeals the trial court's judgment which rejected her claim for sole custody and maintained her as the domiciliary parent but utilized the implemental order to designate the father with the authority over medical treatment and the children's extracurricular activities. We affirm.
Jamie Killian Coody ("Jamie") and John Allen Coody ("John")1 were married on February 3, 2003 and were granted a divorce in 2010. At the time of their divorce, Jamie and John had two minor sons, Remington and Brycen,2 born on October 12, 2004, and July 11, 2006, respectively. Ever since their divorce, Jamie and John have shared the joint custody of their two sons, and Jamie was designated as the domiciliary parent with the authority to make all decisions regarding their sons.3
On September 3, 2014, after considering pleadings and evidence, the trial court, among other incidental rulings, maintained joint custody and Jamie's designation as the domiciliary parent, but detailed the parents’ allocation of the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the children, ordered the parents to mediate every twenty-eight days, and determined an amount of child support and any unpaid medical bills that John may owe.
Thereafter, on February 8, 2017, again after a trial on the merits, the trial court found Jamie and John in contempt of court,4 continued the requirement that the parents meet with Mark Ifland ("Mr. Ifland") every twenty-eight days, ordered the two children to undergo individual and family counseling as needed, decreed that the counselor report to the court after six months regarding recommendations as to any modifications or changes to periods of physical custody, continued joint legal custody and Jamie's designation as the domiciliary parent, and tweaked the parents’ periods of physical custody yet again.
On February 23, 2018, John filed a rule to change the designation of Jamie as the domiciliary parent or to return the periods of physical custody to that decreed on September 3, 2014. He also requested that Jamie be found in contempt of court for failing to allow him physical custody of the children on multiple occasions.
On March 1, 2018, John filed a motion for the issuance of a civil warrant for the return of his sons for purposes of court-ordered visitation. Forming the basis of this motion, John alleged that Jamie had recently denied him visitation with his sons on February 27, 2018, that this course of conduct by Jamie had occurred on at least three other occasions, and that he feared it would occur prospectively. Shortly thereafter, on March 19, 2018, Jamie filed a motion seeking sole custody of the two children.
The trial court conducted hearings on the cross-custody motions over three days, November 28, 2018, January 11, 2019, and August 20, 2019. After providing extensive oral reasons for judgment in which it found neither party proved a material change in circumstances to alter either joint custody or Jamie's designation as the domiciliary parent, the trial court maintained its earlier judgments, awarding joint legal custody of the two children to Jamie and John, designated Jamie as the domiciliary parent, found Jamie in contempt of court, and ordered counseling for the two children and the parents with Bruce Plauché ("Mr. Plauché"). Nonetheless, the trial court modified the implementation order, designating John with the authority and responsibility for making medical decisions regarding the children and for making decisions about the children's sports, band, and extracurricular activities.
Jamie appealed, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in modifying the joint custody implementation order to designate John with the authority to make the medical decisions as well as decisions about the children's sports, band, and extracurricular activities along with the responsibility for making certain the children attend all activities in which they participate; (2) in finding a material change of circumstance which affected the welfare of the children; (3) in failing to state for the record any findings that established it was in the best interest of these minor children to award domiciliary status to John over certain affairs of the children; and (4) in denying Jamie's request to modify the joint custody to sole custody to allow the children to participate in normal, regular school activities as well as extracurricular activities.5
The trial court's factual conclusions are given substantial deference by appellate courts in child custody matters. Steinebach v. Steinebach , 07-38 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 957 So.2d 291. Unless there is a legal error, "[t]he determinations made by the trial judge as to custody ... will not be set aside unless it clearly appears [from the record] that there has been an abuse of discretion[.]" Nugent v. Nugent , 232 So.2d 521, 523 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970) ; see also Mulkey v. Mulkey , 12-2709 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357. "The basis for this principle of review is grounded not only upon the better capacity of the trial court to evaluate live witnesses, but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts." McCorvey v. McCorvey , 05-174, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 357, 362, writ denied , 05-2577 (La. 5/5/06), 927 So.2d 300.
Absent legal error, before a court's factual findings and conclusions can be reversed, appellate courts must "review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record clearly establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous." Moss v. Goodger , 12-783, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/12), 104 So.3d 807, 810. If the trial court's findings of fact are reasonable, appellate courts should not reverse them. Id . However, appellate courts are also prohibited from simply rubberstamping a trial court's findings of fact. Id. Instead, appellate courts are constitutionally mandated to review all the facts contained in the record and determine whether the trial court's findings are reasonable considering the entire record. Id.
Additionally, when a trial court applies incorrect legal principles and these errors materially affect the outcome of a case and deprive a party of substantial rights, legal error occurs. Evans v. Lungrin , 97-541, 97-577 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731. "[W]here one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 735.
Although Jamie asserts four assignments of error, her arguments center on the trial court's decision to grant John the decision-making authority over their children's medical care and their sports, band, and extracurricular activities. That argument necessitates that we evaluate the three issues raised in Jamie's assignments of error: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding a change in circumstances that materially affected the welfare of the children since the last court order; (2) whether the trial court considered the best interest criteria that permeates child custody matters; and (3) whether the trial court's failure to award Jamie sole custody was erroneous.
The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. La.Civ.Code art. 131. The best interest of the child is the sole criterion to be met in making a custody award, as the trial court "sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child, and must pursue actively that course of conduct which will be of the greatest benefit to the child." C.M.J. v. L.M.C., 14-1119, p. 17 (La. 10/15/14), 156 So.3d 16, 28 (quoting Turner v. Turner, 455 So.2d 1374, 1378 (La.1984) ). It is the child's emotional, physical, material, and social well-being and health that are the court's very purpose in child custody cases; the court must protect the child from the real possibility that the parents are engaged in a bitter, vengeful, and highly emotional conflict. C.M.J., 156 So.3d 16. The legislature has mandated that the court look only to the child's interests so that the court can fulfill its obligations to the child. Id.
However, in actions to change custody decisions rendered in considered decrees, an additional jurisprudential requirement is imposed. Evans, 708 So.2d 731. When a trial court has made a considered decree of permanent custody, the party seeking a change bears the heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is "so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification of the custody decree, or of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child." Bergeron v. Bergeron , 492 So.2d 1193, 1200 (La.1986). "Although the trial court retains a continuing power to modify a child custody order, there must be a showing of a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the...
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