Cook Cnty. Republican Party v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16 C 6598 |
| Citation | 207 F.Supp.3d 841 |
| Parties | COOK COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY and Chicago Republican Party, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Stephen Falk Boulton, Boulton & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
James Michael Scanlon, James M. Scanlon & Associates, Pericles Camberis Abbasi, Law Office of Pericles Camberis Abbasi, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Cook County Republican Party and Chicago Republican Party (collectively the "GOP") filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983"), charging asserted violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Both the GOP and two of the defendants, Frances Sapone ("Sapone") and Sammy Tenuta ("Tenuta"), have filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking declaration of their respective rights and legal relations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (" Section 2201," the federal Declaratory Judgment Act). As for the remaining defendants, the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, Marisel Hernandez, William Kresse and Jonathan Swain (collectively "the Board"), they have opted not to weigh in on the current cross-motions—but because this opinion pronounces a final judgment in the case, they are bound by its terms as well.
Every Rule 56 movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). For that purpose courts consider the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to nonmovants and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor (Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. , 282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir.2002) ). Courts "may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts" in resolving motions for summary judgment (Payne v. Pauley , 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003) ). But a nonmovant must produce more than "a mere scintilla of evidence" to support the position that a genuine issue of material fact exists (Wheeler v. Lawson , 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.2008) ) and "must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial" (id. ). Ultimately summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).
One more complexity could be added where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are presented. Under the same principles as stated in the preceding paragraph, this Court must adopt a dual perspective that it has often referred to as Janus-like: As to each motion the nonmovant's version of any disputed facts would have to be credited, and that could on occasion lead to the denial of both motions. Fortunately that is not a risk here, because all relevant facts are undisputed.
In March 2016 the GOP—concerned about infiltration by what it believed could be "carpetbagging" candidates for ward committeeman posts who were in fact Democratic operatives—added this provision (hereafter "Section 3") to its bylaws shortly before the March 15 primary election:
Section 3: A vacancy shall exist in the office of Republican committeeman in any ward or township in which an elected or appointed committeeman votes, or has voted, in the primary for another political party in the previous 8 years.
At that primary election Sapone and Tenuta stood for election as the Republican 29th and 36th ward committeemen respectively and—unsurprisingly, for they ran unopposed—received the most votes in their wards. But because both Sapone and Tenuta had voted in Democratic Party primaries within the previous eight years, the Chairman of the Cook County Republican Central Committee declared those Republican committeeman offices vacant pursuant to Section 3.
At that same primary election no Republican candidate appeared on the ballot for the office of United States Representative for the 7th Congressional District. For such a vacancy to be filled, Illinois law (10 ILCS 5/7–61 )1 requires the political party involved, among other steps, to hold a meeting to nominate a candidate. So on April 13 Republican ward committeemen from election precincts within the 7th Congressional District held a nominating meeting at which they selected Jeffrey A. Leef ("Leef") as their nominee for Congress. Though the 29th and 36th wards were included within the 7th Congressional District, the GOP did not notify Sapone and Tenuta of the meeting because of the Section 3 declaration that they did not validly serve as committeemen.
That determination by the GOP prompted Sapone to file an objection to Leef's nomination on the ground that she and Tenuta were entitled to notice of the April 13 meeting.2 This action was filed by the GOP after the initial hearing on that objection resulted in a recommendation by the hearing officer that the Board exclude Leef from the ballot. On July 12 this Court entered a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoining the Board from conducting further hearings or issuing any decision in the Board's Proceeding No. 2016–EB–RES–01 () until further order of this Court. Shortly thereafter the GOP filed for a preliminary injunction, which this Court granted. Recognizing the need to resolve this matter in time to allow ballots to be printed for the upcoming November election, this Court requested that the parties file abridged motions for summary judgment. As stated at the outset, the active adversaries now seek summary judgment as to the GOP's Section 1983 claims and a declaration of their respective rights and legal relations pursuant to Section 2201.
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, the GOP must show (1) misconduct that "was committed by a person acting under the color of state law" and (2) that as a result of that misconduct it was deprived of "a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" (West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ). As to the first required showing, there is no dispute that the Board acted under the color of state law. And as to the second, because the GOP contends that those actions compromised the party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, it seeks as a remedy an order permanently enjoining the Board from conducting hearings in Sapone v. Leef and a declaration of its rights pursuant to Section 2201 :
And as the seminal opinion in Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 240–41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937) put it:
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
It is well settled that the First Amendment's freedom of association guaranty protects the rights of political parties to select their leaders freely. As Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. , 489 U.S. 214, 229–30, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) has explained:
As we noted in Tashjian [v. Republican Party of Conn. , 479 U.S. 208, 224, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) ], a political party's determination of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution. Freedom of association also encompasses a political party's decisions about the identity of, and the process for electing, its leaders.
To that end courts carefully constrain governmental interference with a party's business of choosing its members and leaders. Any such "heav[y] burden on a political party's associational freedom" is "unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest" (California Democratic Party v. Jones , 530 U.S. 567, 582, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) ).
Sapone and Tenuta contend that invalidating Section 3 would impose a "lesser burden" on the GOP's associational rights and that such invalidation is constitutionally permissible if it serves a "correspondingly weighty" state interest (S. Mem. 6).3 On that score they attempt to seek support from Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997), which upheld a Minnesota law banning "fusion candidates" (candidates who appear on multiple parties' ballots). In upholding the ban Timmons, id. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 1364 reasoned that although the law may have prevented a particular individual from appearing on a particular ballot, it did not severely burden associational rights because it did not "restrict the ability of the New Party and its members to endorse, support, or vote for anyone they like" and was "silent on parties' internal structure, governance, and policymaking."
But Timmons itself torpedoes the Sapone-Tenuta attempted argument, for the bylaw in this case is precisely the type of regulation that Timmons identifies as more burdensome than the one at issue in that case. Wholly unlike the law at issue in Timmons , Section 3 pertains directly to "internal structure, governance, and policymaking"...
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