Cook Cnty. v. Davis

• Decision Date: 31 October 1892
• Citation: 32 N.E. 176,143 Ill. 151
• Parties: COOK COUNTY v. DAVIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

143 Ill. 151

32 N.E. 176

COOK COUNTY

v.DAVIS.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 31, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; M. F. TULEY, Judge.

Bill by the county of Cook against George R. Davis for discovery and an accounting. The bill was dismissed, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.F. W. Walker, (Edward J. Judd

, of counsel,) for appellant.

Sidney Smith, (A. M. Pence, of counsel,) for appellee.

SHOPE, J.

This was a bill in chancery by the county of Cook against George R. Davis, late treasurer of that county, to enforce a claim purely legal in its character. The bill alleges his election and entry upon the duties of said office, and that, as such treasurer, he duly accounted for and paid out all moneys coming to his hands officially, and turned over to his successor in office all books, vouchers, and papers, etc., pertaining to his office. It is then alleged that, while treasurer of the county, he received divers large sums of money, the amount of which is unknown, for interest upon, or as compensation for, the loan or deposit of the public revenues of the county with divers banks, bankers, and other persons, whose names are unknown, which sums of money he is liable by law to account for and pay over to the county. The prayer is that Davis be required to account for and pay over to the county all such sum and sums of money as it may appear that he has so received; and by an amendment, that he discover and set forth the names of all with whom he deposited the public moneys, and who paid him interest or compensation for holding the same. By section 9 of article 10 of the constitution of the state the treasurer of Cook county is to receive as compensation for his services a salary to be fixed by law, to be paid only out of fees actually collected by him. It is then provided that ‘all fees, perquisites, and emoluments [above the amount of such salary] shall be paid into the county treasury.’ It is insisted that the moneys received, as alleged, by the treasurer, for interest upon or compensation for the use of the public funds, being in excess of his salary, were ‘perquisites' and ‘emoluments' of his office, within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and must be paid into the treasury of the county, as other funds coming to his hands as treasurer. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the bill, which it was required to do upon the ground of want of jurisdiction to determine the cause, if upon no other. If the demurrer was properly sustained for that reason, the question of the defendant's liability for the money received by him, if any, for the use of the public funds of the county, is not before us on this record.

It must be apparent, and, as we understand counsel, it is practically conceded, that the recovery here sought is of a purely legal demand, for which, if appellee is liable at all, the recovery could be had in an appropriate action at law. If the money alleged to have been received and not accounted for came to his hands as treasurer, and is by law secured to be paid by his official bond, suit at law could be maintained thereon. If he received funds not within the contract obligation of his bond, but which he is nevertheless bound by law to pay over to the county, an action at law affords ample remedy for enforcing the personal liability of appellee therefor, which is all that is sought by this bill. When a court of law is competent to afford an adequate and ample remedy, courts of equity will remit the parties to the courts of law, when the right of trial by jury is secured to them. In such cases either party has a right to demand that the matter of the defendant's liability be submitted to a jury, according to the course of the common law; and, unless some special and substantial ground of equity jurisdiction be alleged, and, if necessary, proved,-such as that a lien exists for the money demand which cannot be adequately enforced at law, or that discovery is necessary to a recovery by complainant, or other like equitable considerations affecting the adequacy of the remedy at law,-courts of equity will decline to interfere. These principles are familiar to every lawyer, and have frequently received approval in this court. Taylor v. Turner, 87 Ill. 299;Scale Co. v. Shurtleff, 81 Ill. 313;Gore v. Kramer, 117 Ill. 176, 7 N. E. Rep. 504; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249;Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69. In actions cognizable at law the mere fact that an accounting is necessary, even when there are cross accounts, is insufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction, (Hadley v. Morrison, 39 Ill. 392;) ‘the general rule being that a proper case is presented when the remedies at law are inadequate,’ (Pom. Eq., Jur. 177, 178, 1420, 1421; Story, Eq. Jur. 458, 459.)

It is insisted, however, that the bill in this case...