Cook County v. Holland, 33034
|119 N.E.2d 760,3 Ill.2d 36
|24 May 1954
|COOK COUNTY v. HOLLAND et al.
|Supreme Court of Illinois
Francis X. Cuisinier, Chicago, for appellants.
John Gutknecht, State's Atty., Chicago (Gordon Nash, Vincent P. Flood, and David L. Leeds, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
On March 29, 1952, the county of Cook filed its petition in the circuit court of Cook County to condemn certain property located in the village of Hillside. A cross petition was filed alleging that appellants were the owners of the property sought to be taken; that said property was a part of a whole tract consisting of a quarter section and that the taking of the part sought to be condemned would damage the remainder of the tract. The cause was tried before a jury, which had been permitted to view the premises, and a verdict was returned fixing the compensation to be paid by petitioner to the owners and persons interested for the land taken at $1834 and finding that there was no damage to the remainder. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, whereupon the defendants-appellants, following an unsuccessful application for a new trial, have taken this appeal.
The defendants have enumerated seven errors relied upon for reversal and new trial; however, the points and authorities raised by them do not correspond in number or form to the errors relied upon. The points and authorities set forth rules of law supported by citations which apparently pinpoint the defendants' grounds for reversal and which in general support the statement of errors. This court will endeavor to evaluate all the evidence, giving special attention to the arguments made by the defendants with the hope of doing complete justice to this appeal as presented.
The first contention made by defendants is that in eminent domain proceedings the burden is on the petitioner to prove just compensation. In this connection it becomes necessary to review the testimony presented by the petitioner, the county of Cook. Petitioner offered four witnesses, the first of whom was the head of the Land Procurement Division of the Department of Highways for Cook County. His duties entailed assisting in the location of highways in Cook County and the supervision of the preparation of plats showing the right of way to be acquired. He testified as to the route to be taken through Cook County by the proposed Congress Street Expressway from its point of origin at Michigan Avenue and Congress Street in Chicago westerly to the Cook County line. He further testified that he was familiar with the subject property which lay within the proposed right of way, and pointed out its boundaries on a blueprint admitted in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. The blueprint showed that the property was almost triangular in shape with its base situated along the north side of Harrison Street for a distance of 650 feet, and consisted of 1.223 acres.
The next three witnesses offered by the petitioner were real-estate brokers with appraisal experience. One did business in the village of Hillside and two in the city of Chicago. All of them testified that they were familiar with the property sought to be taken and that it was a part of a 40-acre tract, being situated in the southwest corner thereof. Their testimony showed that the 40 acres had been used as a golf course, but had been abandoned as such for some five years. The subject property, the 1.223 acres, is vacant except for certain public improvements consisting of a water main on the north side of Harrison Street, a sewer on the south edge of Harrison Street, a fire hydrant in front of the property and electric lines overhead. There are no sidewalks. The remainder of the 40 acres is vacant except for a part stucco and part frame residence located near the eastern edge and a couple of barns and some old buildings which had been used by the golf club. Part of the property is wooded, much of it is grown up with underbrush and from a portion of it the top soil had been removed for commercial purposes. The 40 acres is bounded on the south by Harrison Street, on the east by a large stone quarry which had been in existence for a number of years, on the north by vacant property and on the west by a section line. Proceeding westerly from the section line on the north side of Harrison Street to Wolf Road, a distance of approximately a quarter of a mile, there is vacant property. At the intersection of Wolf Road and Harrison Street is located a public school, the village hall and fire station. Going easterly from Wolf Road on the south side of Harrison Street is the Hillside Golf Course, then some vacant property and then some greenhouses, barns and a residence. Southerly from defendants' property is a small residential section containing approximately 55 houses. Immediately east of the 40 acres on the north side of Harrison Street are two old frame residences, and in back of them is the quarry belonging to the Consumers Company. North of the quarry and northeasterly of defendants' property is the Aluminum Company of America plant facing on Mannheim Road. North and west is an intensively built up residential area containing about 183 single-family homes and others under construction. There is a Catholic school and church about a half mile to a mile away. Transportation on either the Chicago, Aurora & Elgin Railway or the C.T.A. bus line is about three quarters of a mile away. The nearest shopping center is located in Bellwood three quarters of a mile to a mile to the east. All of the witnesses were familiar with the sale of 30 acres of vacant land about a mile west of the subject property which occurred in December of 1951. That land contained similar public improvements and was considered to be best suited for residential purposes. The sales price was $1000 per acre. Based upon their experience in the real-estate business, their familiarity with the subject property and many of the factors herein set forth, these witnesses testified that in their opinion the highest and best use on March 29, 1952, of the land sought to be condemned was residential, and that the fair cash market value therefor on said date was $1834, $1345 and $1528.75, respectively. This was all the testimony offered on behalf of the petitioner.
On cross-examination the first real-estate expert testified that he could not tell whether or not any part of the quarry was located in the 40-acre tract; that below the surface of the land is dirt; that in valuing the property in question he considered the factor of the quarry land being immediately adjacent, but he did not know if any of the 40 acres is being quarried presently or ever has been quarried. The second real-estate witness on cross-examination stated that he did not know if the eastern boundrary of the 40 acres included any part of the quarry, that he did not know what was below the surface of the land and that he made no tests to determine what was beneath the surface. He further stated that he had in his experience appraised quarry property. The third witness stated that the quarry was not part of the 40 acres and that he had never appraised quarry property.
It is undoubtedly the rule in this State that the petitioner has the burden of proving the fair cash value of the property to be taken, as is stated in the cases cited by defendants. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Bohne, 415 Ill. 253, 113 N.E.2d 319; Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. Talbott, 321 Ill. 538, 152 N.E. 486; Mauvaisterre Drainage and Levee Dist. v. Wabash R. Co., 299 Ill. 299 132 N.E. 559, 22 A.L.R. 944; Chicago, B. and Q. R. Co. v. F. Reisch & Bros., 247 Ill. 350, 93 N.E. 383. None of these cases, however, bears any factual similarity to this case. In the Bohne case and in the Reisch case, the verdicts fixing compensation were reversed because the petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proving the value of certain leasehold interests included in the property sought to be condemned. In the Talbott case the verdict was reversed on an appeal brought by the petitioner on the ground that the landowner failed to prove by competent evidence the damage to the land not taken. The verdict was reversed in the Wabash Railway Co. case because the witnesses offered on behalf of the petitioner had no knowledge of the values of land for railway purposes and were therefore incompetent to give an opinion.
Nor do any of these cases lend support to defendants' argument. It is argued by them that since none of the petitioner's real-estate experts realized that 8 1/2 acres along the easterly edge of the 40-acre tract had in fact been leased and operated as a quarry, their opinions were not worthy of consideration. This argument is apparently based upon the proposition that the petitioner is compelled to assume defendants' theory that the highest and best use of the land sought to be taken is for quarry purposes. It has long been the rule that parties to a condemnation proceeding have the right to adopt their own theory as to the highest and best use of the land taken and each may introduce evidence without being bound by the theory of the other. Union Electric Power Co. v. Sauget, 1 Ill.2d 125, 115 N.E.2d 246. It is not contended that any portion of the 1.223 acres was leased for quarry purposes. No other land was described in the petition and the petitioner was not required to introduce evidence as to any other land. Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. Talbott, 321 Ill. 538, 152 N.E. 486. It should be noted that all of these witnesses were aware of the existence and proximity of the quarry when they gave their opinions. The fact that they did not know what was beneath the surface of the land or made no test to determine what was below the surface, or that they did not know that some of the 40 acres had been leased for quarry purposes, would only tend to affect the weight of their testimony. These things were brought out upon...
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