Cook v. Bentley (Ex parte Cook)

• Decision Date: 04 March 2016
• Docket Number: 1140611.,1140610
• Citation: 202 So.3d 316
• Parties: Ex parte Curtis J. COOK, Jr. (In re Curtis J. Cook, Jr. v. Governor Robert Bentley et al.). Ex parte Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. (In re Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. v. Robert Bentley et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

202 So.3d 316

Ex parte Curtis J. COOK, Jr.

(In re Curtis J. Cook, Jr.

v.Governor Robert Bentley et al.).

Ex parte Joe Daniel Holt, Jr.

(In re Joe Daniel Holt, Jr.

v.Robert Bentley et al.).

1140610

1140611.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 4, 2016.

Curtis J. Cook, Jr., pro se.

Joe Daniel Holt, Jr., pro se.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew L. Brasher, deputy atty. gen., and Anne A. Hill, gen. counsel, and Albert S. Butler, asst. atty. gen., Alabama Department of Corrections, for respondents.

BRYAN

, Justice.¹

Facts and Procedural Background

Curtis J. Cook, Jr., and Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. (hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as “the petitioners”), are inmates incarcerated by the Alabama Department of Corrections (“the DOC”). The petitioners each filed in the Elmore Circuit Court (“the trial court”) a “petition for release order” seeking their release from prison pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, § 14–15–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975

(“the APLRA”). Holt filed his petition on or around June 20, 2014; Cook filed his petition on or around September 12, 2014.² The petitioners also filed requests for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. On June 27, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting Holt's request for IFP status. However, on August 25, 2014, the trial court entered an order revoking Holt's IFP status. On September 17, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Cook's request for IFP status.

The petitioners each filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals petitions for a writ of mandamus in which they sought an order from that court directing the trial court to set aside its orders denying the petitioners' requests for IFP status. On March 12, 2015, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered separate orders in which it stated that it did not have jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's petitions for a writ of mandamus and, consequently, transferred the petitions to the Court of Civil Appeals. On March 13, 2015, the Court of Civil Appeals likewise determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's petitions and entered separate orders transferring the petitions to this Court.³

This Court assigned Cook's petition case no. 1140610, assigned Holt's petition case no. 1140611, and entered an order consolidating the cases for the purpose of issuing one opinion and to address the issue of which of Alabama's appellate courts has jurisdiction to review proceedings arising from the APLRA. Accordingly, before addressing the merits of the petitioners' arguments, this Court must determine which of Alabama's appellate courts has jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's petitions.

Jurisdiction

The APLRA, which became effective on April 24, 2013, applies “to all pro se civil actions for money damages relating to terms and conditions of confinement brought under the laws of this state, or for injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief, brought by prisoners incarcerated in any state correctional facility.” § 14–15–2, Ala.Code 1975

. The APLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil action under state law. § 14–15–4(b), Ala.Code 1975. Should a prisoner commence an action seeking relief in the form of a release order, he or she must file with the petition for release a request for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to indicate that certain prerequisites, found in § 14–15–10(a), Ala.Code 1975, have been met.⁴ § 14–15–10(d), Ala.Code 1975. One limitation on relief prescribed by the APLRA is that a state court may order a prisoner's release from incarceration only when a three-judge court finds from clear and convincing evidence that “[c]rowding is the primary cause of the violation of a right” and “[n]o other relief will remedy the violation of the right.” § 14–15–10(f)(1) and (2), Ala.Code 1975.

The APLRA also provides that a pro se prisoner seeking relief as prescribed by the APLRA may seek IFP status by providing the court with a certified copy of his or her “prisoner money account” for the 12 months preceding the filing of the request for relief. § 14–15–5(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975

. If the prisoner's “inmate trust account” shows no deposits in the 12 months preceding the filing of the request for relief, the court has no discretion regarding IFP status but, instead, “shall permit the prisoner to proceed without paying the filing fee and costs.” § 14–15–5(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). The APLRA does not give courts guidance or provide factors for courts to consider in determining whether to grant IFP status in cases in which the prisoners' inmate trust accounts indicate that deposits have been made into the accounts in the 12 months preceding the filing of the request for relief.

Although no party argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over these matters, we briefly address, for thoroughness, that court's appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction “of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post conviction writs in criminal cases.” § 12–3–9, Ala.Code 1975

. Because Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arise from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. That determination is supported by the fact that the APLRA consistently refers to actions seeking relief pursuant to the procedures set forth in the APLRA as civil in nature. See, e.g., § 14–15–2, § 14–15–3(1), § 14–15–4(b)

, and § 14–15–10(a) and (b). In addition, § 14–15–2 expressly provides that the APLRA does not apply to actions brought pursuant to § 15–21–1, Ala.Code 1975, which governs habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, although the APLRA provides that a prisoner may seek release from incarceration as a form of relief, our legislature clearly intended to make a distinction between a prisoner's action seeking release from incarceration pursuant to the procedures set forth in the APLRA and a prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Cook's and Holt's petitions for release seek relief as prescribed by the APLRA, we conclude that their petitions are not in the nature of habeas corpus petitions. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals does not have jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the filing of their petitions seeking relief under the APLRA. Accordingly, appellate jurisdiction over an action seeking relief prescribed by the APLRA must lie either with the Court of Civil Appeals or with this Court.

The petitioners argue that the Court of Civil Appeals has jurisdiction over their mandamus petitions because, they say, the Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs arising from decisions of administrative agencies. The respondents,⁵ on the other hand, argue that this Court has jurisdiction over the mandamus petitions because, they say, the petitions do not fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals.

Section 12–3–10, Ala.Code 1975

, provides that the Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction

“of all civil cases where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $50,000, all appeals from administrative agencies other than the Alabama Public Service Commission, all appeals in workers' compensation cases, all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption, and child custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases.”

The only area of the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive jurisdiction that could conceivably encompass Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions is that court's jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs “arising from appeals” from decisions of administrative agencies. However, Cook's and Holt's petitions for release filed in the trial court are not appeals from an administrative agency. These are not cases in which an administrative agency has denied a petitioner requested relief and that petitioner has appealed the agency's decision either to a circuit court or to the Court of Civil Appeals. Although the basis for the relief sought by the petitioners concerns the DOC's alleged failure to address overcrowding in Alabama's prisons, the DOC has no authority under the APLRA to grant the petitioners the relief they seek; the relief they seek can be granted only by a three-judge court. § 14–15–10(b)

. The mere fact that the DOC is the agency charged with overseeing Cook's and Holt's incarceration does not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive appellate jurisdiction of “all appeals from administrative agencies” and “all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases” as envisioned by § 12–3–10

. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals does not have jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions. Because no other appellate court has jurisdiction over Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions, jurisdiction lies with this Court. Ala. Const.1901, Art. IV, § 140 (c); § 12 –2–7(1), Ala.Code 1975. Thus, we turn now to the merits of the petitioners' arguments.

Standard of Review

“In Ex parte Melton, 837 So.2d 819, 820–21 (Ala.2002)

, this Court discussed the standard of review applicable to a petition for the writ of mandamus:

“ ‘ “ A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will be ‘issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993). A writ of mandamus will issue only in situations where...