Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
| Citation | 85 Ill.App.3d 402,40 Ill.Dec. 864,407 N.E.2d 95 |
| Decision Date | 25 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-468,79-468 |
| Parties | , 40 Ill.Dec. 864, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2653, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4792 Ronnie D. COOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a Foreign Corporation, licensed and transacting business in the State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Kenneth L. Ott and James R. Carter, Kenneth L. Ott & Associates, Peoria, for plaintiff-appellant.
Homer W. Keller, Wayne L. Hanold, and Thomas G. Harvel, Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, Peoria, Jerome A. Kenney, Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, for defendant-appellee.
This case involves an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Peoria County dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Although there are a number of issues raised in this case, the ultimate issue is whether the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint was proper.
The record reveals that on November 19, 1975, and again on December 19, 1975, the plaintiff, Ronnie D. Cook, injured his back while employed by the defendant Caterpillar Company. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a workmen's compensation claim against Caterpillar. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). The defendant paid plaintiff a total of $1,642.60 in temporary total compensation that accrued intermittently from November 19, 1975, until January 17, 1977.
On January 18, 1977, the plaintiff reported for work. However, due to continued pain and discomfort in his neck and back, he found he was unable to work, advised his foreman in this regard, and punched out after having been on his shift less than two hours. The next day the plaintiff's wife notified the defendant that the plaintiff would be absent from work. On January 20, 1977, the plaintiff's wife delivered a disability benefit form to Caterpillar. The form was signed by the plaintiff's doctor, and stated that the plaintiff's back condition would be aggravated by engaging in work which required lifting or bending. The plaintiff did not report to work on January 19, 20, 21 and 24. On January 24, 1977, the defendant discharged Cook. The specific reason given for the firing was plaintiff's violation of a company rule which provides that an employee may be discharged "for being habitually tardy or absent, or being absent from work for more than three days without proper notification and approval." The company's action was based upon plaintiff's absences on January 19, 20, 21 and 24. Proceeding according to the grievance procedure contained in Article 5 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Caterpillar and the plaintiff's union, the plaintiff filed a grievance with the defendant. This grievance did not contain any allegation that the plaintiff had been discharged in retaliation for having filed a Workmen's Compensation claim. The grievance was subsequently submitted to arbitration, pursuant to Article 6 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
On March 2, 1977, an Arbitrator of the Illinois Industrial Commission rendered a decision in which he found that the plaintiff was entitled to receive from Caterpillar $164.27 per week for an intermittent period of 16 1/7 weeks pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b)). On review, this award was increased to temporary total compensation of 21 6/7 weeks. This decision was not appealed.
On April 30, 1977, the labor arbitrator rendered his decision regarding the plaintiff's grievance. Limiting his decision to the narrow issue of whether the plaintiff's discharge had been for "just cause", the arbitrator found that Cook had in fact provided just cause for his dismissal when he was absent from work without leave on January 19, 20, 21 and 24 and dismissed the grievance.
On January 18, 1979, the plaintiff filed the instant action against Caterpillar, alleging that Caterpillar engaged in a retaliatory discharge of the plaintiff when the plaintiff was discharged for pursuing his right to receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In his two count complaint, the plaintiff sought $250,000 in compensatory damages, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. A motion was subsequently filed by Caterpillar to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. In its motion Caterpillar contended that by resorting to and exhausting his out of court remedies, plaintiff was not entitled to seek redress in the courts or, alternatively, the decision reached under the out of court procedures was res judicata respecting any subsequent legal action. The court granted defendant's motion and plaintiff appeals.
The first issue raised by plaintiff is whether the fact that plaintiff exhausted his remedies pursuant to the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement bars access to the court or whether it is a condition precedent to the filing of a civil suit for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff contends he must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. Having failed to gain satisfaction by this method, he contends that he may subsequently file a suit for retaliatory discharge sounding in tort. This argument rests on two premises. The first premise is that the issue of retaliatory discharge could not have been resolved by arbitration. The second is that the action lies in tort and not in contract.
At the heart of the premise that the issue could not have been resolved by arbitration is the assumption that the Collective Bargaining Agreement does not provide a means of redress for retaliatory discharge. That assumption is erroneous. Section 5.1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement provides for the grievance procedure and defines grievances. Part b of section 5.1 states that a grievance is "(a)ny matter involving the interpretation, application or violation of any provisions of this agreement * * * ." One of those provisions is section 5.5 which states that "Employees shall be * * * discharged only for just cause." The provision further discusses the procedures to be followed when there has been a discharge. It is thus clear that whether or not an employee has been discharged for just cause is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
If the employee was not discharged for just cause, then he was wrongfully discharged. It is obvious that an investigation into whether or not there was a wrongful discharge would examine the possibility that the employee was the victim of a retaliatory discharge. Therefore, the arbitrator clearly has the power to decide the matter if one side should bring it up.
It is true that the Agreement does not specifically enumerate retaliatory discharge as a grievance. However, not every conceivable problem can be covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Such an agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. Because of the breadth of matters covered by such an agreement, as well as the need for a fairly concise and readable instrument, the agreement cannot specifically enumerate a provision to cover every situation. Therefore, the provisions regarding the employer's right to discharge for just cause and the employee's right to continuance of his employment in the absence of such just cause are couched in general and ambiguous terms. Payne v. Pullman Co. (1957), 13 Ill.App.2d 105, 141 N.E.2d 83. These terms "are given practical implementation by the establishment of a complete system of arbitrament * * * " Payne, supra, 13 Ill.App.2d at 118, 141 N.E.2d at 89. In view of the above, it is clear that simply because retaliatory discharge is not specifically mentioned in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, it is not beyond the scope of the Agreement. In fact, the discharge provisions of the Agreement were intentionally left in general terms so as to allow enough flexibility to permit various considerations such as retaliatory discharge to be weighed when an arbitrator tries to determine whether or not there was just cause for a discharge. It is an inescapable conclusion that the concept of retaliatory discharge is subsumed within the just cause provision and is within the power of the arbitrator to consider when determining if a discharge is for just cause.
The second premise relied on by plaintiff is that an action for retaliatory discharge sounds, in tort, not contract. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that where there has been a retaliatory discharge of an employee terminable at will, the discharged employee may bring an action in tort. The reasoning behind the court's decision is that an employee terminable at will has no recourse against his employer if the employer decides to discharge the employee for filing a Workmen's Compensation claim. In the absence of the ability to recover in tort, an employee terminable at will would be forced to choose between continued employment and the Workmen's Compensation legally due him. This would have seriously undermined the Workmen's Compensation Act and so the court permitted employees terminable at will to sue in tort for retaliatory discharge.
The issue in this case is whether Kelsay is applicable to a situation where an employee is not terminable at will, but instead has recourse against an employer under a collective bargaining agreement permitting discharge only for just cause and allowing for arbitration to guarantee the parties' rights. We believe that it is not. The policy considerations in Kelsay are not present here. In the instant case the employee is protected. As shown above, the discharge provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement serve to protect the employee from retaliatory discharge. Thus, the employee is free to apply for Workmen's Compensation without worrying that he will have to sacrifice his...
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