Cook v. Cox
Decision Date | 16 April 1973 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 230-70-R. |
Citation | 357 F. Supp. 120 |
Parties | James Robert COOK v. James D. COX, etc. et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Daniel A. Carrell, Richmond, Va., for plaintiff.
Vann H. Lefcoe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, Va., for defendants.
James Cook, a Virginia prisoner, seeks redress from the defendant prison officials for alleged constitutional deprivations suffered while he was incarcerated in the state penitentiary. Jurisdiction is attained by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties are presently before the Court pursuant to plaintiff's motion for a hearing. Because of the peculiar history of this litigation, however, the Court finds this matter ripe for summary judgment. The issues appurtenant thereto have been fully briefed by counsel in memoranda before the Court. It is upon same, and the records before it, that the Court deems this matter ready for disposition.
Cook brought this action pro se against J. D. Cox, then Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, on April 21, 1970, alleging that he was unconstitutionally confined to isolation (solitary confinement) and padlock on several occasions and that he had been beaten by an unnamed prison guard without reason. Counsel was appointed for Cook on June 30, 1971, when it appeared that controverted issues of fact and law existed on the record before the Court. On September 22, 1971, plaintiff submitted his demand, by counsel, for jury trial of the factual issues raised. On March 21, 1972, the Court granted defendant Cox's motion of March 22, 1972, for a more definite statement of claims. On March 31, 1972, Cook, by counsel, filed an amended complaint naming as additional party defendants A. E. Slayton, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary; W. K. Cunningham, Director of the Division of Corrections; and Otis Brown, Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions. The amended complaint alleged the following constitutional deprivations:
1. Cook was placed in isolation without notice of charges or of duration of confinement on October 29, 1968.
2. On November 20, 1968, while in isolation, Cook was attacked without provocation by an unnamed prison guard and subsequently not given medical treatment therefor.
3. On May 28, 1969, Cook was placed in C-cell (maximum security) without a hearing.
4. On March 27, 1970, Cook was again placed in isolation without a hearing or notice of charges.
Relief prayed for included money damages and a prayer for expunction of the records of these confinements from Cook's prison records.
This action went to trial before a jury on April 10 and 11, 1972. Because several of the preliminary legal issues raised, including that of whether Cook was entitled to a jury, were not determined, counsel agreed, upon the Court's suggestion, that the jury should be instructed to return a special verdict to establish the facts and that the issue of liability for damages would be developed in memoranda of law to be submitted to the Court. The jury's verdict read as follows:
"Yes" or "No." ________ Written by Foreman (1) Physical Damage NO (2) Mental Damage YES /s/ John A. Passeri, Jr. Foreman Date: 4-11-72
A subsequent motion for judgment N. O.V. of April 27, 1972, by the defendants was denied by the Court for the reason that said motion was untimely. On September 29, 1972, the Court solicited memoranda from counsel on the issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from the plaintiff. That issue, as well as procedural issues raised with respect to the further prosecution of this action, are now before the Court. Accordingly, the Court will proceed with this matter by determination of the following issues:
1. Is Cook entitled to a jury?
2. What elements must be proven in order to hold the defendants liable?
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right of jury trial to suits at common law.1 The few courts that have considered the issue have split on the question of whether a § 1983 suit is one "at common law." See, e. g., Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F.Supp. 683 (N.D.Ohio 1972) ( it isn't) and Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 278 F.Supp. 632 (S.D.Tex.1968), rev'd. on other grounds, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970) ( ). In the Court's opinion, the issue properly turns on a determination of whether § 1983 is a jurisdictional type statute which merely places a traditional type claim2 involving state action within the framework of federal jurisdiction,3 or whether the section creates a special statutory claim independent of common law. If the former, a § 1983 action seeking money damages is in essence a tort action, which is "legal" in nature, to which the right to jury trial directly attaches. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962). If the latter, a § 1983 claim is a special action to which other analysis, infra, may be applied. See Lawton v. Nightingale, supra.
The Court concludes that the latter position is correct, that is, that § 1983 creates a separate federal right. Support for this view is found in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 195, 81 S.Ct. 473, 488, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring):
(Footnote omitted)
Additionally, the majority opinion, 365 U.S. at 180, 81 S.Ct. at 480, after reviewing the legislative history concludes:
The debates were long and extensive. It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has given similar interpretation to § 1983 as a separate statutory cause of action. In Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1972), the Court stated:
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