Cook v. General Elec. Co.

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MILLER
• Citation: Cook v. General Elec. Co., 588 N.E.2d 1087, 146 Ill.2d 548, 167 Ill.Dec. 957 (Ill. 1992)
• Decision Date: 23 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 70840,70840
• Parties: , 167 Ill.Dec. 957 Robert COOK, Appellee, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY et al. (General Electric Company, Appellant).

Page 1087

588 N.E.2d 1087

146 Ill.2d 548, 167 Ill.Dec. 957

Robert COOK, Appellee, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY et al. (General Electric Company, Appellant).

No. 70840.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 23, 1992.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1992.

Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago (Robert W. Schmieder and Stephen R. Swofford, of counsel), for appellant.

Rosemary D. McGuire, of Brennan, Cates & Constance, Belleville, for appellee.

Chief Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

On November 15, 1988, plaintiff, Robert Cook, filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of St. Clair County against Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific) and General Electric Company (GE) seeking damages for injuries he sustained when the train he was operating collided with a combine. Cook alleges that Union Pacific, his employer, and GE, the manufacturer of the locomotive, failed to provide adequate safety equipment on the train to protect the engineer.

GE filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Montgomery County and Walshville Township and moved to transfer the entire action from St. Clair County to Montgomery County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the governmental defendants could only be sued in Montgomery County. The sole issue presented here is whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied GE's motion and severed the contribution action, sending only that action to Montgomery County. The appellate court denied review. We granted GE leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (134 Ill.2d R. 315) and now reverse the circuit court.

Cook, a resident of St. Clair County, was employed by Union Pacific at its Walshville Township location in Montgomery County. The accident occurred at the intersection of the railroad tracks and County Road 150N in Montgomery County. Following the filing of plaintiff's complaint against Union Pacific and GE, Union Pacific, a Utah corporation, filed a complaint for contribution against the estate of the combine driver, who died in the accident, and the combine driver's employer. GE, a New York corporation, filed a third-party action for contribution against Montgomery County and Walshville Township.

GE's motion for transfer was filed in several different versions. GE filed its first forum non conveniens motion on April 5, 1989, before it filed its third-party complaint against Montgomery County and Walshville Township. The motion alleged that all relevant connections with the suit were in Montgomery County, and that the suit could be tried there more conveniently. On April 19, GE asked for leave to file a complaint for contribution against Montgomery County and Walshville Township and amended its forum non conveniens motion to reflect the addition of the third-party defendants. On April 24, leave was granted and GE filed its third-party complaint. After the first amended motion was denied on May 18, GE argued in a second amended motion that because of the venue provision of section 2-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-103), the governmental defendants could only be sued in Montgomery County. On June 13, the circuit court denied GE's second amended motion, observing that neither of the governmental defendants had made an appearance to assert its venue rights. That same day, Montgomery County asserted its rights by filing a motion to dismiss or transfer the action to the circuit court of Montgomery County. GE moved for reconsideration of its second amended forum non conveniens motion, but instead, the circuit court, "exercising its discretion under Laue v. Leifheit (1984), 105 Ill.2d 191 [85 Ill.Dec. 340, 473 N.E.2d 939]," severed GE's third-party action against Montgomery County and Walshville Township and transferred that action to Montgomery County, leaving the original tort action in the circuit court of St. Clair County. The appellate court denied review. We granted GE's petition for leave to appeal.

GE argues here that Laue v. Leifheit (1984), 105 Ill.2d 191, 85 Ill.Dec. 340, 473 N.E.2d 939, requires that contribution actions be tried in a single suit with the original tort action and that because section 2-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-103) requires actions against governmental entities to be brought in the counties in which the entities are located, the entire action must be transferred to Montgomery County. Further, GE argues that under the traditional factors considered under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial of the case would be more convenient in Montgomery County.

Cook replies that his choice of venue in St. Clair County is proper and convenient since he lives there, his doctors are there, and it is near the airport at St. Louis, making St. Clair County easier for out-of-State witnesses to reach. Cook also argues that there is no absolute requirement that contribution actions be tried together with the original action and that governmental defendants need not always have the benefits of the venue provisions of section 2-103.

We first address GE's argument that the considerations of Laue v. Leifheit and section 2-103, taken without more, compel transfer of this case from St. Clair to Montgomery County.

We note first that because Montgomery County and Walshville Township are parties to the contribution action, the contribution action must be tried in Montgomery County. Section 2-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-103) states that "[a]ctions must be brought against a * * * governmental * * * corporation in the county in which its principal office is located or in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose." The governmental defendants here have their principal offices in Montgomery County and the accident took place in Montgomery County. Therefore, under the statute, the contribution action must be tried in Montgomery County.

Plaintiff observes that an exception to section 2-103 has been made in a situation where several governmental entities based in different counties are joined in a single suit. (See Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 191, 63 Ill.Dec. 936, 438 N.E.2d 1299.) Based on Lawless, plaintiff urges us to make a second exception here, allowing the actions to be tried together in St. Clair County. Lawless, however, involved a single suit against governmental defendants from two separate counties. Here, both governmental defendants are in the same county and thus both are subject to suit in Montgomery County. Because both governmental defendants have their principal offices in one county, we decline plaintiff's invitation to make an additional exception allowing third-party governmental defendants to be sued in counties other than those specifically allowed by section 2-103. If a further exception is to be made under the circumstances presented here, we believe the exception should be made by the General Assembly.

Having decided that the contribution action must be tried in Montgomery County, we now examine whether the circuit court properly severed the claims, or whether they should be tried together in Montgomery County.

We first note that Lawless has further implications for plaintiff's argument in favor of the trial court's severance of the contribution actions. The court in Lawless was presented with the choice of making an exception to section 2-103 allowing the claims against the governmental defendants to be tried together in one suit, or having separate trials in two counties. In making its decision the court found that considerations of judicial economy were important enough to compel an exception to the governmental venue statute and held that all the claims should be tried together in one county. (Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 191, 195, 63 Ill.Dec. 936, 438 N.E.2d 1299 ("Creation of this multiplicity of actions would add confusion to the litigation process and exacerbate the problem of overcrowded court dockets").) In the present case we are presented with no such dilemma. Montgomery County and Walshville Township are both in the same county; therefore a joint trial may be had in Montgomery County, which is a proper venue for both actions, with no need for an exception to the venue statute.

As an additional argument against severance, defendant contends that under Laue v. Leifheit (1984), 105 Ill.2d 191, 85 Ill.Dec. 340, 473 N.E.2d 939, the contribution actions cannot be severed and that the entire cause must be tried in the same action. In Leifheit, we held that "when there is a pending action, [any] contribution claim should be asserted * * * in that action." (Emphasis in original.) (105 Ill.2d at 196, 85 Ill.Dec. 340, 473 N.E.2d 939.) In part, our decision in Leifheit was motivated by concerns for judicial economy and our policy of trying related suits together.

"One jury should decide both the liability to the plaintiff and the percentages of liability among the defendants, so as to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits in an already crowded court system and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. Requiring the parties to litigate the matter in one suit will also save court time and attorney fees." (Leifheit, 105 Ill.2d at 196-97, 85 Ill.Dec. 340, 473 N.E.2d 939.)

(See also McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. (1988), 121 Ill.2d 278, 291, 117 Ill.Dec. 207, 520 N.E.2d 368 ("all claims can be tried at once instead of in a piecemeal manner, which would serve both private and public interests").) We fail to see how Leifheit can be interpreted to give the trial court discretion to sever GE's contribution claim.

As an alternative basis for the trial court's severance of the claims, plaintiff suggests that the severance can be justified under section 2-614(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2-614(b) allows the trial...