Cook v. Heidi Wash.

Decision Date03 August 2022
Docket Number2:22-cv-143
PartiesDANIEL LEE COOK, Plaintiff, v. HEIDI WASHINGTON et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

DANIEL LEE COOK, Plaintiff,
v.
HEIDI WASHINGTON et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-143

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division

August 3, 2022


OPINION

ROBERT J. JONKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility and the Woodland Correctional Facility (WCC)

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in Whitmore Lake, Livingston County, Michigan; the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan; and the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF) in New Haven, Macomb County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi Washington, WCC Warden Unknown Deangelo, MRF Warden Unknown Warren, Unknown Party #1 (identified as the director/supervisor official for MDOC property transport), and Unknown Party #2 (identified as the corrections officer who destroyed Plaintiff's word processor).

Plaintiff has spent most of the last five years confined at a security level that did not permit him to possess his word processor. He reports that it was packed up in perfect working condition at MBP in 2017. Thereafter, he was repeatedly denied access to it.

Plaintiff alleges he was transferred to ICF during 2018. He again sought access to the word processor. His requests were denied.

Later that year he was transferred to WCC. He again sought access to his word processor. Defendant Deangelo refused Plaintiff access. Plaintiff mailed a complaint regarding the issue to Defendant Washington during January of 2019. A few days later he was transferred to MRF.

At MRF, Plaintiff was issued his word processor. The property slip stated that it was in good condition, but it was obviously broken. Plaintiff complained to Defendant Warren. Defendant Warren stated the word processor would be fixed or replaced. That never happened.

During Plaintiff's stay at MRF he was “in and out of segregation multiple times.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Property staff at MRF again stored Plaintiff's word processor and stated that it was in good condition; but it was not.

Plaintiff was transferred to ICF during October of 2019. Months later he transferred back to MBP. He transferred back to ICF and then back to MBP during August or September of 2021. where he remains. During all of these transfers the property was listed as being in good condition

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yet it remained broken and inoperable. Plaintiff has asked MBP Warden Huss and Defendant Washington to replace the word processer to no avail.

Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendants to replace the word processor and to award damages in the amount of $20,000.00.

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial...

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