Cook v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1938
• Docket Number: 14598.
• Citation: 194 S.E. 636,186 S.C. 77
• Parties: COOK v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

194 S.E. 636

186 S.C. 77

COOK v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 14598.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 7, 1938

Appeal from Richland County Court; A. W. Holman, Judge.

Action by Leslie E. Cook against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for fraud and deceit for defendant's alleged failure to revive an industrial life policy. From a judgment on a verdict awarding plaintiff $5 nominal damages and $256 punitive damages, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Elliott McLean, Wardlaw & Elliott, of Columbia, for appellant.

E. J Best and Chas. F. Cooper, both of Columbia, for respondent.

FISHBURNE Justice.

On June 22, 1904, the defendant issued to the plaintiff, when he was seven years of age, what is styled an industrial policy insuring his life in the sum of $240. The policy, also referred to as an infantile endowment, provided for the payment of a premium of 10 cents per week. The policy continued in force until May 8, 1933, when it finally lapsed for nonpayment of premiums. But before this date it had lapsed and had been reinstated at least twice, by a premium lien agreement indorsed thereon. The original policy was destroyed by fire, but upon the application of the plaintiff in 1928, a duplicate policy was issued to him.

Possession of this duplicate was obtained from the plaintiff by an agent of the defendant in November, 1934, and this controversy arises from the facts and circumstances connected with that transaction. When the agent, Mr. Black, secured possession of the policy, it had a paid-up value of $136, augmented by dividends, which was a fixed liability of the defendant without further payment of premiums, payable upon the death of the insured.

This action is one based upon fraud and deceit, and the gist of it is found in the following allegations of the complaint:

"That on or about November, 1934, the plaintiff made application to the defendant company to revive and reinstate the aforementioned policy, and at the same time delivered the said policy to the defendant and its agents for the purpose of reviving the same, and at the time of its delivery to the said defendant, the defendant and its agents promised to revive and reinstate said policy of insurance and return the same to the plaintiff.

That the aforesaid policy, on account of its age, possessed great benefits and advantages to the plaintiff and was of much value to him and to his beneficiaries. That the plaintiff ever since the delivery of said policy to the defendant has made many, various and sundry demands on the defendant for the return to him of said policy of insurance, but the said defendant company and its agents have intentionally, maliciously, wilfully and fraudulently declined and refused to give the plaintiff his said policy of insurance as aforesaid."

The defendant pleaded a general denial.

The trial of the case resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5, nominal damages, and $256 punitive damages.

Upon the conclusion of the testimony the defendant moved for a directed verdict, upon the ground that the testimony failed to show any actionable fraud on the part of the defendant, and contended that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony "is that the insured voluntarily surrendered a policy of insurance, which was at that time not in force, for the purpose of having it revived; there being no consideration for the promise on the part of the agent to revive the policy; there being no application therefor, and no payment being made therefor, and, therefore, the plaintiff is now in the identical position he was in before the policy was surrendered, and consequently no damage can flow to him."

The county judge overruled the motion, and from this ruling the defendant appeals.

At the time of the transaction which gave rise to this action, the plaintiff resided at Edgewood, a suburb of the city of Columbia, with his wife, who by a subsequent change was the beneficiary named in the policy, and his children. They held various industrial policies, calling for small weekly premium payments on the lives of several members of the family. These premiums were collected weekly at the home of the insured, by the defendant's agent, Mr. Black. His debit book contained the numbers of these various insurance policies, and among them was the number of the policy now in suit. On the occasion when the policy in question was delivered to him, all of the policies held by the family had lapsed for nonpayment of premiums, but the agent knew that this policy and at least two others could be revived and reinstated. He called at the home of the insured to solicit the reinstatement of the policies referred to, but he says in his testimony that the policy in question was given to him, not for the purpose of renewal or revival, but that he was specifically instructed to obtain its cash value, if it had any.

The appellant evidently discounts this portion of the agent's testimony, who testified on its behalf, because in the motion for a directed verdict it is urged that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the policy was surrendered for the purpose of having it revived. The insured, his wife, and his daughter, testified unequivocally that Mr. Black came to their home and persuaded the insured to give up the policy so that he could have it revived; and stated that no cash payment would be required, but that he would reinstate it by a policy lien agreement. With this understanding, they say, the policy was delivered to him, and he promised to return it within a few days.

All of this occurred sometime in November, 1934. The plaintiff testified that he had intended to take the initiative himself and have the policy revived, as he had done before, but when Mr. Black took the matter up with him he relied upon the representations made to him, and intrusted him with the policy for the purpose of reinstating it, by having a lien agreement indorsed on it.

The policy was never revived, and, according to the testimony of the plaintiff, was never returned.

The plaintiff was employed as a boilermaker in the machine shop of the Southern Railway Company at Columbia, and depended upon his wife to attend to his insurance matters. It appears that she was sick, and confined to the house during the months of November and December, 1934, and January and February, 1935. The policy not having been returned, Mrs Cook, the beneficiary, sometime in March, 1935, went to Columbia and called at the office of the defendant for the purpose of making inquiry about it and securing its return. Mr. Roseberry, the company's district manager, was not in, but his stenographer in the office told her that she knew nothing about it, but would take it up with the manager. Thereafter Mrs. Cook visited the office several times for the sole purpose of recovering the policy, but was never able to see Mr. Roseberry, who, she was informed, was either out...