Cook v. Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.

• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
• Writing for the Court: OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
• Citation: 315 A.3d 885
• Docket Number: 161 M.D. 2021
• Decision Date: 05 April 2024
• Parties: The Honorable Maria Musti COOK, in her official capacity as the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Nineteenth Judicial District; and The Court of Common Pleas of York County, Petitioners v. The PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; and SEIU Local 668 PSSU, Respondents

315 A.3d 885

The Honorable Maria Musti COOK, in her official capacity as the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Nineteenth Judicial District; and The Court of Common Pleas of York County, Petitioners

v.The PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; and SEIU Local 668 PSSU, Respondents

No. 161 M.D. 2021

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 23, 2022

Decided November 2, 2022

Publication Ordered April 5, 2024

West Codenotes

Recognized as Unconstitutional

43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1428

Original Jurisdiction

Robert J. Krandel, Philadelphia, for Petitioners.

Warren R. Mowery, Jr., Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for Respondent The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board.

Kieran G. Kenny, Philadelphia, for Respondent SEIU Local 668 PSSU.

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge, HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER

At issue is whether the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board) has jurisdiction when a judicial employer disciplines a judicially appointed employee. In this case, a probation officer received a written reprimand for violating York County’s (County) search and seizure policy. The probation officer, by and through his union representative, utilized the grievance process contained in the internal court process that had been incorporated into the County’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Thereafter, the probation officer’s discipline was enhanced from a written reprimand to a two-day suspension. As a result of this enhancement, the probation officer, with the assistance of his union, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.

The Secretary of the Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing on the unfair labor practice charge. The Court of Common Pleas of York County (Common Pleas) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Board was without jurisdiction based on the separation of powers doctrine as the discipline involved a judicially appointed employee. In SEIU Local 668 PSSU v. York County and York County Court of Common Pleas (York County), PERA-C-18-120-E (April 20, 2021), the Board denied the motion to dismiss but determined that no unfair labor practice occurred. The Honorable Maria Musti Cook, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, and Common Pleas (together, Petitioners) filed a "Petition for Review in the Nature of an Appeal and, Alternatively, An Action for Declaratory Judgment" (Petition), seeking review of the Board’s determination in this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and/or seeking a declaration from this Court in its original jurisdiction that the Board was without jurisdiction to make that determination. Presently before this Court for disposition is the Application for Summary Relief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) (Application), filed by the Board and the Service Employees International Union, Local 668, Pennsylvania Social Services Union (SEIU) (together, Respondents). In the Application, Respondents seek the dismissal of the Petition in its entirety. Upon careful review, we deny Respondents’ Application and stay the appellate portion in the Petition while the Court resolves Petitioners’ request for declaratory judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

These are the facts alleged in the Petition. The County is party to a CBA with SEIU, which is the bargaining agent for court-appointed employees, including those in the Probation and Parole and Domestic Relations units. (Petition ¶ 9.) The County is the bargaining representative for Common Pleas. (Id.) The County and SEIU have entered into various agreements over the years. (Id. ¶ 10, Exhibit (Ex.) B.) The CBA at issue contains a provision that states Common Pleas did not waive "its exclusive right to hire, fire, or supervise employees under Section 1620 of The County Code."¹ (Id. ¶ 11, Ex. B at 2-3.)

On February 26, 2018, Adult Probation Officer Jason Walker (Probation Officer) received a written reprimand from Common Pleas "for failing to follow court procedures, failing to debrief his supervisor following an incident, and failing to submit a written incident report within 72 hours of an incident." (Id. ¶ 13.) Probation Officer was disciplined because he "conduct[ed] a warrantless search of a residence that was not under the active supervision of the [Common Pleas’] Department of Probation Services," he "ordered an individual not under court supervision to dispose of property," and he "did not have the resident complete and sign a Consent to Search form, despite claiming to [have] receive[d] verbal permission to search the residence." (Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis in original), Ex. C.) Thereafter, Probation Officer’s union, SEIU, filed a grievance on his behalf demanding that Common Pleas withdraw the reprimand. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. C.) On March 5, 2018, April Billet-Barclay, Director of Probation Services (Probation Director), "objected to [SEIU’s] grievance on the basis of separation of powers principles," responded to the grievance, and increased Probation Officer’s discipline to a two-day suspension. (Id. ¶ 16, Ex. C.) Probation Officer’s discipline was increased as a result of a "gross disregard for the Fourth Amendment² rights of the citizens of [the] com- munity[, Probation Officer’s] failure to accept any responsibility for [his] behavior, [his] complete disregard for department policy …, and the poor example [Probation Officer] set for rookie officers." (Id., Ex. C at 3.)

On May 25, 2018, SEIU filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board seeking to revert Probation Officer’s discipline from a two-day suspension to a written warning. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Board’s Secretary issued a complaint and notice of hearing on June 18, 2018. (Id., Ex. A.) Common Pleas filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, under Beckert v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 56 Pa.Cmwlth. 572, 425 A.2d 859 (1981), the Board was without jurisdiction to review Probation Officer’s discipline based on the doctrine of separation of powers because the unfair labor charge "clearly involved discipline of a court employee." (Id. ¶ 19.) In lieu of a hearing, the parties stipulated facts and briefed the matter before the Board’s hearing examiner. (Id. ¶ 20.) Common Pleas’ brief did not address the merits, continuing to assert the Board did not have jurisdiction. The hearing examiner issued a proposed decision and order on May 13, 2019, that held that the "Board had jurisdiction, considered the merits of Probation Officer’s discipline, and ultimately concluded that" SEIU failed to establish an unfair labor practice and, as such, rescinded the complaint and dismissed the unfair practice charge. (Id. ¶ 21, Ex. A at 1.)

Common Pleas filed exceptions to the proposed decision and order, again arguing that under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Board was "without jurisdiction to consider unfair labor practice charges that involve discipline of a court employee." (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 20, 2021, the Board adopted the proposed decision and order and dismissed Common Pleas’ exceptions, concluding "there is binding precedent expressly holding that the Board has jurisdiction to hear unfair practice cases concerning the rights of court-appointed employees under" the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA).³ (Final Order at 1-2 (citing Teamsters Local 115 v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 394, 619 A.2d 382, 382 (1992)).) Concluding it had jurisdiction, the Board reviewed the unfair labor practice charge and found that the facts "reveal[ed] that [SEIU] failed to meet its burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination." (Final Order at 2.) The Board, therefore, affirmed the hearing examiner’s proposed decision and order, rescinding the complaint and dismissing the unfair labor practice charge.

B. The Petition and Response

[1] Petitioners then filed the Petition invoking this Court’s appellate and original jurisdiction.⁴ In the Petition, Petitioners challenge the Board’s jurisdiction to review the discipline of a judicial employee, arguing that the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction violates the doctrine of separation of powers. (Petition ¶¶ 8, 30-31.) Petitioners request that this Court overrule the Board’s Final Order and further "find that absent an unfair labor practice charge alleging [Common Pleas] is interfering with, coercing, or restraining organizing and bargaining activity of court employees, the Board is without jurisdiction to entertain an unfair labor practice charge involving the hire, fire, or supervision of court employees" after the initial bargaining and organizing period is over, and order the Board to dismiss the complaint before it for lack of jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 38(a), (b).) Alternatively, Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment from the Court declaring that "absent an unfair labor practice charge alleging [Common Pleas] is interfering with, coercing, or restraining organizing and bargaining activity of court employees, the Board is without jurisdiction to entertain an unfair labor practice charge involving the hire, fire, or supervision of court employees." (Id. ¶ 39.) In support of their claim that the Board is consistently exceeding its jurisdiction in reviewing the discipline of judicial employees, Petitioners cite to SEIU Local 668 v. Chester County and Chester County Court of Common Pleas, PERA-C-19-26-E (Proposed Decision & Order January 15, 2020) (Chester County), as evidence of the Board’s extra-jurisdictional review. In that case, a Board hearing examiner held that the Board had jurisdiction to consider an unfair labor practice charge brought by SEIU based on allegations that the judicial employer held a meeting with an employee that could have resulted in discipline, the employee...