Cook v. Ramsey

• Decision Date: 17 March 1914
• Citation: 86 N.J.L. 263,90 A. 265
• Parties: COOK v. RAMSEY.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

90 A. 265

86 N.J.L. 263

COOK

v. RAMSEY.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 17, 1914.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Information in the nature of a quo warranto by Edmund Wilson, Attorney General, on the relation of Alford B. Cook, against David H. Ramsey. From a judgment ousting defendant from the office of chief of police of the city of Rahway, he appeals. Reversed.

Foster M. Voorhees, of Elizabeth, for appellant. William R. Wilson, of Elizabeth, for respondent.

PARKER, J. This appeal brings up a Judgment of the Supreme Court upon an information in the nature of a quo warranto by the Attorney General against the appellant Ramsey, acting as chief of police of the city of Rahway. The claim made in the information was that Ramsey was appointed chief of police, in violation of the provisions of an act of 1907 (P. L. p. 442; C. S. 2464; pp. 527, 528), entitled "An act concerning police in municipalities." The attack on Ramsey's tenure of the office in question was based on section 2 of the act of 1907, which provides that: "In municipalities where members of the police force are or may be removable only for cause after hearing, no person shall be appointed or promoted to any such office on the police force above the rank and file of the force, by whatever name designated, unless such person shall have served continuously as a member of such force for at least five years." The words "such office" evidently refer to the latter part of section 1, which speaks of "the appointment of officers of the force above the rank and file thereof by whatever name designated."

Ramsey was appointed in 1911, not having served continuously as a member of the force for five years; and as the Supreme Court properly said, if the statute is constitutional, his appointment was unlawful. The Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional, considering only two objections to it, namely: (1) That dealt with in the case of Beverly v. Wain, 57 N. J. Law, 143, 30 Atl. 545, and distinguished in Kennedy v. Belmar, 61 N. J. Law, 20, 38 Atl. 756, both Supreme Court decisions, that the title is too broad for the act itself; and (2) that classification of municipalities into those in which policemen are or may be removable only for cause, and those in which they are not, is illusory. As to the second objection, we agree with the Supreme Court that the classification is a most practical one, and as it includes, not only municipalities in which tenure during good behavior now exists, but also those that may come into that class, we...