Cook v. Rockett
| Decision Date | 27 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-39597 |
| Parties | KURT COOK and HECTOR RANGEL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LAWRENCE ROCKETT, JONATHAN FRENCH, and DARLENE FRENCH, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY R. DAVID PEDERSON DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Burns Law Group, P.C. Mitchel S. Burns Farmington, NM for Appellants
Dugan &Associates, P.C. Thomas P. Dugan Durango, CO for Appellee Lawrence Rockett
The Law Offices of Tyson K. Gobble Tyson K. Gobble Farmington, NM for Appellees Jonathan French and Darlene French
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired, sitting by designation
{¶1} This case provides a tricky problem regarding stipulated judgments and statute of limitations. Plaintiffs Kurt Cook and Hector Rangel appeal the district court's decision that their complaint-based wholly upon an order from an earlier case in 2001-was barred by the statute of limitations for judgments. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-2 (1983 amended 2021).[1] We hold that stipulated judgments that reflect contractual arrangements between parties are not subject to the statute of limitations in Section 37-1-2. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' complaint and the attached exhibits.[2] In 2001, Ernie Martin and Mary Hegwer had a legal dispute over property in Farmington, New Mexico. At that time, Martin was the owner of 515 East Main Street (Main Property), and Hegwer owned the abutting property at 434 East Broadway Street (Broadway Property). In August 2001, Martin and Hegwer entered into an agreement that granted Martin, his heirs, or assigns, a right of first refusal to purchase the Broadway Property. The parties read the agreement into the record to the district court. The district court signed off on the agreement and entered an order in October 2001 (the order). The relevant portion of the order states:
[Martin], his heir or assigns, shall have the right of first refusal to purchase [Hegwer]'s property. Said right of first refusal shall be exercised within 30 days of presentation of any bona fide, legitimate offer by a ready, willing and able purchaser. Said offer shall be accompanied by an appraisal from a licensed appraiser. [Martin] is granted the option of purchasing the property for the same terms and conditions as indicated in the bona fide offer, or if the offer is greater than the appraisal plus ten percent (10%), then [Martin] may purchase the property for the appraised value plus ten percent (10%). Said right of first refusal shall run with the property and may be executed on all or part of [Hegwer]'s property that she may decide to sell. Said right of first refusal shall also be binding upon [Hegwer]'s heirs or assigns. If [Martin] does not exercise his option within 30 days of receiving notice of an offer that triggers the option, the option shall terminate. [Hegwer] is under no obligation to sell the property, except under the terms contained herein.
The order was recorded with the San Juan County Clerk a week later.
{¶3} Hegwer deeded the Broadway Property to herself and Defendant Lawrence Rockett in May 2003 and recorded the deed with the San Juan County Clerk in June 2004. Hegwer died in July 2009, leaving Defendant Rockett as the sole owner of the Broadway Property. Defendant Rockett then sold the Broadway Property to Defendants Jonathan and Darlene French in March 2018. Defendant Rockett did not present a bona fide offer and appraisal to the owners of the Main Property before the sale of the Broadway Property.
{¶4} Plaintiffs and the prior owner of the Main Property first learned of the sale of the Broadway Property in mid-September 2019. Plaintiffs, the current owners of the Main Property, purchased the Main Property in late-September 2019. Plaintiffs secured a licensed appraiser, who appraised the Broadway Property at a value of $120,000. Plaintiffs mailed a letter to Defendant Rockett exercising the option to purchase the Broadway Property for the amount of the appraisal plus 10 percent in January 2020.
{¶5} In February 2020, Plaintiffs filed this complaint against Defendants and asserted claims for declaratory judgment, specific performance, quiet title, and breach of contract. In lieu of an answer, Defendant Rockett filed a Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA motion to dismiss. He argued that because the claims asserted by Plaintiffs were based on a judgment that was filed more than eighteen years ago, and the statute of limitations for actions founded upon a judgment is fourteen years, see § 37-1-2, the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' complaint. After a hearing on the motion, the district court dismissed the action with prejudice. In its order, the district court adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which it noted the findings of fact were not disputed by the parties. Plaintiffs appeal.
DISCUSSION
{¶6} Plaintiffs argue (1) the right of first refusal in the order is a contract and not a judgment subject to Section 37-1-2; (2) the fourteen-year limitation period in Section 37-1-2 does not begin until the right of first refusal option has arisen; and (3) the order was a conveyance of a future option to purchase property pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 47-1-12 (1903) and not a judgment within the meaning of Section 371-2.
{¶7} Generally, we review a district court's decision to dismiss a case under Rule 1-012(B)(6) de novo. Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917. However, the district court granted Defendant Rockett's motion to dismiss after considering the transcript of the August 2021 hearing and making findings of facts and conclusions of law. We therefore treat the district court's action as granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See id. ¶ 10 (); First Sw. Fin. Servs. v. Pulliam, 1996-NMCA-032, ¶ 4, 121 N.M. 436, 912 P.2d 828 ().
{¶8} "Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582.
As the parties do not disagree on the facts, and the issue before us is whether the order should have been dismissed as a matter of law, our review is de novo. See Dominguez v. Perovich Props., Inc., 2005-NMCA-050, ¶ 9, 137 N.M. 401, 111 P.3d 721 ().
{¶9} To the extent we must engage in statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Generally, "[i]n construing the language of a statute, our goal and guiding principle is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Grisham v. Romero, 2021-NMSC-009, ¶ 23, 483 P.3d 545. "In determining legislative intent, we look to the plain language of the statute and the context in which it was enacted, taking into account its history and background." Pirtle v. Legis. Council Comm., 2021-NMSC-026, ¶ 14, 492 P.3d 586.
{¶10} The statute of limitations for judgments states, "Actions founded upon any judgment of any court of the state may be brought within fourteen years from the date of the judgment, and not afterward." Section 37-1-2. We must determine if the order is subject to this statute of limitations. We hold it is not and explain.
{¶11}We start with the order. Defendants argue that the order "had the earmarks of a default judgment since Mr. Martin and Ms. Hegwer both failed to produce the written agreement ordered by the trial court." Defendants rely on the fact that Martin and Hegwer were told by the district court to reduce their agreement to a writing, but failed to do so, and the order does not bear the signature of the parties or their counsel. We disagree.
{¶12} The order is titled "Stipulated Final Judgment and Order." The parties agreed to the terms of the order in front of the district court. The order states, "THIS MATTER, having come before the Court for final hearing on August 28, 2001, the parties being present and represented by counsel, the Court having heard the stipulation of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises," before making findings. The district court judge signed the order, despite neither the parties nor their attorneys signing it. Based on our review, the order is, at its core, a stipulated judgment. See Maestas v. Martinez, 1988-NMCA-020, ¶ 15, 107 N.M. 91, 752 P.2d 1107 (); see also Benavidez v. Benavidez, 2006-NMCA-138, ¶ 8, 140 N.M. 637, 145 P.3d 117 ( .
{¶13} A stipulated judgment, otherwise known as a consent judgment "is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial