Cook v. Saul

• Decision Date: 28 April 2020
• Docket Number: CA No: 8:19-cv-01301-CMC-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Teresa R. Cook, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Teresa R. Cook, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner Social Security Administration, Defendant.

CA No: 8:19-cv-01301-CMC-JDA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

April 28, 2020

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).¹ Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI").² For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on October 11, 2016, and an application for SSI on October 14, 2016, alleging an onset of disability date of March 6, 2016. [R. 182-89.]The claims were denied initially and on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 110-114, 115-119, 82-93, 94-105.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") and, on January 16, 2018, ALJ Peter Jamison conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 29-60.]

The ALJ issued a decision on April 11, 2018, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (the "Act") from March 6, 2016, through the date of the decision. [R. 15-23.] At Step 1,³ the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through September 30, 2018, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 6, 2016, the alleged onset date. [R. 17, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: left hip disorder, lumbar spine disorder, and depression. [R. 17, Finding 3.] At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 17-18, Finding 4.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

[C]laimant has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with further limitation to lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; occasionally push and/or pull with bilateral lower extremities; occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, crouch and crawl; no climbing of ladders and scaffolds; avoid unprotected heights hazardous moving mechanical parts, and vibration; and avoid exposure to extreme cold. Further,claimant is limited to frequent interaction with supervisors, coworkers and public.

[R. 19, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC finding, the ALJ determined at Step 4 that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant as a cook. [R. 22, Finding 6]. Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from March 6, 2016, through the date of the decision. [R. 22, Finding 7.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but the Appeals Council declined review. [R. 1-6.] Plaintiff filed the instant request for review in this Court on May 3, 2019. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains multiple legal errors warranting the reversal and remand of the case. [Doc. 14.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff's RFC by failing to account for limitations in her ability to stand, walk, and use her hands. [Id. at 9-11.] Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed to properly assess her subjective pain complaints in accordance with SSR 16-3p. [Id. at 12-13.]

The Commissioner contends the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because there is substantial evidence of record that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. [Doc. 16.] Specifically, the Commissioner contends the ALJ sufficiently explained the evidence supporting his RFC assessment. [Id. at 8-11.] The Commissioner also contends the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain and found that her alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence or other evidence of record. [Id. at 11-13.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgmentfor that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court tofind the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four may be appropriate to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision. See Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding case where neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to relevant evidence). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 ("The [Commissioner] and the claimant may produce further evidence on remand."). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).

In contrast, sentence six provides:

The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time...