Cook v. Smith
| Decision Date | 07 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 572 C.D. 2019,572 C.D. 2019 |
| Parties | Daryl Cook, Appellant v. Robert Smith |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Daryl Cook appeals, pro se, from the February 12, 2019 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County (trial court), which granted summary judgment on Cook's civil complaint (Complaint) against Robert Smith, then Superintendent (Superintendent) of the State Correctional Institution at Muncy (SCI-Muncy).
Background
Cook filed his Complaint in the trial court on August 14, 2017, naming Superintendent as the sole defendant. (Complaint, Original Record (O.R.) at Item No. 1.) As alleged in the Complaint, at all times relevant Cook was then an inmate incarcerated at SCI-Fayette. (Complaint ¶4.) On July 28, 2015, Cook received approval to send a $300.00 check to his daughter, Khalia Landers, who was then an inmate incarcerated at SCI-Muncy. Id. ¶¶6-7. Although Cook was approved to send the money to Landers, on August 12, 2015, the check was returned to him. Id. ¶7. Superintendent allegedly told Landers that the money was not placed in her prison account because he had not approved the transfer. Id. at ¶8. Cook alleged that because the $300.00 was not placed in Landers' prison account, he sent a letter to Superintendent on September 29, 2016, requesting to know why Landers was not allowed to receive the money, who was responsible for returning Cook's money to him, and who decided to not notify Landers that the money was sent. Id. However, according to the Complaint, Superintendent never responded to the letter. Id.
Cook alleged that due to Landers not receiving the money, he and his daughter had a falling out because they each believed the other was lying about having sent and/or received the money. Id. ¶9. Cook averred that Superintendent acted in bad faith by not allowing Landers to receive the money and not responding to Cook's letter, which caused Cook to suffer "intentional infliction of emotional distress," "bad reputation," "defamation of character," "loss of consortium with his daughter," "loss of association with his daughter's sister," "loss of family bond," "loss of money," "loss of sleep," "loss of appetite," "loss of privacy," "loss of freedom of choice," "loss of property rights," "tortious interference of property rights," and "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of state common law, and [Cook's] rights and protections under the First, Fourth, Eighth, [and] Fourteenth Amendment[s] to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §1983." Id. ¶¶10-11. Cook sought a declaratory judgment declaring that he had a right to send the money to Landers and that Superintendent violated his rights under "state law and [the] Constitution and law of the United States." Id. ¶12. Cook sought compensatory damages in the amount of $1,500,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $3,000,000.00. Id. ¶13.
Cook did not serve the Complaint within 30 days of filing it and twice had to have it reinstated. Cook finally served Superintendent on November 14, 2017; however, Cook did not serve the Office of Attorney General (OAG). Superintendent did not timely answer the Complaint and on December 12, 2017, Cook served Superintendent with a notice of praecipe to enter default judgment. On December 27, 2017, the OAG, on behalf of Superintendent, filed an answer to the Complaint. On January 10, 2018, Cook filed a praecipe for default judgment and the trial courtprothonotary entered a default judgment against Superintendent. However, that same day, Superintendent filed a petition to open the default judgment. In an opinion and order dated February 9, 2018, the trial court struck the default judgment due to "multiple defects on the face of the record." (O.R. at Item No. 19.) In the same opinion and order, the trial court placed the matter on the January-March 2019 trial term as a non-jury trial and ordered discovery to be completed by October 19, 2018.
The parties then proceeded to discovery. On June 4, 2018, Cook filed a motion for sanctions or to compel discovery (First Motion for Sanctions). On September 17, 2018, the trial court granted the motion in part, ordering Superintendent to (1) provide Cook with any grievances filed by Landers, and the results thereof; and (2) answer Cook's question as to whether Cook complied with Department of Corrections (DOC) policy in his request and, if not, provide information on the section of DOC policy that was violated. (O.R. at Item No. 25.) The trial court concluded that the remaining objections were rendered moot as a result of Landers' release from state prison and/or the answers provided were sufficient. Id.
On December 7, 2018, Superintendent filed a motion for summary judgment. Superintendent argued that summary judgment was warranted because Cook failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a prison grievance for the matter and failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. On December 10, 2018, Cook filed a motion for sanctions or judgment on the pleadings (Second Motion for Sanctions). Cook claimed that Superintendent had not complied with the discovery order because he did not produce a DOC policy justifying the reason why Landers was denied the money. Cook requested that the trial court order Superintendent to produce such a policy as well as Landers' request for approval to receive the check. Cook also filed a brief in opposition to Superintendent's motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were no administrative remedies available because Superintendent never responded to the informal letter request sent to him; Superintendent did not have a validreason for refusing to approve Landers' receipt of Cook's check; and DOC policy did not apply to a family member and/or violated the United States Constitution.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Superintendent's motion for summary judgment in an opinion and order dated February 12, 2019. The trial court concluded that, pursuant to the Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997e, and section 6603 of the Pennsylvania Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §6603, a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before he can pursue a civil action in court. (Trial court op. at 4.) The trial court concluded that Cook failed to exhaust administrative remedies and, therefore, dismissed his state and federal claims. The court noted that although DOC's inmate grievance system encourages inmates to resolve issues by filing informal requests, the grievance system requires that inmates file formal grievances with the Facility Grievance Coordinator, regardless of whether the inmate's informal request resolved the issue. Thus, the court determined that even if Cook's September 29, 2016 letter to Superintendent were deemed an informal request under the grievance system, Superintendent's failure to respond did not absolve Cook of his duty to file a formal grievance. (Trial court op. at 5.)
Additionally, the trial court concluded that even if Cook had exhausted administrative remedies, Cook failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because it was undisputed that his check was returned to him, which meant that he had not been deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. The trial court also reasoned that DOC policy requires both the inmate sending mail and the inmate receiving mail to acquire approval before the mail can be properly processed and that Landers did not obtain approval to receive the check. Id.
After Cook filed his notice of appeal, the trial court directed him to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. In his statement, Cook challenged the trial court's decisions to strike the default judgment, deny the Second Motion for Sanctions, and grant Superintendent's motion for summary judgment. In an orderdated June 4, 2019, the trial court stated that it was satisfied that its February 9, 2018 and February 12, 2019 opinions and orders sufficiently addressed the issues on appeal. (O.R. at Item No. 48.) The trial court also noted that Cook's Second Motion for Sanctions was implicitly overruled by the trial court's February 12, 2019 opinion and order, as well as Cook's own response in opposition to summary judgment. Id. The trial court explained that in his opposition to summary judgment, Cook had attached a letter from the OAG that complied with the Court's September 17, 2018 discovery order. Id. Based on the attachments to the opposition to summary judgment, the trial court determined that on November 5, 2018, the OAG provided Cook with the documents that Cook averred in the Second Motion for Sanctions had not been delivered to him. Id.
Discussion
On appeal, Cook argues that the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in (1) striking the default judgment; (2) denying Cook's Second Motion for Sanctions; (3) granting Superintendent's motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) granting Superintendent's motion for summary judgment for failure to state a claim.1
We first address whether the trial court erred in striking the default judgment. Cook contends that the OAG received actual notice of his lawsuit, thus negating the fact that he did not serve the OAG with his Complaint. He alleges that the lack of technical compliance with the service of process rules did not result in any disadvantage or prejudice to the OAG because the OAG received actual notice. Cook also argues that because he was incarcerated, the sheriff should have been required to serve the OAG and/or should have been required to inform Cook that he was required to serve the OAG.
Under Pennsylvania law, if there is a defect on the record as of the date the default judgment was entered, i.e., one so obvious that it is apparent from the face of the court record, then the default judgment must be stricken. Kreidie v. Department of Revenue, ...
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