Cook v. State

Decision Date16 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2D03-2987.,2D03-2987.
Citation921 So.2d 631
PartiesMark E. COOK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Benedict P. Kuehne and Susan Dmitrovsky of Sale & Kuehne, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

CANADY, Judge.

Mark E. Cook appeals his judgment and sentences for eight counts of capital sexual battery. Although we conclude that none of the issues raised by Cook require reversal, we write to address Cook's claim that the trial court improperly admitted certain similar fact evidence of other crimes. Cook argues that the State was collaterally estopped from presenting the similar fact evidence because there was a determination in Cook's favor on the merits in an earlier administrative proceeding concerning the allegations on which the similar fact evidence was based.

I. Background

The crimes of which Cook was convicted in 2003 occurred during the period from 1978 to 1984 and were perpetrated against three students at the elementary school where Cook was the principal. The offenses were severed for three separate trials, with the offenses against a particular victim to be tried together. After Cook's first trial resulted in his conviction on the two counts tried, Cook entered a no contest plea to the remaining charges. Pursuant to a stipulation with the State, Cook reserved the right to withdraw the no contest plea if his convictions for the two counts "[were] reversed and remanded for a new trial."

At Cook's trial, testimony was given by the victim of the offenses which were being tried. In addition, similar fact evidence testimony was given by the two victims of the other charged offenses. Similar fact evidence testimony was also given by C.B., who—like the victims of the charged offenses—had been a student at the school where Cook was principal. C.B.'s testimony is the subject of Cook's claim of collateral estoppel.

In February 1984, C.B. had accused Cook of sexual misconduct with C.B. several years before. In response to C.B.'s accusations against Cook, the Florida Department of Education, Education Practices Commission, filed an administrative complaint seeking disciplinary action against Cook's teaching certificate. Central to the complaint against Cook was C.B.'s accusation that "Cook initiated a homosexual encounter [with C.B.], [which] led to some thirty to forty such encounters." A formal evidentiary hearing was conducted before a hearing officer. At the hearing, testimony was presented by Cook, C.B., and various other witnesses.

In his recommended order, the hearing officer specifically found that "there were no homosexual encounters" between C.B and Cook. The hearing officer based his recommendation that the charges against Cook be dismissed on his conclusion "that the testimony of Cook as corroborated by his friends, colleagues and family, is deemed more credible and trustworthy than that of [C.B.] and his supporting witnesses, especially in light of the number of discrepancies and inconsistencies contained in [C.B.'s] testimony." Citing Smith v. School Board, 405 So.2d 183, 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the hearing officer acknowledged "the `elevated standard' of proof in teacher disciplinary cases."

The State does not contest that the hearing officer's recommended order was adopted by the Department of Education, Education Practices Commission, resulting in the dismissal on the merits of the administrative complaint against Cook. Nor does the State contest that the allegations of C.B. addressed by the hearing officer in the administrative proceeding related to the same alleged conduct of Cook that was the subject of C.B.'s similar fact evidence testimony in the criminal trial.

II. Analysis

This case presents an issue of first impression in Florida concerning the collateral estoppel effect in criminal proceedings of prior determinations made in formal administrative proceedings. Specifically, we must decide whether the State is collaterally estopped in a criminal proceeding from presenting similar fact evidence when that evidence has been determined in a prior formal administrative proceeding to be lacking in credibility and an administrative decision has as a consequence been rendered in favor of the defendant. For the reasons we now explain, we conclude that collateral estoppel against the State is not applicable in such circumstances.

A. Collateral Estoppel: General Principles

The doctrine of collateral estoppel—which is also known as issue preclusion and estoppel by judgment—"bars relitigation of the same issues between the same parties in connection with a different cause of action." Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004). The doctrine thus comes into play in a case when, in an earlier proceeding involving a different cause of action, the "same parties" litigated the "same issues" that are presented once again for decision. Id. The doctrine bars "`the parties from litigating in the second suit issues—that is to say points and questions—common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation.'" Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla.1995) (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40, 44 (Fla.1952)). The determination must be essential to the prior adjudication in order to be given preclusive effect. State v. Strong, 593 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). "Collateral estoppel . . ., like its near relative res judicata, serves to limit litigation by determining for all time an issue fully and fairly litigated." Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla. 1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064 (Fla.1995). The doctrine may be applied in "criminal and civil contexts." State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 290 n. 1 (Fla.2003). And it is "applicable to administrative proceedings." Deep Lagoon Boat Club, Ltd. v. Sheridan, 784 So.2d 1140, 1141 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

In summary:

For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to bar relitigation of an issue, five factors must be present: (1) an identical issue must have been presented in the prior proceedings; (2) the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the prior determination; (3) there must have been a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue; (4) the parties in the two proceedings must be identical; and (5) the issues must have been actually litigated.

Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 546-47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) ("Issue Preclusion—General Rule[:] When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.").1

The requirement of Florida law that the prior determination of an issue be based on full and fair litigation is similar to the acknowledgement in Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 28(3) of an exception to the general rule of issue preclusion when "[a] new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them." See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments: ch. 1, Scope ("[A] judgment in a particular case must be subject to reexamination in the name of substantial justice if the initial engagement of the merits was inadequate.").

In general, Florida has adhered to the requirement of mutuality of parties. "[U]nless both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it in a subsequent action." Stogniew, 656 So.2d at 919. Notwithstanding the federal decisions in which collateral estoppel has been applied despite the absence of mutuality of parties, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), and Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971), the rule in Florida has been—with limited exceptions2—that collateral estoppel only "applies when `the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties or their privies,'" McBride, 848 So.2d at 291 (quoting Gentile v. Bauder, 718 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1998)).

A person who was not a named party to an action will nonetheless be subject to collateral estoppel arising from that action if that person was in privity with a party or virtually represented by a party.

For one to be in privity with one who is a party to a lawsuit or for one to have been virtually represented by one who is a party to a lawsuit, one must have an interest in the action such that she will be bound by the final judgment as if she were a party.

Stogniew, 656 So.2d at 920. "The concept of `privity' refers to a cluster of relationships. . . under which the preclusive effects of a judgment extend beyond a party to the original action and apply to persons having specified relationships to that party. . . ." Restatement (Second) of Judgments: ch. 1, Scope. "One party may be said to be a privy of another whenever there is a mutual or successive relationship to the same right." Osburn v. Stickel, 187 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); see also EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.2004) ("`Privity' is a flexible legal term, comprising several different types of relationships and generally applying when a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party."). The existence of a virtual representation relationship is based on "closely aligned" interests of a party and a person who is not a formal party. S...

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