Cook v. United States the Mazel Tov

Decision Date23 January 1933
Docket NumberNo. 82,82
Citation53 S.Ct. 305,77 L.Ed. 641,288 U.S. 102
PartiesCOOK v. UNITED STATES. THE MAZEL TOV
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

[Syllabus from pages 102-104 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Joseph E. Fitzpatrick, of Providence, R.I., Edmund M. Toland, of Washington, D.C., and Mortimer W. Newton, of Providence, R.I., for petitioner.

The Attorney General and Mr. Thomas D. Thacher, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 104-106 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The main question for decision is whether section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930, c. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 747 (19 USCA § 1581), is modified, as applied to British vessels suspected of being engaged in smuggling liquors into the United States, by the Treaty between this country and Great Britain proclaimed May 22, 1924 (43 Stat. 1761). That section, which is a re-enactment in identical language of section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, c. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 979 (19 USCA § 481), declares that officers of the Coast Guard are authorized to stop and board any vessel at any place within four leagues (12 miles) of the coast of the United States 'to examine the manifest and to inspect, search, and examine' the vessel and any merchandise therein; and if it shall appear that any violation of any law of the United States has been committed by reason of which the vessel or merchandise is liable to forfeiture, it shall be the duty of such officers to seize the same.

On the evening of November 1, 1930, the British motor screw Mazel Tov, a vessel of speed not exceeding 10 miles an hour, was discovered by officers of the Coast Guard within four leagues of the coast of Massachusetts, and was boarded by them at a point 11 1/2 miles from the nearest land. The manifest was demanded and exhibited. Search followed, which disclosed that the only cargo on board, other than ship stores, was unmanifested intoxicating liquor which had been cleared from St. Pierre, a French possession. The vessel, ostensibly bound for Nassau, a British possession, had, when boarded, been cruising off our coast with the intent that ultimately the liquor should be taken to the United States by other boats. But the evidence indicated that she did not intend to approach nearer than four leagues to our coast; and, so far as ap- peared, she had not been in communication with our shores and had not unladen any part of her cargo. The boarding officers seized the Mazel Tov at a point more than 10 miles from our coast; took her to the Port of Providence; and there delivered the vessel and cargo to the customs officials.

The Collector of Customs, acting pursuant to section 584 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USCA § 1584), assessed against Frank Cook, as master of the Mazel Tov, a penalty of $14,286.18 for failure to include the liquor in the manifest. By section 584, if merchandise not described in the manifest is found on board a vessel 'bound to the United States,' the master is subject to a penalty equal to its value, and the merchandise, belonging or consigned to him is subject to forfeiture. By section 594 of the act (19 USCA § 1594), whenever a master becomes subject to a penalty, the vessel may be seized and proceeded against summarily by libel to recover the penalty. The government proceeded, in the federal court for Rhode Island, to collect the assessed penalty by means of libels against both the cargo and the vessel. The cases were consolidated.

Cook, claiming as master and bailee of the vessel and as consignee and claimant of the cargo, alleged that the Mazel Tov was of British registry and owned by a Novo Scotia corporation. He answered to the merits; and excepted to the jurisdiction on the ground that the 'vessel was not seized within the territorial limits of any jurisdiction of the United States, but, on the contrary, was captured and boarded at a point more than four (4) leagues from the coast,' and that 'it was not the intention at any time to enter any of the territorial limits of the United States.'

The District Court, having found the facts above stated, dismissed the libels. The Mazel Tov, 51 F.(2d) 292. The government appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the Treaty did not 'effect a change in the customs-revenue laws of the United States, wherein Congress had fixed a fourleague protective zone'; reversed the judgments; and remanded the cases to the District Court for further proceedings. 56 F.(2d) 921, 923. This Court granted certiorari.1 Cook v. U.S., 287 U.S. 581, 53 S.Ct. 10, 77 L.Ed. —-.

Cook contends, among other things, that by reason of the Treaty between the United States and Great Britain proclaimed May 22, 1924 (43 Stat. 1761), the seizure was unlawful under the laws of the United States; that the authority conferred by section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922 to board, search, and seize within the four-league limit, was, as respects British vessels,2 modified by the Treaty so as to substitute for four leagues from our coast, the distance which 'can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense'; that Congress, by re-enacting section 581 in the Tariff Act of 1930, intended to continue in force the modification effected by the Treaty; and, hence, that the Mazel Tov, being a British vessel of a speed not exceeding 10 miles an hour, could not be lawfully boarded, searched, and seized at a distance of 11 1/2 miles from the coast because suspected of 'endeavoring to import or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States in violation of the laws there in force.'

The government insists that the Treaty did not have the effect of so modifying section 581 of the act of 1922; and that, if it did, the re-enactment of section 581 without change, by the act of 1930, removed the alleged modification. It contends further that the validity of the seizure was not material; and if ever material had been waived.

The Treaty (43 Stat. 1761) provides, among other things, as follows:

'Article I. The High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm intention to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending from the coast line outwards and measured from low-water mark constitute the proper limits of territorial waters.

'Article II. (1) His Britannic Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its territories or possessions in order that enquiries may be addressed to those on board and an examination be made of the ship's papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States, its territories or possessions in violation of the laws there in force. When such enquiries and examination show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the vessel may be instituted.

'(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has committed or is committing or attempting to commit an offense against the laws of the United States, its territories or possessions prohibiting the importation of alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in accordance with such laws.

'(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast of the United States its territories or possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense. In cases, however, in which the liquor is intended to be conveyed to the United States its territories or possessions by a vessel other than the one boarded and searched, it shall be the speed of such other vessel and not the speed of the vessel boarded, which shall determine the distance from the coast at which the right under this article can be exercised.'

We are of opinion that the decrees entered by the District Court should have been affirmed.

First. It is suggested on behalf of the government that the power to search and seize within the twelve-mile zone, conferred upon officers of the Coast Guard by section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, was unaffected by the Treaty, save that the British government agreed not to protest where the seizure was within an hour's sailing distance of the coast. The argument is that the Treaty settled the validity of the seizure only for those cases where it was made within the limits described in the Treaty; and that since this seizure was made beyond one hour's sailing distance from the coast the Treaty did not apply.3 In construing the Treaty its history should be consulted. Compare United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, 16 S.Ct. 725, 40 L.Ed. 867; Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606, 43 S.Ct. 221, 67 L.Ed. 428; Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52, 49 S.Ct. 223, 73 L.Ed. 607. Both its language and its history show that the high contracting parties did not intend so to limit its operation. The preamble states that they entered into the Treaty 'being desirous of avoiding any difficulties which might arise between them in connection with the laws in force in the United States on the subject of alcoholic beverages.' The history reveals that serious differences had arisenbetween the two governments in that connection; and that, for the purpose of resolving them, the parties determined to deal completely with the subject of search and seizure, beyond our territorial limits, of British vessels suspected of smuggling liquors.

Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, the United States had never attempted, in connection with the enforcement of our customs laws, to board foreign vessels beyond the three-mile limit, except where consent was implied from the fact that the vessel, being hailed, answered that she was bound for the United States, or where a vessel...

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