Cook v. Univ. of Kansas
| Decision Date | 06 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 11-2184-KHV/KGS |
| Parties | CYNTHIA G. COOK, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS and OLA FAUCHER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Cynthia Cook brings suit against Ola Faucher, the Director of Human Resources/Equal Opportunity at the University of Kansas, for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (Count I), and for depriving plaintiff of a property interest without due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II). This matter is before the Court on two motions. The first is Faucher's Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim (Doc. #13) filed June 6, 2011.1 Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's due process claim because the complaint does not allege that defendant deprived plaintiff of a protected property interest and because the statute of limitations bars the claim. Although Faucher's motion also seeks dismissal of the ADEA count, she now abandons that issue. See Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #18) filed July 12, 2011.
The second motion before the Court is Faucher's Motion To Stay Or Dismiss With Supporting Memorandum (Doc. #19) filed September 28, 2011. In this motion, Faucher seeks to stay or dismiss this action because plaintiff has filed a state court action against the University of Kansas arising out of the same employment actions. For the following reasons, the Court sustains in part and overrules in part defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and overrules defendant's motion to stay or dismiss.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., the Court assumes as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim which is plausible - and not merely conceivable - on its face. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the Court draws on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
The Court need not accept as true those allegations which state only legal conclusions. See id.; Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff bears the burden of framing her complaint with enough factual matter to suggest that she is entitled to relief; it is not enough to make threadbare recitals of a cause of action accompanied by conclusory statements. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Plaintiff makes a facially plausible claim when she pleads factual content from which the Court can reasonably infer that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff must show more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully - it is not enough to plead facts that are "merely consistent with" defendant's liability. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.at 557). A pleading which offers labels and conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not stand. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1949. Similarly, where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but has not "shown" - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950. The degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice depends on context, because what constitutes fair notice under Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., depends on the type of case. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Faucher argues that this case should be stayed under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),2 which establishes certain factors for a district court to consider when deciding whether to dismiss or stay a federal suit that parallels a state court proceeding. Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999). Because federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them," however, a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Colorado River only in "exceptional" circumstances. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817-18. If deferral to the state court proceeding is appropriate, the Court ordinarily should not dismiss a case, but rather should enter a stay pending the outcome of the state case. See Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994). In the event the state court proceedings do not resolve all federal claims, a stay preserves an available federal forum in which to litigate the remaining claims, without plaintiff having to file a new federal action. Id.
The amended complaint alleges the following facts.
The University of Kansas hired plaintiff in June of 1980 as a Secretary I. At the time, she was a classified employee under the Kansas Civil Service Act ("KCSA"), K.S.A. § 75-2925 et seq. In 2005, the Kansas legislature enacted K.S.A. § 76-715a, which allowed the University to convert all classified employee positions to unclassified positions. Section 76-715a specifically stated that "[i]mplementation of this section shall not cause a salary reduction or layoff of any classified employee."
Pursuant to Section 76-715a, the University converted plaintiff's classified position to an unclassified position. On or about January 18, 2008, plaintiff became an Information Specialist in the University of Kansas Customer Service Center. In January of 2009, the University notified plaintiff and six other full-time support staff employees at the Customer Service Center that it planned to lay them off, effective June 30, 2009, due to a reorganization of the Customer Service Center. All seven employees were over 40.
The University has adopted a formal policy for laying off support staff entitled "Layoff Policy/Procedures for University Support Staff." This policy states in part as follows:
Layoff Definition:
(Doc. #10 at 3). In accordance with the University layoff policy, plaintiff applied for placement in two positions with a different salary grade, band and level than her position as an Information Specialist. One such position was that of Information Specialist I - Help Desk Team Lead. On June 18, 2009, defendant notified plaintiff that the University had extended her projected layoff date to August 31, 2009 because "the customer service area still has a need for your expertise in providing assistance to users while the reorganization is being finalized." (Doc. #10 at 4).
In July of 2009, the University hired Heather Coffman as the new manager of the Customer Service Center. At that time, Coffman was about 32 years old. In August of 2009, Coffman interviewed plaintiff for the position of Information Specialist I - Help Desk Team Lead. The University interviewed three other candidates for the position; one was 42 years old and the other two were 29 years old. Plaintiff was better qualified and had more experience than all three of the other candidates. Based on Coffman's recommendations, the University selected all three of the younger candidates to fill Team Lead positions, but did not select plaintiff.
The University terminated plaintiff's employment on August 31, 2009. Plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, the date on which her projected layoff would result in termination of her employment until August of 2009, when she did not get the Team Lead position. Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 29, 2011.
To state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983, plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) she possessed a protected property interest in continuedemployment at the University of Kansas, and (2) defendant deprived her of the appropriate process in terminating her employment. Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004); Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs for Converse Cnty., 52 F.3d 858, 862-63 (10th Cir. 1995). Defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff's due process claim because it is barred by the statute of limitations and because the complaint does not allege that plaintiff had a protected property interest in continued employment.
Because no federal statute of limitations exists for Section 1983 actions, courts look to analogous state laws and the applicable state statutes of limitation to determine the appropriate time limit for filing a particular Section 1983 action. Baker v. Bd. of Regents of Kan., 991 F.2d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1993). The parties agree that a two-year statute of limitations applies. See K.S.A. § 60-513.
Federal law, however, controls when a federal cause of action accrues. Baker, 991 F.2d at 632. A Section 1983 action accrues when a plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Baker, 991 F.2d at 632. Thus, employment discrimination claims under Section 1983 accrue when the employer notifies the employee of its adverse...
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