Cooke v. General Dynamics Corp., 3:95CV0031(WWE).
| Decision Date | 16 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:95CV0031(WWE).,No. 3:95CV0170(WWE).,3:95CV0031(WWE).,3:95CV0170(WWE). |
| Citation | 993 F.Supp. 56 |
| Parties | Jeffrey COOKE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Electric Boat Division, Defendant. Robert DEVORE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Electric Boat Division, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Richard J. Pascal, Mark E. Block, O'Brien, Shafner, Stuart, Kelly & Morris, PC, Norwich, CT, for Plaintiffs.
Rodger W. Lehr, Jr., Douglas M. Peachey, General Dynamics/Electric Boat Div., Groton, CT, for Defendant.
Supplemental Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to its order granting plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court issues this supplemental ruling on defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc.# 89).
At issue in these cases is whether plaintiffs are exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., which exempts workers "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity," as those terms are defined by the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). In order to qualify for this exemption, an employee must meet both the "salary basis test" and the "duties test" set forth in the regulations. Reich v. Waldbaum, Inc., 52 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir.1995); Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 298, 121 L.Ed.2d 222 (1992). The court previously granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendant on the salary basis test. The court, however, did not rule on the second prong of this exemption, which is whether plaintiffs meet the "duties test" set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e).
The facts of these cases are set forth in the court's earlier ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and will be repeated only to the extent necessary for this ruling.
The "Duties Test"
The regulations contain separate definitions for executive, administrative, and professional employees.1 The parties agree that to the extent the plaintiffs' duties fall into any one of these categories, it is the administrative category. The regulations set forth two tests for determining whether an employee is employed in a bona fide administrative capacity: the "long test" applicable to employees earning more than $155 per week but less than $250 per week, 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a) -(e), and the "short test" applicable to employees earning more than $250 per week. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.2(e)(2), 541.214. It is the latter "short test" that is applicable to the plaintiffs in these cases, all of whom earned more than $250 per week.
Under the "short test," an "administrative employee" is one whose (1) "primary duty" consists of "office or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general business operations" of the employer and (2) whose primary duty includes work requiring "the exercise of discretion and independent judgment." 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.2(e)(2), 541.214(a). See Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1163, 114 S.Ct. 1187, 127 L.Ed.2d 537 (1994).
The "primary duty" rule is described at length in the interpretive regulations for executive employees, 29 C.F.R. § 541.103, which also apply to administrative employees. 29 C.F.R. § 541.206(b). Determining whether an employee's primary duty is administrative requires a detailed analysis of the time spent performing administrative duties. As a "rule of thumb," an administrative employee must spend at least 50% of his or her time on administrative duties. However, time alone is not the sole test. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.103, 541.206(b). Under the short test, the employee's "primary duty" will usually be what he or she does that is of principal value to the employer, not the collateral tasks that he or she may also perform, even if they consume more than 50% of his or her time. Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1227 (5th Cir.1990); Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co., 94 F.3d 421, 426-27 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1254, 137 L.Ed.2d 334 (1997). Some of the pertinent factors to consider are the relative importance of the administrative duties he or she performs, as compared to the other collateral tasks; the frequency with which the employee exercises discretionary powers; his or her relative freedom from supervision; and the relationship between his or her salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work that he or she performs. Spinden, 94 F.3d at 427.
The interpretive regulations further explain the meaning of the phrase "directly related to management policies or general business operations" as describing those types of activities relating to the administrative operations of a business as distinguished from "production." This is often referred to as the "administrative/production dichotomy." The regulations state that in addition to describing the types of activities, this phrase limits the exemption to persons "who perform work of substantial importance to the management or operation of the business" of the employer or the employer's customers. 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(a); see Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d at 587; Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936, 112 S.Ct. 1473, 117 L.Ed.2d 617 (1992).
Subsection (b) elaborates on the administrative/production dichotomy. The administrative operations of the business include the work performed by "so-called white-collar employees engaged in `servicing' a business as, for example, advising the management, planning, negotiating, representing the company, purchasing, and business research and control." 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(b). The regulations state that an employee performing such work is engaged in activities relating to the administrative operations of the business notwithstanding that he is employed, for example, as an administrative assistant to an executive in the production department of the business. Id.; see Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d at 588-89; Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d at 902.
The regulations in subsection (c) describe the second aspect of the "directly related to" test — that is, that only persons who perform "work of substantial importance to the management or operation of the business" will satisfy the first prong of the "short test." Subsection (c) describes "work of substantial importance" as including employees "whose work affects policy or whose responsibility it is to execute it or carry it out." 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c). This phrase also includes a "wide variety of persons who either carry out major assignments in conducting the operations of the business, or whose work affects business operations to a substantial degree, even though their assignments are tasks related to the operation of a particular segment of the business." Id.; see Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply, 940 F.2d at 902.
The regulations then provide a number of examples of types of employment that meet this test, including statisticians who analyze data and draw conclusions which are important to the determination of policy, 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(3);advisory specialists and consultants, safety directors, promotion men, 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(5); and systems analysts and programmers who are concerned with planning, scheduling, and coordination of activities required to develop systems for processing data to obtain solutions to complex business, scientific, or engineering problems, 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7). As the regulations note, there are no specific rules that will indicate the precise point at which work becomes of substantial importance to the management and operation of a business. 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(1). See generally Annot., Administrative Capacity under FLSA, 124 A.L.R. Fed. 1 at § 2[a] (1995).
Once it is determined that an employee's primary duty is directly related to management policies or general business operations, the employer must also show that the employee's job included work requiring the exercise of discretion and independent judgment. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e)(2). Under the interpretive regulations, the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison and evaluation of possible courses of conduct in acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered. It implies that the person has the authority to make an independent choice safe from immediate direction or supervision with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a).
Given these standards, any inquiry into exempt status is necessarily fact intensive. The exemptions from overtime pay requirements are to be narrowly construed, Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, 949 F.2d at 614, and the employer bears the burden of demonstrating that an employee fits plainly and unmistakably within the exemption's terms. Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 206, 86 S.Ct. 737, 15 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d at 586-87; Douglas v. Argo-Tech Corp., 113 F.3d 67 (6th Cir.1997); Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co., 94 F.3d at 426; Spradling v. City of Tulsa, 95 F.3d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1081, 137 L.Ed.2d 216 (1997).
Because this issue comes before the court on a motion for summary judgment, all facts must be construed in favor of the plaintiffs, as the non-moving parties, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts must likewise be construed in the plaintiffs' favor. Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987).
There are thirteen plaintiffs in these two cases. In terms of job titles, plaintiffs are employed as material planning specialists, senior financial analysts, project financial analysts, and logistics specialists. An...
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