Cool Moose Party v. State of R.I.
| Decision Date | 27 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 96-514-T. |
| Citation | 6 F.Supp.2d 116 |
| Parties | The COOL MOOSE PARTY and Robert J. Healey, Jr., Individually and as Chairperson of the Cool Moose Party v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, the Rhode Island Board of Elections and the Secretary of State of Rhode Island. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Robert J. Healey, Warren, RI, for Plaintiffs.
Thomas A. Palombo, Attorney General's Office, Providence, for State of Rhode Island.
Robert E. Craven, Giannini & Craven, Providence, RI, for Rhode Island Board of Elections.
Katherine A. Merolla, Pucci, Goldin & Merolla, Providence, RI, for Secretary of State of Rhode Island.
The Cool Moose Party (CMP) and Robert J. Healey, Jr. (Healey), its chairperson brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to declare "the Rhode Island primary laws" unconstitutional and to enjoin the State of Rhode Island, the Rhode Island Board of Elections and the Secretary of State of Rhode Island from enforcing them. The case is presently before the Court for consideration of cross motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs and the defendants.
The issues presented are whether statutory provisions that prohibit members of one political party from voting in another party's primary; prevent "write-in" voting at primary elections and require voters to identify the primary in which they wish to vote impermissibly infringe on rights to freedom of association and/or privacy that are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and whether such provisions violate the "Qualifications Clause" contained in Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution and the Seventeenth Amendment. Because I find that the prohibition against cross-party voting is unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents the CMP from inviting members of other parties to participate in CMP primaries; and, because I further find that the challenged "primary laws" pass constitutional muster in all other respects, the motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part.
The CMP is a political party within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-1-2(9) because its gubernatorial candidate received more than 5% of the votes cast at the last general election.1 Healey is the chairperson of the CMP and one of two declared candidates for the party's nomination for State Representative.
The plaintiffs seek a declaration that "the Rhode Island primary laws" are unconstitutional, but they have identified only two statutory provisions as the subject of their challenge. That lack of specificity is compounded by the fact that some of the plaintiffs' arguments are difficult to decipher and do not clearly state the precise nature of the constitutional violations alleged. In any event, it appears that the questions presented are:
1. Whether R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-15-6, which requires political parties to select their nominees by means of primary elections, violates CMP members' right to freedom of association by preventing them from selecting candidates at a caucus open only to CMP members.
2. Whether R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-15-24, which prohibits members of one political party from voting in another party's primary, violates the plaintiffs' right to freedom of association because it prevents the CMP from allowing members of other parties to participate in the selection of CMP candidates.
3. Whether R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-15-24 also violates the "Qualifications Clause's" requirement that electors for federal office have the same qualifications as those of electors for state offices because the CMP does not nominate candidates for federal office.
4. Whether some unspecified Rhode Island statute (presumably R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-19-31) that prohibits write-in voting at primary elections also violates the "Qualifications Clause."
5. Whether some unspecified Rhode Island statute requiring voters to "publicly" identify the party primary in which they wish to vote violates the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy.
It is well established that the right to vote and the right to associate for political purposes are fundamental rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214, 107 S.Ct. 544, 548, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). However, those rights are not absolute. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. The Constitution permits states to regulate "[t]he Times, Places and Manner" of elections, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1, and the Supreme Court has recognized that "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, (1974)).
Since election laws invariably impose some limitation on the right to vote and the right to associate for political purposes, that fact, alone, does not render them unconstitutional. Id. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063; see Gill v. Rhode Island, 933 F.Supp. 151, 154 (D.R.I.1996), aff'd, 107 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 340, 139 L.Ed.2d 264 (1997). Determining whether a particular regulation impermissibly infringes on protected rights requires consideration of "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury" to those rights; "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed" and an assessment of "the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests" as well as "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights." Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214, 107 S.Ct. at 548 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). When protected rights are severely burdened, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling State interest. Gill, 933 F.Supp. at 154. On the other hand, when the burden is not great, the regulation will pass Constitutional muster if it imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" that serve "important regulatory interests." Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063); Gill, 933 F.Supp. at 154-55. In short, "the level of scrutiny to be applied corresponds roughly to the degree to which a challenged regulation encumbers First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir.1996).
Section § 17-15-6 requires that, when more than one candidate seeks the nomination of a "political party" for a particular office, the nominee must be selected by a primary election rather than by a party convention or caucus. Since the bylaws of the CMP provide for its nominees to be selected at a caucus in which only party members may participate, the CMP contends that the statute impermissibly infringes on the associational rights of its members including the right to determine how nominees are chosen. The plaintiffs also argue that, if the State cannot require primaries, it cannot, lawfully, expend public funds to conduct them.
The argument that states may not mandate primaries was rejected by the Supreme Court in American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1306, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974). In that case, the Court stated that it is constitutionally permissible for a State to require political parties to select their nominees by means of primary elections in order to insure the fairness and integrity of the process. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the requirement of primary elections serves a compelling state interest since it is designed "to take political nominations out of the smoke-filled rooms of party bosses and give them to the voters." Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 919, 113 S.Ct. 1280, 122 L.Ed.2d 673 (1993).
In addition to blunting the argument that § 17-15-6 unconstitutionally mandates primaries, White makes it unnecessary to address the argument that the State may not bear the expense of conducting the primaries. White holds, and the plaintiffs concede, that when state law mandates that primaries be held, political parties should not be made to bear the expense of conducting them. White, 415 U.S. at 792-94, 94 S.Ct. at 1311-12.
Section § 17-15-24, in essence, prevents registered members and candidates of one political party from voting in another party's primary. The CMP asserts that this provision, too, violates the associational rights of its members by depriving them of the power to determine who can participate in the selection of CMP nominees. Specifically, the CMP argues that the statute frustrates their desire to allow members of other parties to vote in the CMP primary. In addition, Healey contends that the statutory prohibition violates the "Qualifications Clause" by precluding him, as a CMP candidate, from voting in the primary of another party that, unlike the CMP, nominates candidates for federal office.
The CMP's argument that § 17-15-24 infringes on its right to allow members of other parties to vote in CMP primaries appears to be inconsistent with its own bylaw that calls for nominees to be selected at party caucuses in which only party members may participate. However, despite that inconsistency, it is clear that, although a State may require a political party to select its candidates by means of a primary election, it may not prevent the party from allowing members of other parties to participate in the primary....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Isabel v. Reagan
... ... INTRODUCTION In February 2016, Arizona's Secretary of State, Defendant Michele Reagan ("the 394 F.Supp.3d 970 ... Deadline On October 19, 2016, the Arizona Democratic Party and the Democratic National Committee filed a lawsuit ... Members of the House of Representatives."); Cool Moose Party v. State of R.I. , 6 F. Supp. 2d 116, 122-24 ... ...
- The Cool Moose Party v. State of RI