Cooley v. Fredinburg
Decision Date | 18 November 1996 |
Docket Number | J-1 |
Citation | 146 Or.App. 436,934 P.2d 505 |
Parties | Marion C. COOLEY, Plaintiff, v. Robert Roger FREDINBURG, Appellant, Marion C. Cooley, as assignee of U.S. National Bank of Oregon, a national banking association; First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A.; L. Ken Casteel; John C. Preston and Patricia J. Preston, husband and wife; Timotheas John Horn and Normalee D. Horn, husband and wife; Tischhauser, Cooper & Co., a partnership; Frieda A. Kuttig; and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity as successor to Bear Creek Valley Bank, Defendants, and Hogue Investment Corporation, Respondent. 88-0971-; CA A89024. . On Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Douglas J. Richmond, Medford, for appellant's petition.
Richard D. Adams, Grant's Pass, for respondent Hogue Investment Corporation's petition.
Before WARREN, P.J., and EDMONDS and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
Appellant Fredinburg and respondent Hogue Investment Corporation (Hogue) separately petition for reconsideration of our decision in this case, in which we concluded that Fredinburg was entitled to judgment against Hogue in the amount of $9,837. Cooley v. Fredinburg, 144 Or.App. 410, 927 P.2d 124 (1996) (Cooley II ). 1 We grant reconsideration of both petitions, increase the amount of Fredinburg's judgment to $12,723, and otherwise adhere to our previous opinion.
We quote the facts from our previous opinion:
Cooley II, 144 Or.App. at 413-15, 927 P.2d 124. (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On appeal, we reversed the trial court, concluding that Hogue could offset the expenses "necessarily incurred in [the property's] protection," but could not offset the fair market value or cost of improvements from the rent it owed Fredinburg. 144 Or.App. at 417, 927 P.2d 124. We also concluded that the trial court erred in holding that Fredinburg was bound by the order requiring him to return the surplus proceeds from the sheriff's sale to FDIC "or its assigns," because Fredinburg was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding that order. Id. at 419, 927 P.2d 124. Accordingly, we ordered judgment to be entered in favor of Fredinburg in the amount of $9,837.
In its petition for reconsideration, Hogue first argues that, while we correctly held that the trial court's order that Fredinburg return the surplus monies was void for lack of notice, Hogue's entitlement to the proceeds had previously been established. It reasons:
Hogue's argument, as we understand it, is premised on the language in the judgment that ordered that the surplus from the sale paid to the court clerk "be disposed of by further order of this court." The judgment obtained by Cooley foreclosed all liens on the property, ordered a sale of the property and ordered that Cooley's judgment and costs be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale. Cooley's complaint did not and could not have contemplated an order requiring Fredinburg to deliver the surplus proceeds to FDIC because at that time there was no certainty that there would be a surplus or that the surplus would find its way into Fredinburg's possession. The subsequent order to that effect was made by the court without notice to Fredinburg after the sale occurred.
Nevertheless, Hogue contends that the portion of the subsequent order that awarded the surplus to FDIC is a valid order because it was part of the relief contemplated by Cooley's complaint and the foreclosure judgment. We think that Hogue's argument overstates the relief that was requested by Cooley's complaint and granted by the foreclosure judgment....
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