Cooley v. Lincoln Electric Co.

• Citation: 776 F.Supp.2d 511
• Decision Date: 07 March 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:05–CV–17734.
• Parties: Curt & Nancy COOLEY, Plaintiffs,v.LINCOLN ELECTRIC CO., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

776 F.Supp.2d 511

Curt & Nancy COOLEY, Plaintiffs,

v.LINCOLN ELECTRIC CO., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:05–CV–17734.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

March 7, 2011.

Andrew S. Goldwasser, Phillip A. Ciano, Ciano & Goldwasser, Cleveland, OH, David W. Shelton, Richard R. Barrett, Barrett Law Office, Oxford, MS, Mark E Liabo, Tom Riley Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, IA, Rick G. Davis, Flowood, MS, John W. (aka Don) Barrett, Barrett Law Office, Lexington, MS, for Plaintiffs.John H. Beisner, Stephen J. Harburg, Jessica D. Miller, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom—Washington, Washington, DC, Brad G. Dowler, E.B. Chiles, IV, John E. Tull, Joseph R. Falasco, Kristine Gerhard Baker, Sarah Keith–Bolden, Steven W. Quattlebaum, Thomas G. Williams, Little Rock, AR, David C. Landever, Weisman, Kennedy & Berris, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

KATHLEEN McDONALD O'MALLEY, District Judge.

This products liability action was brought by Curt and Nancy Cooley against four manufacturers of welding rods: (1) Lincoln Electric Company; (2) Hobart Brothers Company; (3) The ESAB Group, Inc.; and (4) BOC Group, Inc. f/k/a Airco, Inc.

The case was assigned to the undersigned as related to the Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) known as In re Welding Fumes Products Liability Litigation, case no. 03–CV–17000, MDL no. 1535. The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict finding defendants liable to Curt Cooley.¹ The jury awarded $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but allocated 37% of fault to Cooley.² The jury also awarded $5 million in punitive damages, allocated against the defendants as follows: ESAB, $1.75 million; Hobart, $1.75 million; Lincoln, $750,000; and BOC, $750,000.

The parties then filed several post judgment motions. For the reasons explained below, the Court rules on these motions as follows.

• Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' punitive damages claim or, in the alternative, for reduction of the punitive damages awards (docket no. 258) is DENIED.

• Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses (docket no. 255) is DENIED, and defendants' motion for leave to file surreply (docket no. 269) is DENIED AS MOOT.

• Defendant BOC's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (docket no. 256) is DENIED.

• Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims (docket no. 257) is DENIED.

• Plaintiff's motion to tax costs (docket no. 253) is GRANTED, in part, and the Court awards $60,964.79 in costs to Cooley.

I. BACKGROUNDA. BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent evidence presented at trial is summarized in the punitive damages section below; what follows is a brief introduction of the factual basis for Cooley's claims.

Cooley was born in Iowa in 1951, and currently lives there.³ He learned how to arc weld from his father when he was 16 years old.⁴ After he graduated from high school in 1969, Cooley took a one year course on auto body repair at a vocational school and received his first formal welding instruction. Throughout the 1970s, Cooley worked in various auto body shops. The body shops routinely used arc welding to repair cars, and welding was part of Cooley's job.⁵ In 1979, Cooley decided to make a career change and entered the ironworking trade, where he continued to weld as part of his job. ⁶ He was a union ironworker until the late 1980s, when the work dried up and he went back to the auto body business for a few years. He returned to ironworking in 1990, and spent the rest of his working life in that trade—i.e., until 2004.⁷ At times during his career, Cooley was a foreman or supervisor, but he still welded while holding those positions.⁸

In addition to welding as part of his job, Cooley welded outside of work. ⁹ He occasionally bought wrecked cars and repaired them in his garage, and over the years, did artwork with metal that required welding.¹⁰

The last time Cooley welded was January 10, 2003.¹¹

Although defendants dispute the diagnosis, Cooley has been diagnosed with manganese poisoning.¹² This disease causes a movement disorder in the same family of disorders as Parkinson's Disease, but it is “defined by its cause: overexposure to manganese.” ¹³ Manganese is a heavy metal contained in welding consumables, i.e., welding rods and wires. The process of joining steel by welding generally involves melting a welding consumable to fuse together two pieces of metal. Welding consumables give off fumes that contain manganese. In this case, Cooley alleges he has neurological injuries caused by inhaling welding fumes that contain manganese.¹⁴ He describes his injuries as follows: ¹⁵

I have balance problems. I have tremors. I have slower movements than I used to have. I'm impotent. I'm on depression—I'm depressed. I ache all over. I'm constantly fatigued. I can't sleep at all, very little at night. And I have problems with my memory.The essence of Cooley's lawsuit is that defendants, manufacturers of welding consumables, knew inhaling welding fumes presented the risk of irreversible neurological injury, but failed to adequately warn Cooley of that risk.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After this case became part of the Welding Fumes MDL, the parties consented to this Court presiding over the trial. As described above, the jury returned a verdict for Cooley, ultimately awarding $787,500 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The postjudgment motions now pending before the Court challenge these jury verdicts.

The standard of review for each of the substantive motions is discussed below. Because the Court's ruling on certain of the motions could impact its consideration of others,¹⁶ the Court addresses the pending motions in this order: (1) defendants' punitive damages motion; (2) Cooley's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses; (3) BOC's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (4) defendants' aiding and abetting motion. Last, the Court addresses Cooley's motion to tax costs.

II. DEFENDANTS' PUNITIVE DAMAGES MOTIONA. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In his complaint, Cooley asserted entitlement to punitive damages.¹⁷ Prior to trial, defendants moved for summary judgment on Cooley's punitive damages claim. The Court addressed and denied defendants' motion at a pretrial hearing.¹⁸ During the trial, defendants made an oral motion pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the punitive damages claim.¹⁹ The Court denied that motion.²⁰ Defendants renewed their Rule 50(a) motion at the close of the evidence.²¹ Again, the Court denied defendants' motion and submitted the punitive damages claim to the jury.²² After the jury returned its verdict, defendants again renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to punitive damages, this time pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.²³ It is this motion that is now pending.²⁴

B. THE STANDARD FOR RULE 50 MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) states that, “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue,” then the court may “grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” A party may move for judgment as a matter of law at any time before the case is submitted to the jury.²⁵ If the Court denies the Rule 50(a) motion made during trial, as did the undersigned in this case, “the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” ²⁶ The movant may then “renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment.” ²⁷ Defendants timely filed their motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to punitive damages pursuant to Rule 50(b). After a verdict is returned, the Court may rule on a renewed Rule 50(b) motion by: (a) allowing the judgment to stand, (b) ordering a new trial, or (c) directing entry of judgment as a matter of law.²⁸

Subject-matter jurisdiction in this case is based upon diversity of citizenship. The parties agree that, in the Sixth Circuit, “state law governs the standard for granting motions for directed verdicts” and judgments notwithstanding the verdict, in diversity cases.²⁹ Hence, Iowa law provides the applicable standard for a motion for judgment as a matter of law filed under Rule 50.³⁰

Iowa courts apply the “substantial evidence” standard for judgment as a matter of law. That is, judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate if there is substantial evidence to support each element of the plaintiff's claim.³¹ “Evidence is substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from the evidence.” ³² In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court must construe the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” ³³ “This is so regardless of whether the evidence was contradicted.” ³⁴ Thus, the Court will afford Cooley “every legitimate inference that can be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” ³⁵ Indeed, “Iowa courts generally defer to a jury's award of punitive damages.” ³⁶ Although a different fact-finder might reach a different conclusion, the Court must uphold the jury's verdict if reasonable minds could disagree as to whether substantial evidence supported Cooley's punitive damages claim.³⁷

C. IOWA LAW REGARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Court's review of the jury's punitive damages award involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether the record contains substantial evidence showing defendants' conduct was sufficiently egregious to support an award of punitive damages pursuant to Iowa law; and ...