Cooley v. State
Decision Date | 10 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 69,69 |
Citation | 867 A.2d 1065,385 Md. 165 |
Parties | Damon COOLEY v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Stacy W. McCormack, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), for petitioner.
Devy Patterson Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J. RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
On March 7, 2002, Damon Cooley, petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second degree murder and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun,1 in connection with the May 5, 2001, murder of Anthony Williams, Jr. The same jury convicted fellow defendant, Derrick Gibson, who is not a party to this appeal, of first degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence,2 and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. On June 10, 2002, petitioner was sentenced to a term of thirty years imprisonment for second degree murder and a consecutive three-year term for the handgun offense. Mr. Gibson, as well as petitioner, whose motion for a mistrial had been denied, appealed their convictions to the Court of Special Appeals on June 14, 2002, and, in a published opinion, that court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Cooley v. State, 157 Md.App. 101, 849 A.2d 1026 (2004). Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court. On September 15, 2004, we granted the petition.3Cooley v. State, 383 Md. 211, 857 A.2d 1129 (2004).
Petitioner seeks review of the following question:
"When addressing the merits of a motion for a mistrial made during a joint trial of two defendants, can an appellate court place any `evidentiary significance' on the fact that the attorney for one of the co-defendants did not join in the motion?"
We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Special Appeals erred in attaching "evidentiary significance" to the actions or inactions of a co-defendant's counsel. The failure of a co-defendant's counsel to join a motion for mistrial cannot be considered an implied assertion as to the lack of prejudice to a moving defendant. There is no evidentiary significance to what a co-defendant's counsel does or fails to do in respect to a decision on the merits of a trial court's holding on a mistrial motion filed by the other co-defendant.
Final determinations of what measures constitute appropriate courtroom security are decisions that rest entirely in the discretion of the trial judge and such ultimate decisions normally may not be delegated or abrogated to law enforcement officers.
There is general agreement as to the facts of this case. Accordingly, we adopt in large part the facts as set forth in the Court of Special Appeals' opinion, which states:
Cooley, 157 Md.App. at 106-07, 849 A.2d at 1029-30 (alteration added).
The State moved to join the trial of the two defendants. Represented by separate counsel, petitioner and Mr. Gibson each filed pre-trial motions to be tried separately as to each offense and apart from any other defendants. The defendants' motions were denied, and accordingly, petitioner and Mr. Gibson, over their objections, were tried as co-defendants in a multi-day trial beginning March 4, 2002. Mr. Terrell testified at the trial as a State witness.
Cooley, 157 Md.App. at 106-07, 849 A.2d at 1029-30 (alterations added).
Following the conclusion of his testimony, Mr. Terrell was excused. The prosecutor and both defense attorneys were participating in an on-the-record bench conference pertaining to trial scheduling when Mr. Terrell, the day's last witness, exited the courtroom. As Mr. Terrell left the courtroom, it was later alleged that he was accompanied in his departure by several sheriff's officers, an occurrence not specifically observed by petitioner's attorney. However, sometime after the jury had been excused for that day, it was brought to that counsel's attention.
Petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial at the commencement of the next day's proceedings based on the belief that Mr. Terrell's alleged departure in the company of sheriff's officers might impact the jury. Mr. Gibson's counsel did not join this motion. Petitioner's counsel argued in support of his motion for mistrial:
Cooley, 157 Md.App. at 112,849 A.2d at 1033 (alteration restores original). In response, the prosecutor argued:
The trial judge denied the motion for mistrial, stating:
As indicated in the Court of Special Appeal's decision, the trial judge continued:
Id. at 113, 849 A.2d at 1033 (bolding omitted) (some alteration original).
On appeal, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the defendants' convictions as well as the denial of the motion for mistrial based in part on its determination, inter alia, that Mr. Gibson's counsel's failure to join in the motion for mistrial constituted an "implied assertion" and was evidence that no unfair prejudice arising from the jury's observation of the sheriffs escorting Mr. Terrell from the courtroom occurred.
A mistrial is no ordinary remedy and "[a] request for a mistrial in a criminal case is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the exercise of its discretion, in a case involving a question of prejudice which might infringe upon the right of the defendant to a fair trial, is reviewable on appeal to determine whether or...
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