Coolidge v. Coolidge

Decision Date31 January 1955
Docket NumberGen. No. 46324 and 46366
Citation4 Ill.App.2d 205,124 N.E.2d 1
PartiesLaetitia K. COOLIDGE, Appellee, v. Winthrop K. COOLIDGE, Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

William C. Wines, Chicago, for appellant.

Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, Francis J. Benda, Chicago, Francis J. Benda and Joseph H. Pleck, Chicago, of counsel, for appellee.

FRIEND, Justice.

On March 11, 1952 the plaintiff, Laetitia K. Coolidge, filed her complaint against the defendant, Winthrop K. Coolidge, for separate maintenance, alleging generally that defendant, disregarding his duties to plaintiff and without just provocation, endangered her health and rendered her life miserable and unendurable, and that she therefore left the matrimonial home on March 11, 1952, and has since lived separate and apart, wholly without fault on her part; that at the time of her marriage she received gifts of money and property from her father which she turned over to defendant to manage; that defendant insisted that it was his right to manage and control her property; that he refused to consult with her concerning the investment of the funds and to account for them, and stated that he was going to change them into his name; that arguments and controversies followed; that as a result of her father's death in 1943 she received a substantial inheritance from his estate, which defendant urged her to permit him to manage and control; that his importunities in this respect continued until prior to the birth of their fifth child in 1944; that following the child's birth plaintiff suffered from a thyroid condition which necessitated surgery; that during her hospitalization defendant continued his demands and importunities, and when she refused to accede to them he cut off her credit in various stores and treated her in such a manner as to cause her great mental anguish; that when she left the hospital she visited her sister in Baltimore for the purpose of convalescing, where defendant followed her and renewed his demands and importunities; that in order to end the quarreling and arguments she finally deposited all her money and property in an agency account in a bank in Baltimore; that defendant bitterly resented her action, shook his fist at her and stated that her conduct had ended their marriage; that he continuously argued and quarreled with her over her property; that he hated her; that he said he was going to fight for the money; and that he subsequently threatened to commit suicide. She further alleged that in the presence of others and of their children he treated her courteously, but when they were alone he sneered at her, refused to answer her, and for the most part ignored her; that following their altercations in 1944 he transferred his belongings from the family bedroom to a back bedroom where he spent most of his time while at home, and talked to plaintiff only when there was some particular urgency for doing so; and that by reason of the 'unbearable and unendurable treatment' of plaintiff, she consulted an attorney in May 1951 who sought, without avail, to effect a reconciliation. As a result of these circumstances she quitted the family home on March 11, 1952, and instituted these proceedings.

Defendant answered, denying these charges. A year later plaintiff filed her amended and supplemental complaint for divorce, charging physical cruelty and constructive desertion. These charges were likewise denied by defendant. The chancellor, after hearing the evidence without a jury, on June 25, 1953 entered a decree finding the defendant guilty of cruelty and of constructive desertion, and granting the plaintiff a divorce. The decree reserved for further adjudication 'the matter of awarding the permanent custody of the five minor children of said parties, the question of child support, alimony, attorney's fees and costs to be paid plaintiff by defendant, and the matter of determining what, if any, articles of household use, furniture, furnishings, books, silverware and other items of personal use, clothing, wearing apparel and the like belong to plaintiff and should be surrendered to her by defendant and all other matters undisposed of.'

Within ninety days after the decree was entered, defendant filed his notice of appeal therefrom. Thereafter supplemental proceedings were had before the chancellor upon the matters reserved in the decree, evidence was adduced in open court, and a supplemental decree was entered on January 21, 1954 finding 'that both plaintiff and defendant are capable, fit and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of any one or all of the five minor children of said parties,' awarding permanent custody of the older daughters, Laetitia, then fifteen, and Deborah Jean, fourteen, to the defendant, permitting the only son, Dexter, ten, to remain with defendant until 'the close of the current school term of the Chicago Latin School in June, 1954,' after which permanent custody of the boy was to be awarded to plaintiff, and awarding permanent custody of the two younger daughters, Olga, eleven, and Control, nine, to plaintiff. The supplemental decree, after making extensive findings as to the relative means and earnings powers of the parties required defendant to pay plaintiff $150 a month, or $1,800 a year, for the support of Olga and Carol, $150 a month, or $1,800 a year, permanent alimony, and $8,000 in ten annual installments of $800 each, with interest at five per cent, an average for the ten-year period of $1,000 a year. In addition, defendant was required to pay for the expenses of all five children while on vacation with their mother, no amount being specified, and all extraordinary medical and dental expenses for Mrs. Coolidge and the children living with her. The supplemental decree awarded to defendant objects d'art and personal effects in his household, and awarded plaintiff her personal wardrobe and other effects. There were also provisions for the division of wedding presents and periods of visitation as to which no questions are raised.

Plaintiff filed notice of appeal from the supplemental decree, and defendant took a cross-appeal therefrom. His appeal from the decree of divorce and plaintiff's appeal, together with defendant's cross-appeal, from the supplemental decree, were here consolidated upon the joint motion and stipulation of the parties; accordingly, the case comes before us upon (1) the defendant's appeal from the decree of divorce, (2) the plaintiff's appeal from the supplemental decree, and (3) the defendant's cross-appeal from the supplemental decree.

A record of more than 2,500 pages embraces the exhibits and evidence adduced upon the hearing. From it appear the following salient facts: The parties were married on July 20, 1935, and of that marriage five children were born. Defendant is a graduate engineer of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is president of Chicago Copper and Chemical Company, the stock of which is held in the Coolidge family. Mrs. Collidge was educated in a New York finishing school, attended Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania, and thereafter studied art in New York, Baltimore and England.

It is conceded that the parties, with their five children, lived together happily until 1944. Thereafter differences arose which will be discussed at greater length hereinafter, leading to separation on March 11, 1952, when plaintiff quitted the family home. They had occupied a seven-room apartment at 219 Lake Shore Drive, in Chicago. The girls attended the Girls Latin School at 59 East Scott Street, and the boy was a student at the Boys Latin School on North Dearborn Street, both locations being in the near-north-side area. Defendant's place of business was in Blue Island, Illinois, southwest of Chicago. The family had a membership in the Saddle and Cycle Club, and plaintiff was at one time a member of the Junior League. During their early married life they were members of the Fourth Presbyterian Church. Sometime prior to their separation plaintiff joined the Moddy Memorial Church. At her request defendant accompanied her to some of its services, but declined to become a member. Subsequently differences arose as to where the children should receive their religious training. At the time the parties were married, plaintiff had received from her father about $50,000, from which she had a monthly income. Defendant's salary was then about $4,000 a year, and he owned a small amount of securities. The subject of finances was first broached by defendant about the time of the marriage, when he commented on the inadequacy of his income; plaintiff thereupon suggested that her income be used to help cover the expenses, and she agreed that defendant could take charge of her securities. She said that she wanted to use her money for the good of the family, and would eventually place it in an agency or trust fund, but meanwhile she would permit defendant to handle it, with the understanding that they discuss its handling together, and that no investment be made without her consent. At the conclusion of the hearing the chancellor remarked that the financial details were significant only insofar as they may form or give the basis for a motive for everything which occurred subsequently, and said that 'if no money had ever come into this house except the ordinary amount to keep it going, it would probably be a happy family.' As the years passed, defendant's earnings, derived principally from his salary, approximated $20,000 annually. Upon the death of plaintiff's father in 1943, she inherited $100,000. The parties are in agreement that at the time of the hearing and of the supplemental decree, plaintiff's estate amounted to about $168,000. Until approximately 1944, the parties had a joint checking account at the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, and kept all their securities and valuable personal belongings in a joint...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Pohren v. Pohren
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 2, 1973
    ...for divorce'. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 284 Ill.App. 297, 1 N.E.2d 777; Bramson v. Bramson, 4 Ill.App.2d 249, 124 N.E.2d 33; Coolidge v. Coolidge, 4 Ill.App.2d 205, 124 N.E.2d 1; Silverstein v. Silverstein, 178 Ill.App. 145. Most cases were decided before mental cruelty was added as a ground in 1......
  • David v. David
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 4, 1968
    ... ... In support of his contention, the defendant cites Coolidge v. Coolidge, 4 Ill.App.2d 205, 124 N.E.2d 1; Bramson v. Bramson, 4 Ill.App.2d 249, 124 N.E.2d 33; and Nusser v. Nusser, 4 Ill.App.2d 538, 124 N.E.2d ... ...
  • Pantle v. Pantle
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 3, 1958
    ... ... , in which case the court reversed on the ground that the plaintiff had made no attempt to corroborate the alleged first act of cruelty, and Coolidge v. Coolidge, 4 Ill.App.2d 205, 124 N.E.2d 1, in which case the plaintiff testified to three acts of cruelty, one occurring four years prior to the ... ...
  • Knox v. Knox
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 13, 1975
    ...that the conduct must endanger life and limb (see Balfour v. Balfour (1959), 20 Ill.App.2d 590, 156 N.E.2d 629; Coolidge v. Coolidge (1955), 4 Ill.App.2d 205, 124 N.E.2d 1), but found that the latter requirement was no longer necessary. We stated at 77 of 31 Ill.App.2d at 662 of 175 'No ref......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT