Coolidge v. Payson
| Decision Date | 21 February 1817 |
| Citation | 15 U.S. 66,4 L.Ed. 185,2 Wheat. 66 |
| Parties | COOLIDGE et. al. v. PAYSON et. al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THIS cause was argued by Mr. Swann, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Winder, for the defendant.
Mr. Ch. J. MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was instituted by Payson & Co., as endorsers of a bill of exchange, drawn by Cornthwaite & Cary, payable to the order of John Randall, against Coolidge & Co. as the acceptors.
At the trial the holders of the bill, on which the name of John Randall was endorsed, offered, for the purpose of proving the endorsement, an affidavit made by one of the defendants in the cause, in order to obtain a continuance, in which he referred to the bill in terms which, they supposed, implied a knowledge on his part that the plaintiffs were the rightful holders. The defendants objected to the bill's going to the jury without further proof of the endorsement; but the court determined that it should go with the affidavit to the jury, who might be at liberty to infer from thence that the endorsement was made by Randall. To this opinion the counsel for the defendants in the circuit court excepted, and this court is divided on the question whether the exception ought to be sustained.
On the trial it appeared that Coolidge & Co. held the proceeds of part of the cargo of the Hiram, claimed by Cornthwaite & Cary, which had been captured and libelled as lawful prize. The cargo had been acquitted in the district and circuit courts, but from the sentence of acquittal, the captors had appealed to this court. Pending the appeal Cornthwaite & Co. transmitted to Coolidge & Co. a bond of indemnity, executed at Baltimore with scrolls in the place of seals, and drew on them for two thousand seven hundred dollars. This bill was also payable to the order of Randall, and endorsed by him to Payson & Co. It was presented to Coolidge & Co. and protested for non-acceptance. After its protest Coolidge & Co. wrote to Cornthwaite & Cary a letter, in which, after acknowledging the receipt of a letter from them, with the bond of indemnity, they say,
On the same day Coolidge & Co. addressed a letter to Mr. Williams, in which, after referring to him the question respecting the legal obligation of the scroll, they say,
In his answer to this letter, Williams says,
On the day on which this letter was written, Cornthwaite & Cary called on Williams, to inquire whether he had satisfied Coolidge & Co. respecting the bond. Williams stated the substance of the letter he had written, and read to him a part of it. One of the firm of Payson & Co. also called on him to make the same inquiry, to whom he gave the same information, and also read from his letter-book the letter he had written.
Two days after this, the bill in the declaration mentioned, was drawn by Cornthwaite & Cary, and paid to Payson & Co. in part of the protested bill of 2,700 dollars, by whom it was presented to Coolidge & Co., who refused to accept it, on which it was protested, and this action brought by the holders.
On this testimony, the counsel for the defendants insisted that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a verdict; but the court instructed the jury, that if they were satisfied that Williams, on the application of the plaintiffs, made after seeing the letter from Coolidge & Co. to Cornthwaite & Cary, did declare that he was satisfied with the bond referred to in that letter, as well with respect to its execution, as to the sufficiency of the obligors to pay the same; and that the plaintiffs, upon the faith and credit of the said declaration, and also of the letter to Cornthwaite & Cary, and without having seen or known the contents of the letter from Coolidge & Co. to Williams, did receive and take the bill in the declaration mentioned, they were entitled to recover in the present action; and that it was no legal objection to such recovery that the promise to accept the present bill was made to the drawers thereof, previous to the existence of such bill, or that the bill had been taken in part payment of a pre-existing debt, or that the said Williams, in making the declarations aforesaid, did exceed the private instructions given to him by Coolidge & Co., in their letter to him.
To this charge, the defendants excepted; a verdict was given for the plaintiffs, and judgment rendered thereon, which judgment is now before this court on a writ of error.
The letter from Coolidge & Co. to Cornthwaite & Cary contains no reference to their letter to Williams which might suggest the necessity of seeing that letter, or of obtaining information respecting its contents. They refer Cornthwaite & Cary to Williams, not for the instructions they had given him, but for his judgment and decision on the bond of indemnity. Under such circumstances, neither the drawers nor the holders of the bill could be required to know, or could be affected by, the private instructions given to Williams. It was enough for them, after seeing the letter from Coolidge & Co. to Cornthwaite & Cary, to know that Williams was satisfied with the execution of the bond and the sufficiency of the obligors, and had informed Coolidge & Co. that he was so satisfied.
This difficulty being removed, the question of law which arises from the charge given by the court to the jury is this: Does a promise to accept a bill amount to an acceptance to a person who has taken it on the credit of that promise, although the promise was made before the existence of the bill, and although it is drawn in favour of a person who takes it for a pre-existing debt?
In the case of Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins, (3 Burr, 1663,) the credit on which the bill was drawn was given before the promise to accept was made, and the promise was made previous to the existence of the bill. Yet in that case, after two arguments, and much consideration, the court of king's bench, (all the judges being present and concurring in opinion,) considered the promise to accept as an acceptance.
Between this case and that under the consideration of the court, no essential distinction is perceived. But it is contended, that the authority of the case of Pillans...
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... ... could not recede. Johnson v. Clark, 39 N.Y. 216; ... Garrettson v. Bank (C. C.) 47 F. 867; Coolidge ... v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66 (4 L.Ed. 185); Exchange Bank ... v. Rice, 98 Mass. 288. Upon this acceptance any one ... dealing with Barnes' check ... ...
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...if the message were authentic, could not recede. Johnson v. Clark, 39 N. Y. 216;Garretson v. Bank (C. C.) 47 Fed. 867;Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66, 4 L. Ed. 185;Exchange Bank v. Rice, 98 Mass. 288. Upon this acceptance any one dealing with Barnes' check or draft had a right to rely, and ......
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Midwest Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Niles & Watters Sav. Bank
...if the message were authentic, could not recede. Johnson v. Clark, 39 N.Y. 216; Garrettson v. Bank (C.C.) 47 F. 867; Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66 (4 L.Ed. 185); Exchange Bank v. Rice, 98 Mass. 288. Upon acceptance, anyone dealing with Barnes' check or draft had a right to rely, and the B......
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